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Risk management plays a vital role in tackling cyber threats within the Cyber-Physical System (CPS) 
for overall system resilience. It enables identifying critical assets, vulnerabilities, and threats and 
determining suitable proactive control measures to tackle the risks. However, due to the increased 
complexity of the CPS, cyber-attacks nowadays are more sophisticated and less predictable, which 
makes risk management task more challenging. This research aims for an effective Cyber Security 
Risk Management (CSRM) practice using assets criticality, predication of risk types and evaluating 
the effectiveness of existing controls. We follow a number of techniques for the proposed unified 
approach including fuzzy set theory for the asset criticality, machine learning classifiers for the risk 
predication and Comprehensive Assessment Model (CAM) for evaluating the effectiveness of the 
existing controls. 
The proposed approach considers relevant CSRM concepts such as threat actor attack pattern, Tactic, 
Technique and Procedure (TTP), controls and assets and maps these concepts with the VERIS 
community dataset (VCDB) features for the purpose of risk predication. Also, the tool serves as an 
additional component of the proposed framework that enables asset criticality, risk and control 
effectiveness calculation for a continuous risk assessment. Lastly, the thesis employs a case study to 
validate the proposed i-CSRM framework and i-CSRMT in terms of applicability. Stakeholder 
feedback is collected and evaluated using critical criteria such as ease of use, relevance, and usability. 
The analysis results illustrate the validity and acceptability of both the framework and tool for an 
effective risk management practice within a real-world environment. 
The experimental results reveal that using the fuzzy set theory in assessing assets' criticality, supports 
stakeholder for an effective risk management practice. Furthermore, the results have demonstrated the 
machine learning classifiers’ have shown exemplary performance in predicting different risk types 
including denial of service, cyber espionage, and Crimeware. An accurate prediction can help 
organisations model uncertainty with machine learning classifiers, detect frequent cyber-attacks, 
affected assets, risk types, and employ the necessary corrective actions for its mitigations. 
 
Lastly, to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing controls, the CAM approach is used, and the result 
shows that some controls such as network intrusion, authentication, and anti-virus show high efficacy 
in controlling or reducing risks. Evaluating control effectiveness helps organisations to know how 
effective the controls are in reducing or preventing any form of risk before an attack occurs. Also, 
organisations can implement new controls earlier. The main advantage of using the CAM approach is 
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The primary objective of CPS is resilienceby delivering its users an uninterrupted services based on 
relying on the most valuable assets such as information and communication networks, and digital 
datafor its continuous reliable service (Almoghathawi, González and Barker, 2021). These assets 
necessitate the attainment of reliability, stability, and performance, all of which necessarily requires 
the tight integration of technological control systems, computing and communication (Kim and 
Kumar, 2013). However, the cyber-physical systems (CPS) complexity and the interdependencies 
among its various components (people, processes, technology, multiple distributed and independently 
operating systems) has made it an excellent target for cybercriminals. Such systems face different 
security threats, including system failures (e.g., device failure, system overload), human errors (e.g., 
lack of access control, medical system configuration error), supply chain failures (e.g., network 
provider failure, power outage) and malicious actions (e.g., malware, hijacking, cyber espionage 
(Jalali and Kaiser, 2018). Cyber-security threats lead to any potential risks, and risks can affect all 
aspects of critical infrastructure. The probability of loss (Dalziell and McManus, 2004) or an 
uncertain occurrence that may occur and affect the organisation's accomplishment of strategic, 
operational, and financial objectives are referred to as risk (Jasmin Harvey and Service, 2007). 
The significance of protecting the critical infrastructure is important since it can strongly affect the 
international market economy and the trust foundations between people and societies. Now, more than 
ever, shielding and securing critical infrastructures is essential, especially in the healthcare sector. The 
COVID19 pandemic has stressed the healthcare sector's requirements since malicious entities 
aggressively exploit this emergency for their benefit. For example, there is a considerable number of 
registered domains on the Internet that contain terms related to keywords, such as "corona", "covid", 
"covid19". While many of them are legitimate and focus on the pandemic, numerous domains are 
used to spread malware via phishing and spam campaigns. Therefore, the presence of any successful 
cyber-attack on the systems causes a devastating effect on the organisation's critical infrastructure, its 
business processes, and availability of its services, reputation and the economy at large.  
On the other hand, the cyber-threat landscape is evolving rapidly because threat actors' motivation and 
goal, attack pattern, "tactics, techniques and procedure (TTP)", tools to breach systems are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated. This affects the understanding of risk, its severity, and cascading risk 
impact level, making risk management challenging for critical infrastructure systems (Fossi et al., 
2011). According to a recent Experian report, almost half of all business organisations experience at 
least one security incident each year (Levin, 2021). That is why global cybersecurity spending is 
continuously rising to 96 billion US dollars in 2018 (Huyghue, 2021).  Despite efforts to develop and 
defend secure systems, large organisations, particularly critical infrastructure, believe their 
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infrastructure is vulnerable. The successful execution of effective cyber-attack is growing with higher 
frequency and on a larger scale. Rather than worrying whether they would be targets of cyber-attacks, 
IT managers need to understand when a cyber-attack occurs and the consequences. Since cyber-
attacks might be inevitable, the problem of risk prediction becomes critical: identifying which areas of 
a given infrastructure are the most vulnerable allows for preventive action, focusing on effective 
controls, and assessing the cascading risk effect is fundamental. Therefore, there is indeed a pressing 
need to gather Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) information such as; information about the threats 
likely to affect the organisation's assets which include; the threat actor's behaviour, used TTP and 
other relevant properties so that risk type can be predicted. Researchers' detailed research on different 
aspects of the cyber-attack problem focuses primarily on these three topics: prevention, detection, and 
analysis.  
However, only a few works proposed prediction models, such as; (Parhizkar, Rafieipour and 
Parhizkar, 2021), (Kure et al., 2021), (Xiong et al., 2021), which allowed for the adoption of 
preventive actions to avoid disruption services. These papers examined the demographics of users' 
(Hanus, Wu and Parrish, 2021), network connectivity behaviour (Aakaash et al., 2021), and web 
browsing behaviour (Yavneh, Lothan and Yamin, 2021), website features (Alqahtani et al., 2020), 
network mismanagement details (Albladi and Weir, 2020) and historical incident reports of 
organisations (Veeramachaneni et al., 2016) to predict cyber incidents. Despite these contributions, no 
work has focused on integrating ML for predicting risk types within a risk management process.  
Additionally, there is a lack of focus on determining asset criticality and evaluating the effectiveness 
of existing controls to improve the overall risk management process. This research shows that many 
critical infrastructures tend to retain cyber-security countermeasures and techniques which have been 
proved inadequate in the past, and at the same time, they resist adapting more efficiently and new 
technologies. In summary, critical infrastructures need a comprehensive risk management approach 
that ensures that their critical assets are adequately secured, threats are correctly predicted, and 
controls are successfully evaluated and implemented. This research contributes to addressing these 
limitations by proposing a practical i-CSRM framework for critical infrastructure.  
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
Academia, researchers and industry experts have given various descriptions, views and challenges of 
critical infrastructure on cybersecurity issues and challenges (De Bruijne and Van Eeten, 2007). 
Studies on identifying critical assets, potential vulnerabilities, likely threat impacts, threat 
identification, and risk management have been proposed in the literature, but they have not been 
addressed extensively. The cornerstone of a secure critical infrastructure is effective risk management 
(Adar and Wuchner, 2005), identifying critical assets, assessing vulnerabilities, and evaluating the 
effects on assets, considering the likelihood of risks is essential. However, the main challenges in 
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existing risk management approaches are due to increased systems complexity, the evolution of the 
risk level, the rapid development of the cyber-attack landscape and affecting the –understanding of 
risk and its severity, human-factor threats that include unintentional security breaches, lack of 
employee awareness and finally lack of CTI adoption. Other challenges include the lack of focus on 
cascading failures interdependency of critical infrastructure components. These problems and several 
others have limited the goal of critical infrastructure to evaluate future risks continuously and to 
prioritise controls at all levels. In order to develop a solution, identified problems from the perspective 
of this research include: 
• Need for a comprehensive CSRM process model for critical infrastructure: The need for a 
comprehensive process that incorporates systematic activities for the implementation of CSRM in 
critical infrastructures is required. Comprehensive risk management is a continuous, dynamic and 
organised approach that helps understand, manage, and communicate risk for an organisation's 
benefit. CPS components are interconnected, and security threats are growing. Therefore, a 
comprehensive risk management framework that provides a holistic overview must help look at 
several components simultaneously. The success of the risk assessment relies on the unique 
features of each component of the infrastructure. 
• Changes in risk level and the lack of new techniques like machine learning for a particular 
risk type prediction: There are difficulties in an accurate prediction of risk type, risk level 
calculation and severity, allowing organisations to prioritise and manage the risk of evolving 
cyber-attack landscape. Proper CSRM for critical infrastructure is an on-going activity that 
enables and facilitates the control and management of organisations' threats. Every existing risk 
cannot be prevented; however, preceding knowledge allows the organisation to make informed 
decisions. Therefore, new techniques like machine learning to detect threat patterns and 
accurately measure risk type and level are needed to improve CSRM activities in critical 
infrastructure. The input features from the CSRM concepts such as threat actor type, location, 
motivation, skill, intended goal, and resource availability, control types, "tactics, techniques and 
pro)," and the asset types are extracted from the available datasets and used into machine learning 
classifiers for predicting the risk type before calculating the risk level. It is thereby speeding up 
the initial risk identification and classification phases in a risk management process. This 
approach helps organisations plan their incident response functions adequately and take 
preventive security threat measures in advance. 
• The need to adopt CTI for improving the overall CSRM: CSRM for critical infrastructure is 
challenging due to the constant changes in a threat actors attack pattern, motivation and intention. 
With this challenge of cyber exploitation and malicious activity becoming increasingly 
sophisticated, threat actors, TTP constantly evolving and impacting individuals and organisations' 
daily activities, it is critical and urgent to gather information about the threats likely to affect their 
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organisation. Existing risk management approaches have not considered the necessity of adopting 
concepts from CTI and other theories for improving CSRM in critical infrastructure. Therefore, 
organisations should adopt CTI for improving CSRM to detect and respond to both known and 
unknown threats and support determining the proper risk level. Integrating CTI to support CSRM 
helps in dealing with the evolving threat actor profile and attack trends, and the organisation can 
make the strategic, tactical and operational decision for improving overall cybersecurity.  
• Lack of focus on cascading effects of cyber-security risk in critical infrastructure 
organisations: Assessing and mitigating cascading effects across critical infrastructure is one of 
the most complex problems in critical infrastructure protection. Cascading impact is caused by 
physical, technological, human or natural disaster failure generating a sequence of other events in 
the system and disrupting services. The initial vulnerability or impact can trigger other 
occurrences that lead to significant consequences; this occurs when critical infrastructure 
components are interdependent.  
• Tool that supports the practical Risk Management activities are required: The overall risk 
management approach involves some complexities, especially risk identification and 
quantification. It requires a reasonable amount of effort for doing the activities under the risks 
management process. Therefore, this research presents i-CSRMT to support the risk management 
activities and minimise the efforts required to perform the risk management activities and provide 
accurate information about the risks. The i-CSRMT can be simultaneously accessed and used by 
multiple users and allows managing numerous different projects simultaneously.  
1.3. Research Questions 
The research questions were developed in response to the literature review and the potential need to 
enhance risk management practice. The rationale behind this study is developing a systematic 
framework that supports organisations with critical infrastructure to adopt CTI to improve i-CSRM 
that detects and responds to both known and unknown threats and supports the use of ML techniques 
to determine the proper risk level. Therefore, this research focuses on providing a framework that 
includes CTI and ML techniques as an integral part of the i-CSRM process for critical infrastructure 
organisations. A current literature review is conducted to identify and summarise the following 
fundamental issues that need to be addressed: 
RQ1: What are the key theoretical concepts (such as CTI) necessary for improving i-CSRM for 
critical infrastructure protection?  
RQ2: How can organisations systematically implement the i-CSRM framework? 
RQ3: How can organisations use Machine learning techniques to predict risk types to support i-
CSRM activities accurately?  
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In response to the research questions mentioned above, this research develops an i-CSRM framework 
that allows for a comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity risk management for critical 
infrastructure. The framework offers a collection of concepts and a process that are interrelated to 
enhance the performance of critical assets, their vulnerabilities, threats, and risks in critical 
infrastructures by providing: 
i. A comprehensive understanding of i-CSRM and the concepts is needed to achieve the 
overall protection of critical infrastructure. This is achieved by integrating CTI concepts 
extensively for improving existing risk management and cybersecurity practice. We 
consider several concepts relating to CTI such as threat actor, TTP, indicator, and incident 
and integrate them with CSRM concepts such as threat, actor, vulnerabilities, assets, 
controls and risks. 
ii. An implementable process to support critical infrastructures. 
iii. To enable the automation of risk type prediction, we are introducing a machine learning 
framework. The framework takes data, builds the features, applies machine learning 
algorithms and gives results.  
1.4. Research Aim and Objectives 
This research proposes and develops an i-CSRM framework for an effective risk management practice 
within critical infrastructures to improve critical assets protection and resilience. The objectives are 
listed below: 
RO1: Develop an i-CSRM framework that adopts theoretical concepts to improve CSRM to protect 
critical infrastructures.  
RO2: Proposes a process for i-CSRM activities that can be implemented based on current industry 
standards, frameworks, and models. The process includes evaluating the effectiveness of existing 
controls and recommending new control actions in areas where security improvement is needed to 
protect their systems from potential cyber-security risks and threats. A real-life case study is used to 
investigate the usability of the proposed framework. 
RO3: Integration of techniques such as machine learning for risk prediction and accurate information 
about the risk impact level.  
RO4: Develop a dedicated integrated cybersecurity risk management tool (i-CSRMT) that automates 
the overall i-CSRM process enabling organisations to continuously identify and quantify risks within 
a reasonable amount of time.  
RO5: Propose the use of fuzzy logic for the purpose of assest assessment in a critical infrastructure.  
1.5. Contribution of the Research  
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The research has made significant contributions by developing a comprehensive framework that 
incorporates various concepts and improves risk management across critical infrastructure. This novel 
and state of the art framework respond to the research problems and questions. The following are the 
study's four novel contributions: 
I. Contribution 1: The i-CSRM framework contributes to the existing state of the art literature 
with its novel approach that comprises of concepts developed by integrating the existing risk 
management concepts with the STIX model concepts. Furthermore, the frameworks process 
consists of a systematic collection of activities and steps that expresses the conceptual 
framework into strategies, plans, and actions that critical infrastructure can use to achieve risk 
management. The framework further evaluates the effectiveness of existing controls within the 
process, and this effectively determines suitable risk mitigation actions for controlling the risks. 
We apply a set of criteria used to compare evidence by following the proposed comprehensive 
assessment model. 
II. Contribution 2: The i-CSRM framework proposes using machine learning within the i-CSRM 
activities to predict risk types and improve the overall risk management process. The framework 
integrates CTI (STIX) with CSRM concepts such as threat actor, assets, controls and TTP, then 
applies these features to the different machine learning classifiers and then gives results. In 
general, the model: 
o For predicting risk type, we explore the suitability of the machine learning algorithms 
to identify the risk type, thus giving organisations an early warning to plan ahead of the 
threat actor to prevent a powerful attack from occurring. 
o We carried out an extensive experimental evaluation of seven (LR, RF, NB-Multi, NB, 
DT, NN and KNN) machine learning algorithms to evaluate each algorithm's 
effectiveness. 
o Displays the best algorithm with a higher accuracy value in predicting risk type.  
III. Contribution 3: The development of an integrated i-CSRM tool (i-CSRMT) to help risk 
management activities is the thesis' third contribution. The tool's objective is to minimise the 
efforts required to perform the risk management activities and provide accurate information 
about the risks to implement the appropriate controls. It provides a comprehensive workflow to 
guide the organisation through individual activities, starting with defining the organisational 
context and applying risk controls. Moreover, it also integrates methods for risk calculation to 
reveal hazardous threats. Therefore the tool aims for an effective risk management practice 
within critical infrastructure. Furthermore, this research evaluates the proposed frameworks 
applicability on a real-life case study to solve existing problems. The evaluation result indicates 
that the proposed i-CSRM framework can sufficiently support organisations to be more risk-
informed and address risks within the organisation's significant complexity. Integrating machine 
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learning with the i-CSRM framework allows faster detection of threats, alerting of risk, and 
providing appropriate controls in managing overall risks. It also supports making practical 
suggestions for the improvement of the i-CSRM framework. 
1.6. Empirical Evaluation 
The significant contributions of this research are evaluated using empirical methods. Firstly, to 
determine the framework's usefulness; a case study approach is combined with action research. 
Combining action research and case study enables the framework to be implemented in real-life 
contexts. This includes; collecting data through the participation and collaboration of stakeholders 
within the study contexts. A case study is an in-depth study investigating real-life context 
challenges(Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead, 1987). The three main reasons for using a case study in the 
world of information management (Walsham, 1995) are to; 1; enable a researcher better to understand 
an information system in its natural setting andgenerate conclusions from practice, 2; supports a 
researcher to answer the "how" and "why" questions for establishing clear findings, and 3; enable the 
researcher to study the complexity of a process that is being followed. Therefore, this research 
employed a case study to implement our proposed framework, collecting feedback regarding the 
study's validity and areas that require improvement.The third chapter provides a comprehensive 
overview of the research methodology, design, and evaluation used in this research. 
1.7. Outline of the Thesis 
The first chapter discusses the background and motivation for this study and the critical research 
questions. The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter Two: This chapter discusses the relevant literature relating to risk management practices for 
critical infrastructure, background knowledge, discussion, identification of existing gaps and the 
motivation of the i-CSRM framework.  
Chapter Three:This chapter outlines the research methodology used to address the research 
objectives and validate the proposed framework's applicability. 
Chapter Four: The main contribution of this research is presented in this chapter. It presents the 
proposed framework development, which includes a conceptual model upon which this research is 
based.This chapter supports a better understanding and identifying the fundamental concepts of the 
research area for this thesis. By developing research questions and research objectives, identifying 
ideas is easier because it determines what information is needed and how it relates to the research 
area's scope. 
Chapter Five: Another vital contribution of this research is process development. This chapter 
outlines the proposed framework's approach, as well as systemic activities and steps.Organisations 
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who wants to implement the framework and understand their cybersecurity status can adopt these 
activities and steps. 
Chapter Six: This chapter describes and outlines the i-CSRMT tool's architectural layout, 
functionality and specifications, and a description of the tool. 
Chapter Seven: This chapter presents the evaluation of the i-CSRM framework. The various 
approaches adopted for validating the research are presented in this chapter. The validation process 
delivers the methods and procedures used to acquire the necessary information to assess the proposed 
framework's ability to satisfy the research aim and questions.  
Chapter Eight: This chapter discusses the i-CSRM framework compared to other literature works 
and presents the basis for identifying the frameworks applicability and necessary improvement.  
Chapter Nine: The conclusion chapter highlights the significant contributions of this thesis and 





Figure 1.1: Thesis Structure 
1.8. Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the thesis's research framework, describes the problem domain that needs to be 
addressed, and the current measures utilised to tackle the challenges and how it aims to overcome 
those issues. The chapter also included a list of important research questions that would be addressed 
throughout the thesis. The research's contributions to answering the research questions are also 






Background and Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
A common understanding of the research area's critical aspects, including an outline of risk 
management is essential for the research background. The researchers addressed the primary security 
concerns in risk management and the types of controls for dealing with these issues. The chapter also 
discusses relevant works that follow a similar approach to the one included in this work. As a result, 
the first section of the chapter provides the context for risk management. The second section includes 
related works in cybersecurity, risk management in CPS, risk predictions leveraging machine learning 
algorithms, risk management frameworks/standards/guidelines and case study,  techniques for risk 
assessment, many of which are similar to the methodology suggested in this report. Also, the study of 
related works provides a summary of the limitations of each methodology. The literature review lets 
the reader consider existing challenges, potential strategies, and the limitations of the present state of 
risk management. 
It is essential to provide a common understanding of the research area’s crucial aspects, including an 
overview of risk management. The chapter presented the primary security issues in risk management 
and controls for addressing these issues.  The chapter also presents related works that are similar to 
the approach pursued in this work. Hence, the first part of the chapter provides the background of risk 
management. The second part consists of related works in the area of cybersecurity, risk management 
in CPS, risk predictions using machine learning techniques, risk management 
frameworks/standards/guidelines, case studies and cascading impact/effects techniques for risk 
assessment, all of which have similarities with the approach proposed in this research.  Also, the 
review of related works includes a narration of the limitations associated with each technique. The 
literature study gives the reader an understanding of existing problems, proposed solutions and 
weaknesses of the current state of the art in risk management.  
2.1. Overview of Critical Infrastructure Systems 
Traditionally, societies have depended on a broad of services alongside the infrastructures that 
provide them. Over time, some of these infrastructures have become critical and vital to the 
community to support life every day. Critical infrastructure has evolved as an essential component in 
modern societies, especially in handling tasks that are typically dependent on reliable and secure 
operation. These are socio-technical systems, and they offer services to the community. They are 
considered relevant for the regular and daily functioning of the community. The critical 
infrastructures systems are considered assets and systems that can be either physical or virtual so that 
26 
 
different countries depend on these infrastructures for thriving (Ellinas et al., 2015). Monitoring, 
controlling, and enhancing these infrastructures’ security are incredibly critical to avoid disrupting 
their effectiveness.  
These critical infrastructures constitute individual subsystems that escalate life in the community. 
Destruction or incapacity of the essential infrastructure systems is said to have a debilitating impact 
on the national economy, security, national health or public safety, or a combination of all these 
matters. Control and monitoring of critical infrastructures are essential to avoid operational disruption 
and normal operations due to component faults, attacks or even natural disasters. The US Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) presently describes a critical infrastructure as “systems and assets, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national 
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters”. “A critical infrastructure at the 
European Union level specified in a Council Directive defines critical infrastructure as “an asset, 
system or part thereof located in the Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital 
societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption 
or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member state as a result of the failure to 
maintain those functions.”  
When critical infrastructure systems are well secured, this can help them resist internal and external 
disturbances, and they are also able to operate on an acceptable efficiency level even when several 
disturbances occur. To improve the resilience of critical infrastructure systems, this is the main 
objective of the stakeholders. Essential systems of infrastructure resilience are considered a practical 
and sustainable application of critical infrastructures by all the stakeholders to undertake tasks for the 
citizens, the government, and the economy. The following activities leading to the essential systems 
of infrastructure resilience have been proposed. 
• Preparation of the critical infrastructure systems specification based on the structural 
analysis- the essential elements and vulnerable points, dependencies and interdependencies 
are identified.  
• Running a dynamic analysis to help in the identification of most critical risk scenarios-
generally, the subject of research or simulation is the propagation of the consequential 
impacts of essential systems of infrastructure phenomena, an identification of the effects of 
threats, analysis of the common failures, and system response to a loss.  
• The most challenging risk scenarios are prioritised, and those taken into account later during 
risk management.  
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2.2. Critical Infrastructure Domains 
There are different categories of critical infrastructure systems. Each of these categories is found to be 
essential to the development and welfare of society. Without a significant operation and functioning 
of these segments in the organisation, this can deter the service scope and the government’s 
effectiveness to run the community's day-to-day governance. There are varying accounts of the 
critical infrastructure classifications, which determines the sort of role that it plays in our lives- with 
the United States President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) as a pivot 
element in categorising critical infrastructural systems (Moteff, Copeland and Fischer, 2003). A 
PCCIP report, as cited in (Moteff, 2005) proposed eight classifications of essential systems of 
infrastructure, including; 
• Information and Communications- handles information follow within every society. 
• Electricity and Power Systems- the sectors that handle the central generation of lighting 
across all society parts. 
• Oil and Gas- this sector dictates the availability of natural resources for energy 
development that will run other critical industries. 
• Transportation and Storage- the sector is relevant to the movement of consumable 
goods that can sustain any nation’s feeding situation.  
• Banking and Finance- the sector is critical to the value of financial stability within any 
society.  
• Transportation- This includes all the various systems like the airline, trains, cars 
waterways that allow for smooth movement of people from one location to another. 
• Water Supply System- distributes potable water throughout any society. 
• Emergency Service and Government Services- all quick response lines to emergencies 
such as the ambulance services, fire fighting service 
Various domains and sectors such as the power grid, healthcare, information technology, 
communication, and food and agriculture have critical variant infrastructures, and they may find a 
top-down risk assessment framework to be essential to their effectiveness (Committee, 2010). Risk 
management is a routine in most organisations. Many organisations avoid cyber-attacks, financial 
loss, fraud or a failure to meet production expectations by implementing risk management strategies 
to prevent such events. A successful organisation relies on many factors; the influence of these factors 
varies from domain to domain. Therefore, this section describes the critical infrastructure of various 
domains, their limitations, security challenges and characteristics. The information gathered for each 
critical infrastructure domain is needed for the successful risk management process as well as the 
threat modelling activity in chapter five 
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2.2.1. Healthcare Infrastructure 
A risk management platform’s success in the health care system depends on creating and maintaining 
safe care systems to reduce opposing events and improve human performance (Organization and 
Control, 2008). However, healthcare systems, like other critical infrastructure domain, face threat-
related issues. These issues include; malicious actions (hijacking, cyber espionage, malware), system 
failures (device failure, system overload), human errors (misidentification, medication errors, medical 
system configuration error, lack of access control), supply chain failures (power outage, network 
provider failure) (Argaw et al., 2020). Protecting healthcare systems is essential because it affects the 
international market economy as well as peoples trust. Looking at the recent COVID 19 pandemic 
situation, the healthcare systems has become a target for threat actors by exploiting the systems for 
their selfish interest.  
Effective risk management at every level of the health service can reduce potential risks. Risk 
management in the health care system is explicitly concerned with improving the quality and safety of 
healthcare services with the help of risk management processes to identify the circumstances and 
opportunities that may put patients at risk of harm and then act to prevent or control those risks. Risk 
management has become an integral part of the healthcare administration. Therefore, serious 
consideration to implementing and supporting risk management programs to protect their assets and 
minimise financial losses is recommended  (Singh and Ghatala, 2012). 
2.2.2. Power Grid Infrastructure 
This section offers a high-level description of the power grid structure. As seen in Figure 2.1, the 
infrastructure comprises three major components: a power plant, a transmission substation, and a 
distribution grid. The power grid is a network of power lines and related infrastructure that transmits 
and distributes energy around a geographical region. Transportation, distribution networks, sanitation, 
power, and public services such as colleges, clinics, post offices, and even prisons are examples of 
such facilities (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004). The electric sector's cyber-physical systems include 
industrial control systems (ICS), which enable digital control of machinery's physical operations. 
Whereas generation machinery such as turbines was once only manually regulated, equipment is now 
primarily protected and managed by ICS synchronously, by automation, and sometimes remotely. 
Because of technical advances, most power grids are becoming highly susceptible to cyber-attacks. 
Modernization activities of older grid system elements to integrate new digital automation, or smart 
grid innovations, have culminated in a more significant number of Internet protocol (IP) powered grid 
network access points(Yan et al., 2012). The convergence of information technology (IT) and 
operational technology (OT) in ICS broadens the cyber vulnerability environment by adding new 
threat vectors due to improved device communication. Networks may become less reliable when 
constantly reconfigured to provide one-time access for a particular purpose or ease and are never fully 
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restored. Remotely available infrastructure is much more prone to public discovery via unsecured 
networks or the Internet.  According to (Amin, 2011), each structure of the US power grid 
(generation, transmission, and distribution) presents analogous and distinct risks to the reliable 
delivery of electricity through cyber-physical properties. 
 
Figure 2.1: An overview of the Power Grid System 
2.2.3. Transport Infrastructure 
The transport infrastructure also faces some security challenges that could negatively impact its 
operations like the other critical infrastructure domain. Some of the challenges faced by the transport 
binding infrastructure domain are:  
• The effectiveness of the existing controls is not being continuously checked and adequately. 
Existing controls need to be checked continuously, recorded and observed to identify those 
controls that are not meeting the requirement and additional controls that need to be 
implemented.  
• Lack of cybersecurity information sharing amongst the critical infrastructure domains.  
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• Most transportation networks come with many legacy systems that pose a severe security 
threat to the organisation's functionality beneath, mainly due to obsolete security controls and 
mechanisms that initially aimed to prevent product theft and tampering. Over the last few 
years, however, the transport critical infrastructure shift to an interconnected version of 
themselves, making unnecessary and potentially dangerous such systems' co-existence. 
2.2.4. Financial Infrastructure 
Financial misadventures in financial and non-financial companies and government institutions are 
creating financial crises, demonstrating the need for risk management in different ways. In most 
regulatory agencies, poor risk control is avital issue. By identifying key risks, obtaining consistency, 
understandability, operational risk measures, choosing the risks to reduce and which to increase and 
by what means, and establishing procedures to monitor the resulting risk position, risk management is 
the process by which managers satisfy; reliable risk measures, estimate the size of potential losses, 
and mechanisms to monitor risks (Pyle, 1999). In the banking industry, risk control helps manage 
liquidity, credit, business, operational, and foreign exchange threats (Županović, 2014). Risk 
management is the method of safeguarding investments and reducing financial loss for a company. 
Risk management includes practices to reduce the incidence and intensity of unpredictable events, 
mitigate harm, and foster a high-reliability performance framework(Singh and Ghatala, 2012). 
2.2.5. Telecommunication Networks 
Unauthorized individuals may gain access to private information and critical infrastructure through 
computer networks, satellite communication systems, and connections. One of the critical networking 
infrastructures that pose significant security threats is satellite networks. Attacks on networks, such as 
DoS (Distributed Denial of Service), may make corporate and military communications inaccessible 
at crucial periods, stopping legal clients from accessing essential resources (Abouzakhar, 2013). 
2.2.6. Software Development Projects 
Software development is a knowledge activity that requires a wide range of technical advances and 
necessitates a high degree of expertise. Because of these and other reasons, the amount of danger 
involved with each project operation is vital to a project's performance. It is not enough to be mindful 
of the threats as a project manager. There are aspects of complexity in undertaking a good software 
development project. This is what is referred to as a project chance. Project leadership must recognise, 
evaluate, prioritise, and address all significant risks for a software development project to succeed. 
Choosing a software development approach and related activities is a significant and inherently 
dangerous choice for a software development team (Selby, 2007). Increased consumer loyalty, 
reduced failure rates, quicker production cycles, and a response to quickly evolving specifications are 
all commitments offered by agile processes. Agile processes are iterative. 
31 
 
Systems Development (SD) projects are carried out by many organisations yearly. Software 
development activities require extensive resources such as time, personnel, and money with complex 
inter-organisational development processes and sophisticated technical requirements  (Warkentin et 
al., 2009). Businesses rely on software growth. In most cases, software projects have been carried out 
in an unpredictable environment that is likely to have drawbacks that harm a business’s successful 
result. Evaluation of projects that have been carried out has revealed that most projects that did not 
succeed were already expected to fail. A successful project is only successful if it meets functionality, 
reliability, maintainability, portability, efficiency, integration and operability and delivered on time 
and within the expected budget. Just a few projects are completed on-time and within budget, but 
most of the projects are either cancelled or changed. The high failure in managing risk when 
developing a software project is due to managers not taking suitable measures to assess and manage 
the risk involved in software projects (Addison and Vallabh, 2002). 
2.3. Critical Infrastructure Interdependency 
Critical infrastructure systems have three primary levels that are constituted in a vertical 
classification. These are the system level, the sector level, and the element level. The system level is 
considered the basic level, given its functions. It comprises of the socio-economic infrastructure and 
the technical infrastructure. The technical infrastructure encompasses the sectors that produce and 
provide specific products such as water supply and energy or technical services such as transport 
(Elmaghraby and Losavio, 2014). The socio-economic infrastructures are composed of the type of 
sectors that provide financial or social services. These include healthcare, currency and financial 
markets, public administration and emergency services. The sector level comprises the subsectors and 
the individual sectors that are mainly found in critical infrastructure. This level usually presents the 
classification of distinct sectors together with their mutual links. The transportation sector, for 
instance, is made up of different subsectors such as energy, water, and inland waterways transport 
(Elmaghraby and Losavio, 2014). The vital specific elements that form the element level are 
considered the building blocks of critical infrastructure.  
A critical infrastructure system must be considered comprehensively, considering the networked 
arrangement whereby the individual subsystems are connected through different linkages. Like any 
other complex system, a critical infrastructure system has various elements with varying levels of 
importance. Once a risk faces them, a threat or any vulnerability can lead to a situation where the 
national system is failing. A structural arrangement also leads to creating a broad correlate between 
the individual subsystems that helps determine the intensity and propagate the impact that critical 
infrastructures have on society. Failure of critical infrastructures is vital to society as they are the 
lifeline and the support systems that are called upon to facilitate societal growth and development 
(Fischer, 2014). Thus, risk management in the critical infrastructure is crucial, and it necessitates 
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governments to take cybersecurity measures that help to safeguard these essential systems of 
infrastructure.  
2.3.1. Interdependency of Critical infrastructure Domains 
According to (Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly, 2001), four types of interdependencies are recognised 
for critical infrastructure domains. From the operational perspective, a critical infrastructure domain 
such as the healthcare domain relies on the correct functioning of other critical infrastructure domain, 
such as the power grid, telecommunication systems, banking sector and water supply. They may or 
may not be directly connected to the healthcare system, but they are considered critical infrastructure 
in the healthcare sector and their correct operation must be guaranteed. Due to the relationships 
between the infrastructures, each is correlated to the other's state since they are directly correlated. 
These are typically referred to as interdependencies, and they range from cyber, physical, logical and 
geographical inter-dependency. The four types of interdependencies include: 
i. Physical interdependency: A situation where the operations of one infrastructure depend 
on the material output of another. 
ii. Cyber interdependency: Depending on information conveyed through an information 
set-up. 
iii. Geographic interdependency: When the dependence is basically about the 
environmental impact that affects several infrastructures simultaneously. 
iv. Logical interdependency: When the dependency cannot be categorised as either 
physical, cyber or geographic. 
2.3.2. Asset Interdependency within a Critical Infrastructure Domain 
Complex ecosystems of interconnected devices in the different domains are presented in this section. 
From the operational perspectives, critical infrastructure assets rely on the correct functioning of other 
vital elements. Several standards propose asset taxonomy for important infrastructure sectors such as 
ENISA (Argaw et al., 2020). For example, databases that store patients' sensitive information in a 
healthcare critical infrastructure domain, such as personal and contact information, credit card details, 
examinations’ results, prescriptions, and video records from surveillance cameras, are interdependent, 
as shown in Figure 2.2. Other complex devices that are interconnected and are interdependent include 
(Mrabet et al., 2020); 
• Computers, network printers and scanners 
• Firewalls, intrusion detection systems, routers 
• Vital signs monitoring systems monitor and analyse most of the patient vital signs while 
being connected to the corporate network.  
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• Specialised equipment, such as ultrasounds, X-rays and electrocardiographs, are connected to 
the corporate network with files stored in databases for each patient. 
• IP telephony and telecommunication infrastructure. 
• Cloud services 
• Industrial control systems (e.g., temperature, access control) 
Therefore, investigating how each asset is protected against cyber-attacks is crucial. It is vital to 
identify and categorise vulnerabilities and threats associated with each asset to secure these assets by 
examining the attack surface. Some of the consequences that can be presented are loss of personally 
identifiable information (PII), patient treatment errors and inaccessibility to other patient data. In the 
healthcare sector, all these consequences can potentially lead to economic effects (e.g., forensic and 
system recovery service fees), reputation demolition, service inconveniences and, in the worst case, 
loss of lives (Fournaris, Pocero Fraile and Koufopavlou, 2017). These assets must be secured and 
protected using authorisation techniques and access control systems. 
 
Figure 2.2: Interdependency of Assets 
2.3.3. Cascading Impact/effect 
The cascading impact is an inevitable and often unexpected series of events required to trigger the 
next case. The study of cascading effects is a central challenge in critical infrastructure security since, 
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considering the limited risk of specificincidents, they may have catastrophic implications for several 
critical infrastructures. A cascading impact happens when one infrastructure's failure impacts one or 
more elements in another infrastructure, allowing the second infrastructure to be partly or wholly 
inaccessible (Kotzanikolaou, Theoharidou and Gritzalis, 2013). Due to the common-cause failure, 
each of the concurrently failed infrastructures may lead to multiple cascading chains of their 
dependent infrastructure failures. As a result, significant effort is required to research cascading 
effects and examine cascading impact management and defence ((Wang, Zhang and Gan, 2016).  
Cascading failure occurs in power grids where one of the components fails entirely or partly, causing 
the load to be transferred to neighbouring elements in the system. Those surrounding elements are 
then forced beyond their range, causing them to become overwhelmed and transfer their load to other 
elements. Cascading failure is a typical effect in high voltage networks in which a single point of 
failure (SPF) on a completely loaded or slightly overloaded circuit results in a sudden point through 
all system nodes. This surge current will trigger already overloaded nodes to malfunction, creating 
additional overloads and bringing the whole device down in a matter of seconds. This failure phase 
cascades through the system's elements and persists until significantly all of the system's elements are 
corrupted, and the system is functionally disconnected from its load source. For example, under some 
circumstances, a broad power grid will fail due to a single transformer's failure. 
2.4. Risk Assessment Overview 
The risk analysis patterns enable an organisation's management, the information needed to allow 
sound judgments regarding cybersecurity. Risk analysis procedure indicates the obtainable security 
controls, computes susceptibilities and appraises the impact of the threats on all vulnerability areas.  
(Ivanenko, 2020) notes that risks can be considered regarding possibilities and potential consequences 
with similar definable elements that encompass the settings, assumptions, metrics, and procedures that 
ensure risk assessments add to a combined indulgence amid critical infrastructure partners. Distinct 
risk assessment methods help develop an appraisal plan that ends up in proper, scenario-based 
outcomes and susceptibility calculations, along with assessing the possibility that a suggested threat of 
hazard will happen. Significant risk analysis terminology includes the following: 
i. Asset- any infrastructure with significance and requires protection. 
ii. Threat- an activity or activity with capability in the future to create damage. 
iii. Vulnerability- a situation of exposed weakness. Where vulnerability is not discussed, 
there will be no need to develop frameworks for threat activities. 
iv. Countermeasure- Any device or activity aimed at vulnerability reduction. 
v. Expected loss- the imaginably accepted negative effect of assets due to threat execution.  
A security risk analysis is the overall consideration of interrelating assets, threats, exposures, and 
countermeasures to ascertain the current risk level. The degree of risk that remains after looking at all 
35 
 
countermeasures inclusive of vulnerability levels and relative threats is known as residual risk. In 
practicality, it is the residual risk that has to be accepted or reduced to a point where it can be 
accepted. When there is a threat within an infrastructure’s system, it targets vulnerabilities creating 
loss where there are no countermeasures to handle attacks. Asset protection is the last goal of risk 
analysis to reduce threat actions' impacts through residual risk. 
 
Figure 2.3: Threat, vulnerability, countermeasures and asset relationship (Jenkins, 1998) 
A security risk analysis is an approach used in calculating the risk to computer-related assets and loss 
attributed to an existing threat. An asset's vulnerability first determines threat analysis by identifying 
and evaluating the impact of countermeasures set in place. An infrastructure’s level of vulnerability to 
any threat solely depends on the controls/safeguards in place at the time risk analysis has been done 
(Zografopoulos et al., 2021). Risk analysis assessments are also aligned to initiating an economic 
balance between the exposure to risk and the consequential impact of these risks. At the core of 
selecting practical and cost-friendly protective approaches to risk assessments, it is premeditated that 
the cost of dealing with a specific risk should not exceed the maximum loss associated with the risk. 
Research by (George and Renjith, 2021) argued that the decision to establish risk assessment 
measures and countermeasures might be motivated by the critical infrastructure system's relevance. 
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Thus, risk analysis created for particular assets are demarcated as vital infrastructure, tested and 
substantiated. This is a process that is indicated in the above linear approach.  
2.4.1. Need for Risk Assessment in Critical Infrastructure 
Governments must protect their essential critical infrastructures against natural disasters, terror 
activities and very recently, cyber-attacks. The management of risks is a shared responsibility among 
all the stakeholders in the critical infrastructure. These stakeholders include the industry partners, 
governments, non-government organisations and first responders. According to  (Lewis, 2019), the 
organisations handling high power transmissions need to integrate security to initiate proper disaster 
preparedness, response and recovery. Accessibility to cyber-attacks on such critical infrastructures in 
industries like electricity, transportation, and centralised water system services is daily exposed to 
risk. Such attacks can have detrimental effects, threatening global economies and general lifestyle. 
The success of critical infrastructure security ideology depends on reliable and meaningful 
partnerships groomed between government and commercial institutions. Success also depends on the 
various implementation process and timing (Trigaux et al., 2021). It is essential to identify the risks 
that could impact critical infrastructure networks' reliability because hackers or terrorist threats are 
inevitable. The stakeholders also need to consider other vital aspects such as human error, failure of 
equipment and natural causes. When choosing resolutions that assist in detecting and identifying 
security risks and malfunctions in systems behaviour, it is necessary to include as many of the risks 
that stand a chance to affect the infrastructure (Sasaki, 2020).  
According to research by (Tweneboah-Koduah and Buchanan, 2018), the modern connected network 
processes and systems can be a danger to the system control space. This is grounded on the fact that 
the use of logic-based electrical systems increases risk susceptibility. System protocols such as 
Control Net, Device Net, Serial Modus, and Profibus are based on vendor-specific technologies and 
use different operating systems and internet protocols in overlooking, controlling, and monitoring 
control operations. The incumbent knowledge of taking measures to safeguard the critical 
infrastructure has been a critical research interest by different researchers. Research by (Kumar et al., 
2021) finds that developing physical boundaries is critical around critical assets. However, among the 
interconnected critical infrastructures, striking a difference between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ is 
challenging since most infrastructural resources have become technologically interconnected and 
dependent. This has led to the improvement of the complexity of the system. Research by (Argyroudis 
et al., 2020) showcases those security risks relative to the critical infrastructure. They argue that there 
are physical, logical and technological defects in the networking infrastructures that may affect the 
effectiveness of the critical infrastructures 
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2.4.2. Risk Management methodologies for Critical Infrastructure 
This study's central concept is risk assessment, risk management for critical infrastructure, and 
machine learning classification to predict risk. These concepts are essential to this thesis's nature and 
are aligned to completing the primary objectives, characteristics, and functions. Different literature 
studies define “risk analysis” as a management development to curtail the minuets number of negative 
surprises from happening inside a system (Lavanya and Malarvizhi, 2008). Since security attempts 
usually do not ensure total protection against all forms of threats- risk analysis is utilised and 
expatiated adequately in this thesis. Conducting a risk analysis is crucial as it helps understand where 
the risks can be identified and make a general consideration of the affected assets. When 
infrastructure is affected by risks, this creates vulnerabilities that amount to losses. To safeguard 
infrastructures from risks, this necessitates assets protection and uses a standard framework to guide 
the implementation of measures and safeguards. Alongside the vulnerabilities, understanding the 
source of the attacks through risk analysis helps to calculate the risks and the losses and the 
consequential impact.  
(Lewis, 2019) finds that effective risk management on critical infrastructure systems depends on the 
critical infrastructure community's ability to engage different and shared understanding of risk and 
integrate a wide range of activities to manage risk. In the United Kingdom, there has been a 
development of measures and cross-sector risk management plans associated with understanding how 
risks in critical infrastructure systems should be managed. In different countries, governments make 
sure that they applaud the responsibility to safeguard the essential systems of infrastructure from 
terror activities, natural disasters, and in most cases, cyber-attacks (Leita and Dacier, 2012). 
2.4.1.1. Risk Management Tools  
Risk management tools also play an essential role in increasing risk management processes/activities 
and decreasing dependence on each particular risk assessment expert's expertise. When working with 
Critical Infrastructures, specific resources' contribution becomes much more critical and may even be 
critical for effective Risk Management. A single expert is unlikely to contend with the variety and 
sophistication of knowledge needed to properly perform a critical infrastructure security risk 
evaluation (Adar and Wuchner, 2005). 
There are different distinct types of tools used for managing risk in all the risk management processes. 
These tools allow planners to explicitly address uncertainty by identifying and generating metrics, 
prioritizing, developing responses, tracking risk from components, task or cost. The purpose of the 
tools is mainly automatically performing the risk management activities; produce the output from the 
activities. Logically, people like to be creative and create a methodology and tool at a low cost that 
meets the business needs (Hawk and Kaushiva, 2014). Below is a list of tools used for managing risk: 
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• IRAM (Information Risk Analysis Methodology) Tool: IRAM is designed for business-led 
information risk analysis methodology. IRAM provides tools to businesses for impact 
evaluation, threat and vulnerability assessment, and control selection. However, since IRAM 
is not a web-based automated solution, it does not have resources for continuous tracking and 
risk report status and workflow to handle unnecessary threats. IRAM is an excellent tool for 
analyzing risk, but it is not designed to quantify residual risk and cannot independently 
provide important information on residual risk status because of its centralized and 
aggregated manner. Therefore IRAM needs to be combined with a tool that can calculate 
residual risk status and provide strong risk monitoring and reporting capabilities (Creasey and 
Marvell, 2013) 
• STREAM (Strategies Risk-based Enterprise Assurance Management) Tool: Acuity risk 
management provides an attractive, low-cost alternative to spreadsheets for governance, risk 
and compliance (GRC), scalable from free single-user to Enterprise-wide deployment for the 
most prominent organisations. STREAM has the advantage in that its framework mappings 
allow Controls to be mapped to Asset Classes and Threats. Each time an Asset is added to an 
asset class, STREAM will automatically map all relevant controls and threats to the Asset 
(Asset is a term used in STREAM to represent a component of the target scope for risk 
management) (Creasey and Marvell, 2013). However, it does not take any risk predictions.  
• Critical Infrastructure Risk Assessment Support (CIRAS) Approach: The CIRAS 
approach aims to create a methodology and tool to help in the selection of Critical 
Infrastructure protection measures by taking into consideration the effect of traditional CI 
incidents such as interdependence, cascading, and escalation of the incident. The CIRAS 
strategy is unusual in that it requires a systematic evaluation of all facets of C.I.s protection 
policies, including the anticipated risk mitigation and its expense, as well as financial benefits 
(Bialas, 2016a).  
2.4.3. Threat Analysis  
Threat anlysis is the process of moving topics from unknown unknowns to known ones when the risk 
is fully implicit and alleviated (Chismon and Ruks, 2015). The report considers four different CTI 
types, including strategic, operational, tactical and technical. (Barnum, 2012) reflects the on-going 
efforts to generate, advance, and enhance the community-based enlargement of sharing and 
organizing cyber threat information. (Conti, Dargahi and Dehghantanha, 2018) elucidates the 
increasing number of cyber-attacks that requires cybersecurity and forensic specialists to detect, 
analyse and defend against cyber threats in almost real-time. In practice, timely dealing with such a 
large number of attacks is impossible without intensely perusing the attack features and taking similar 
intelligent defensive actions; this, in essence, defines cyber threat intelligence notion. (H. Kure and 
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Islam, 2019) targeted to progress the appreciation of the perception of CTI by awarding a much-
needed definition of CTI and producing an idea of the intelligence creation method. (Mavroeidis and 
Bromander, 2017) introduces the Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) model, which enables cyber 
defenders to explore their threat intelligence capabilities and understand their position against the 
ever-changing cyber threat landscape. In addition, they used their model to analyze and evaluate 
several existing taxonomies, sharing standards, and ontologies relevant to cyber threat intelligence. 
Our results however, show that the cyber security community lacks an ontology covering the 
complete spectrum of threat intelligence.  
In (Mateski et al., 2012) described threat metrics and models for characterising threats consistently 
and unambiguously. They embedded these metrics within a process and suggested ways in which the 
metrics and process can be applied and extended. However, a further study regarding how analysts 
assess threats is needed. In (Sauerwein, Sillaber and Breu, 2018) defined CTI as the obtained 
unstructured and ad-hoc sources of information that is made publicly available. Therefore, they 
conducted an in-depth analysis of the unstructured and unapproved use of CTI and investigated its 
application in organisations. Their analysis revealed that many heterogeneous and overlapping 
cybersecurity information sources serve as input for information security and risk management 
processes. However, associated risks and how to extract its value in a compatible way with the 
organisational requirement are needed. In this paper, (Abu et al., 2018) identifies some challenges 
relating to CTI, such as threat data being overloaded, quality of threat data that is shared amongst 
community members, privacy and legal issues which governs the lawful sharing of data and the 
interoperability issues faced by threat sharing platforms and standards used by the platforms.  
However, with all these challenges, adopting CTI by organisations to help them minimise future 
threats still outweighs its lack of adoption. 
2.4.4. Threat Taxonomy 
This research investigates the cyber threats and the most targeted assets from the threat actor’s 
perspective. Threat taxonomies respond to the necessity to offer a common language for conveying 
I.T. threats that could lead to cyber-attacks or cyber-incidents of any nature. The heterogeneous nature 
of the cyber-security field gave birth to several threat taxonomies from various organisations, where 
each one of them took into consideration its own specific needs and created a tailored version of threat 
classification. The majority of the tools mentioned below provide lists and APIs for accessing up-to-
date threat details. Some consider these sources to be threat intelligence, but views vary. Serious 
threat information necessitates a certain degree of (domain- or business-specific) research. This 
section contains a variety of resources for analysing, generating and modifying Threat Intelligence. 
Among the critical infrastructure vulnerability sources are: 
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2.4.4.1. Frameworks and platforms: The following frameworks, tools, and services are used for 
gathering, analysing, generating, and exchanging Threat Intelligence: 
• Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF): CIF enables you to integrate known malicious 
vulnerability information from several sources for prevention and mitigation. Vulnerability 
information includes: Improper Authorization, Authentication Bypass by Spoofing, Improper 
Input Validation.  
• Cortex: Cortex enables observables such as IP addresses, email addresses, URLs, domain 
names, directories, and hashes to be evaluated individually or in bulk mode using a single 
web interface. The site interface serves as a frontend for multiple analyzers, eliminating the 
need to integrate this during the study. Analysts may also use the Cortex REST Application 
Programming Interface (API) to simplify their study aspects. 
2.4.4.2. Formats: Threat intelligence (mostly Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)) can be shared in 
standardised formats. 
• Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC): Analysts, 
developers, testers, and learners may use CAPEC to strengthen public awareness and 
protections by utilising a robust vocabulary and classification taxonomy of documented 
threats. CAPEC's chart includes 541 attack trends and four levels of categorization until 
February 2021. The taxonomy of CAPEC is based on Mitre's Popular Weakness Enumeration 
(CWE) (Barnum, 2008) and it provides summaries, attack prerequisites, and solutions for the 
most common attack trends at any stage of the hierarchy, spanning the entire attack life cycle. 
• The Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC): MAEC projects are 
aimed at creating and providing a standardized language for sharing structured information 
about malware based upon attributes such as behaviours, artefacts and attack patterns 
(Kirillov et al., 2011). 
• The Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX): The STIX language is a 
structured way of expressing cyber threat information. The STIX Language aspires to be 
entirely descriptive, scalable, extensible, and automatable to communicate the full spectrum 
of possible cyber threat content. STIX allows tool-agnostic areas and offers so-called test 
frameworks that enable tool-specific elements to be embedded, such as Open IOC(Barnum, 
2012).  
• The Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII): The TAXII 
standard defines a set of resources and message exchanges that, when introduced, enable 
organisations and product/service boundaries to communicate actionable cyber threat 
information. TAXII is a collection of principles, protocols, and message exchanges for 
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exchanging cyber threat knowledge to identify, deter, and mitigate cyber threats (Connolly, 
Davidson and Schmidt, 2014). 
• The Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS): VERIS is a 
collection of indicators that serve as a shared vocabulary for defining security incidents 
formally and repeatable. VERIS is a solution to one of the security industry's most pressing 
and persistent issues: a scarcity of high-quality data. VERIS not only has a centralised format, 
but it also gathers evidence from the public to investigate attacks through the Verizon Data 
Breach Investigations Report, which is published publicly at VCDB.org(Burger et al., 2014). 
• Web Application Consortium (WASC): Representatives of the Web Application 
Consortium established the WASC Threat Classification (Alhanahnah, Jhumka and Alouneh, 
2016) to explain and coordinate the challenges to a web site's security. This classification 
describes the types of attacks and flaws that may contribute to a website, its files, or its users 
being hacked. 
2.4.4.3. Standards: Below are links to a variety of Threat Intelligence reading materials, including 
(scientific) studies and whitepapers: 
• Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK): ATT&CK is a 
model and structure for defining an adversary's behaviour when operating inside an enterprise 
network (Tactic, 2017). ATT&CK is a rapidly growing complete overview for post-access 
procedures that raises the visibility of the types of behaviour used after a network attack. 
MITRE is working hard to integrate with other similar constructs, including CAPEC, STIX, 
and MAEC. 
• The European Union Agency for Network and Security Information (ENISA): ENISA 
published its initial version of Threat Taxonomy to aid information collection and 
understanding of threats related to information and communication technology assets. Some 
of these threats are related to cyberspace, while others are materialized in the physical-world 
but affect information and cyber-assets. However, it is worth noting that the taxonomy is 
maintained chiefly for cyber threats (Marinos, 2016). 
• Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE): CWE is used for communicating the impacts of 
vulnerabilities. CTI seeks to understand and characterise vulnerabilities, misconfigurations or 
weaknesses that are likely to be targeted. It introduces a common weakness scoring system 
(CWSS), which provides a mechanism for prioritising software weaknesses consistently, 
flexibly, and openly. It is a standardised approach for characterising weaknesses, thereby 
allowing organisations to make more informed decisions during the risk management phase 
and give higher risks (Martin, 2007). 
• Open web application security project (OWASP): OWASP is an open community 
dedicated to enabling organisations to conceive, develop, acquire, operate, and maintain 
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applications that can be trusted. It provides basic techniques to protect against web 
application security challenges. To ensure consistency and relevance of risks and their impact, 
we adopted the OWASP risk methodology (Tymchuk, Iepik and Sivyakov, 2017). This 
methodology helps organisations to estimate risk from business and technical perspectives. 
Many aspects that contribute to the likelihood and impact of each risk are considered, and 
therefore the risk's severity is determined. 
2.5. Related works 
Similar works in security risk management approach for CPS, cybersecurity in smart grid, and 
security risk management frameworks/standards/guidelines are discussed in this section. A literature 
analysis in these fields allows the reader to understand the limitations of the current state of the art 
and understand the complexities of cybersecurity in critical infrastructure and customize this 
research's foundation. 
2.5.1. Risk Management in Critical Infrastructure 
Authors in (Yoneda et al., 2015) showcased the existence of critical significance of CPS from a user 
perspective in an enterprise. First, the office was regarded as a CPS whereby physical security and 
information security are connected. The CPS risk assessment was performed with a risk assessment 
approach, and the risk factors in the CPS accounted for using the Risk Breakdown Structure (RBS). 
With the help of a risk matrix, the countermeasures were proposed and classified and the risk values 
included in an information security management system (ISMS) for an in-depth risk assessment. The 
quantitative evaluation helped to show that the prospected solutions could assist in minimizing risk to 
some extent. (Patel, Graham and Ralston, 2008) proposed a new approach to assess the vulnerability 
of an organization to breaches in information security. A threat-impact index alongside a cyber-
vulnerability index related to the vulnerability trees was presented as a threat-impact index measure. 
Using these approaches, managers can determine the current state of security, which could help them 
select optimal security mechanisms. Nonetheless, the probability included in each damage category 
would be significant in helping the risk managers to be able to quantify the number of risks that are 
related to the information system. (Hahn et al., 2013) offers a generalized observation of the processes 
of integrating smart grid security. This includes the set of communication, controls and the physical 
system components necessary to provide an accurate cyber-physical environment. (Cárdenas et al., 
2011)  proposed an approach to help detect risks and computer attacks that alter the targeted control 
systems' behaviour by understanding the implications of the threats and risks to assist in designing a 
new-attack detection algorithm alongside an attack-resilient algorithm.(Ericsson, 2010)considers the 
existence of the cyber-security issues, information security domain, together with the concept of the 
access points in a rather substantiated way in a power system communication (PSC). 
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(Wu, Kang and Li, 2015) proposed using a quantitative risk assessment approach that centres on the 
CPS running conditions and helps in a real-time calculation of risks. Using this model, it becomes 
easier for users to respond to different risks on time, help select and implement comprehensive 
security measures in helping managers avoid threats and damages that might result. It also helps the 
users by providing them with attack details such as the type of attack, the frequency, host ID and the 
target source ID. Nonetheless, a risk assessment approach using this approach requires the inclusion 
of an automatic identification alongside quantitative analysis methods to help in dealing with several 
information updates concerning the assets, threats, and vulnerabilities within the CPS. This notion is 
the research by (Cherdantseva et al., 2016) which examined some of the risk assessment approach 
based on the factors such as objectives, application domain, risk management stages, impact 
measurement, and tools. The research also shows the need for improvement regardless of several risk 
assessment approach that exists. However, most of the risk assessment approaches have failed in 
addressing the context of the risk management process, how to overcome an attack, how to account 
for the human elements, evaluation and validation of data, probabilistic data and its improvement, and 
tool support. (Ten, Manimaran and Liu, 2010) proposed an implementation of a comprehensive cyber-
security framework with the help of the SCADA system for critical infrastructure. The key significant 
components that have been proposed for the framework include anomaly detection, real-time 
monitoring, impact analysis with the help of tree-based methodology and the application of mitigation 
strategies; the attack tree was designed on the effectiveness of the power system control networks to 
help in evaluating systems, scenario and vulnerabilities by identifying the adversary objectives in the 
system. Additionally, (Izuakor and White, 2016) suggested a novel approach for assessing critical 
infrastructure asset identification using a multi-criteria decision theory to address the difficulties of 
identifying crucial assets. The current methodology stops short of providing a systematic framework 
for making important decisions.(Bialas, 2016b)proposed a novel formal risk assessment approach for 
dealing with dangerous accidents' internal and external effects in sensitive infrastructure. This risk 
assessment approach adhered to the ISO31000/IEC31010 risk control and coordination standard. This 
study did not consider interdependencies, and it also did not have a framework for determining risk 
level and control mitigations. (Fekete, 2011) explained how society creates decisions over what is 
most relevant to them based on the amount of power society has. The study also shows how to 
classify what is most relevant to them, focusing on the assumption that there is no total defence from 
cascading effects and risks. The study of Fekete is less concerned with hazard reduction. European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) also analysed a telecommunication system by using 
UML to create a model for the telecommunication system named "Danger Vulnerability and Risk 
Analysis" (TVRA), which aids in strategic analysis of security targets, unexpected events, properties, 
vulnerabilities, and challenges (Virtualization, 2013). (Ezell, 2007) has proposed a concept that uses 
the Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model (I-VAM) to quantify vulnerability and applied it to 
a medium-sized clean water scheme. His analysis, on the other hand, struggled to classify properties 
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and instead quantified the system's weaknesses. (Cherdantseva et al., 2016) conducted a study of the 
current state of cybersecurity risk management utilising SCADA systems. The study looked at the 
plurality of risk management methods that evolve or contribute in the framework of the SCADA 
method. They were evaluated and tool-supported in terms of their goals, implementation domain, risk 
management principles, effect assessment, and sources of probabilistic evidence. According to their 
findings, an intuitive scheme for categorising cybersecurity risk management approaches for SCADA 
systems has been proposed. Regardless of the various risk reduction methods for SCADA structures, 
the requirement for a holistic solution that includes all risk management processes remains unmet. 
According to (Byres, Franz and Miller, 2004), they proposed applying the attack tree methodology on 
SCADA communication systems based on the standard MODBUS protocol attack. This type of 
approach offers a flexible and structural way of undertaking security analyses of applications, 
protocols, and networks. These authors identified some possible attack objectives that an intruder 
might attain against a MODBUS-Based SCADA system and the existing security vulnerabilities 
inherent in the SCADA systems. There are attack trees that are typically helpful tools used in 
modelling vulnerabilities and threats in different systems from their study. Nonetheless, a threat 
modelling valuable method to the protocol designers, vendors, and users’ needs more attention. More 
formal approaches that enhance the aggregation of low node values and make dynamic reflection are 
needed. 
 Research by (McQueen et al., 2006) showcase a new model used in estimating the time to 
compromise a system component that an attacker can access. Further, the model offers an estimate of 
the time-to-compromise's expected value as a function of identified vulnerabilities and attacker skill 
level. The model was used in aiding in risk reduction estimation between a baseline system and a 
SCADA system. The research by (McQueen et al., 2005) shows that risk reduction on a partial 
SCADA system was carried out and a methodology to estimate quantitative risk reduction.  
From the methodology that (McQueen et al., 2006) discusses, it is poised as an effective way of 
estimating the time-to-compromise. (Sapori E, Sciutto M and Sciutto G, 2014) Proposes a risk-based 
methodology assess security management systems that were applied to railway infrastructure. The 
methodology analysed the system, integrates technological, human and procedural aspects by using 
flow charts. It analysed how to manage and identify threats, vulnerabilities and criticality of the 
subsystems. However, human functions replaced with technological systems are not a constantly 
achievable goal. Also, identifying critical assets were not the main focus of this paper. 
In (Islam et al., 2017), there is an illustration of a risk management framework that helps users with 
cloud migration decisions, following the necessary risk management principles. This framework is 
essential as it enables users in identifying risks based on the relative importance of migration 
objectives and risk analysis with the semi-quantitative approach. In the end, the users can make 
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accurate cloud migration decisions based on the critical migration scenarios. Practical risk assessment 
approaches are the cornerstone of a successful application of a critical infrastructure protection 
program. Different risk assessment approaches for critical infrastructures supports this insinuation. 
Risk assessment is thus indispensable to identifying threats, assessing the vulnerabilities, and 
evaluating the impact on infrastructures, assets, or systems considering the possibility of the 
occurrence of these threats. This is one of the critical elements that differentiate risk assessment from 
a traditional impact assessment approach. Studies by (Theocharidou and Giannopoulos, 2015); (Adar 
and Wuchner, 2005) discuss critical challenges facing critical infrastructure risk management and 
outline several methods and best practice guidelines that encompass creating frameworks, risk 
analysis methods, and the adoption of models. The sole focus on technical threats and technical 
solutions are no longer adequate. Therefore, security and risk management methodologies have to 
consider societal factors (Schauer, 2015). Risk management is applied to threats and hazards of all 
kinds that affect critical infrastructures and how best to lessen those threats and hazards based on 
current capabilities and resource requirement (Committee, 2010).   
2.5.2. Frameworks/Standards/models for critical infrastructure 
Different internationally accepted risk management standards such as ISO 31000 (ISO, 2009) offer 
risk management approaches that consider risk management crucial in comprehensive organisational 
processes, including management processes and strategic planning. IEC 31010 is also another 
recognised risk management methods and techniques(GOST, 2009). NIST framework focuses on 
managing cyber-security risk and NERC CIP to identify and protect the critical cyber-assets that back 
up the electric power grid's dependable operation. According to (Cybersecurity, 2014), the NIST 
framework is considered a practical approach to managing cyber-security risks. It is applied in 
delivering a complete platform that helps identify relative paths, providing guidance that ranges from 
requirements to implementation. The critical infrastructure organisations can leverage the NIST 
framework's application and their existing frameworks to enhance a systematic identification, 
management, and assessment of cybersecurity risks. NIST framework can also serve as the foundation 
for a new cybersecurity program or a mechanism that improvesnew programs. The consequence of 
using this framework serves as the groundwork that encompasses a reassessment to make a 
verification that helps to fulfil the cybersecurity requirements (Purdy, 2010).  
There are guidelines, such as the North American Electric Reliability Company (NERC), that have 
recognized the cyber-security principles for critical infrastructure protection (CIP-002 to CIP 009) to 
include a security mechanism for the documentation and security of critical cyber assets that maintain 
the electric power grid operating continuously (NERC, 2006). The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) established the cyber-security charter to enhance a country's essential 
infrastructure (O’Rourke, 2017). NIST includes a risk management system to enhance network 
compliance, reinforce risk management procedures and ensure institutes' execution. A particular goal-
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driven risk management approach (Islam et al., 2017) accentuates goals as objectives specific to the 
organisation mission. Risks are reflected as a hindrance to the goal, so that identified risks are 
assessed based on which goals they oppose. The method is helpful in various domains, such as cloud 
computing and software development.  
NIST SP800-30 risk assessments uphold risk response resolutions at the different levels of the risk 
management order. The Tiers focus on the organisational operations, assets and individuals and select 
standard controls (Stoneburner, Goguen and Feringa, 2002). The Centre for Internet Security Critical 
Security Controls (CIS_CSC) provides a prioritised set of actions that alleviate the most coordinated 
attacks against systems and systems and can be applied for critical infrastructure sectors. OWASP 
methodology helps organisations estimate risk from business and technical perspectives (Tymchuk, 
Iepik and Sivyakov, 2017). A common weakness scoring system (CWSS) provides a mechanism for 
prioritising software weaknesses in a dependable, supple, and open way. It is a standardised approach 
for characterizing weaknesses, thereby allowing organisations to make more informed decisions 
during the risk management phase and give higher risks (Martin, 2007). ENISA, the European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Protection, has established a mechanism that requires 
information regarding asset security to be ensured(Luna et al., 2011). STIX model represents 
structured threat information, which conveys the full range of CTI (Barnum, 2012). STIX is actively 
being adopted or deliberated for adoption by cyber threat-related organisations, which helps 
organisations understand the proper context of threats to make smart defensive choices.  
The Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security (ISA99) (Piggin, 2013) committee tackle 
cybersecurity issues regarding industrial automation and the control of systems through the Industrial 
Automation and Control Systems Security/International Electrical Commission (ISA/IEC-62443)  
standards 
2.5.3. Machine learning Technique for Risk prediction 
This section introduces the fundamental concepts and principles of machine learning as it applies to 
critical infrastructure systems. We explore machine learning approaches and best practices for 
designing, building, and evaluating machine learning applications in critical infrastructure. (Ahmed 
and Abraham, 2015) In recent years, with cloud computing developments, there are risks involved 
with using a cloud environment. The researchers applied different selection algorithms such as 
random filter classifiers and isotonic regression to assess risk assessment. The results showed that 
prediction algorithms and feature reduction are very efficient and can help achieve high-risk 
modelling accuracy. Future research could focus on integrating machine learning models to isolate 
risk factors in private and public network infrastructures. (Bilge, Han and Dell’Amico, 2017); in this 
paper, the researchers found that the current evolution of cyber threats ecosystems whereby no system 
can be considered invulnerable. It is critical to quantify risks levels within a system and develop risk 
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prediction methods so that proactive measures can be taken to minimize the damage of cyber threats. 
The researchers presented the Risk Teller system, which helps to analyse binary file appearance logs 
of machines to make prediction of which machines are at risk of infection months in advance. They 
show that Risk Teller can also use the machine profile computed for a specific machine to enhance the 
prediction of subsequent infections with the highest prediction precision.  
(Fang et al., 2019) Forecasting and predicting cyber threats are critical. Previous researches have 
shown that cyber-attack data exhibit some phenomena such as high nonlinearity that become 
challenging in predicting cyber-attack risks and modelling the risks. The researchers utilized a deep 
learning framework with bi-directional recurrent neural networks to assess the magnitude of risks. 
The study showed that bi-directional recurrent neural networks with long short-term memory (BRNN-
LSTM) have a high significant prediction accuracy compared to the statistical method. Future 
research should look into the application of machine learning to detect software vulnerabilities. 
(Gupta et al., 2020) With recent technological advancements and especially in intelligent devices, 
traditional data analytics fail in handling big data generated by different devices. The researchers 
explored machine learning and deep learning models to make intelligent decisions concerning attack 
identification and mitigation. They proposed ML-based secure data analytics architecture (SDA) to 
help classify attack input data. The threat model address research challenges in SDA using different 
parameters such as reliability, accuracy and latency. In the future, more research should focus on 
understanding the existing SDA proposals concerning parameters and how they can be aligned to 
cyber-security threats. (Husák et al., 2018) This research provides a survey of prediction and 
forecasting methods applied in cybersecurity. The researchers discuss four main tasks: attack 
projection, recognition of intention, the prediction of next moves, and intrusion prediction. The 
authors proposed attack graphs, Bayesian networks, and Markov models to help in learning the risks 
and threats. They further discussed the application of machine learning and data mining in threat 
detection. The results indicate that suitability for machine learning is needed to understand risk and 
intrusion predictions. Future research needs to focus more on improvements in attack prediction and 
its utilization in practice.  
(Liu, Zhang, et al., 2015) This research offers the first step to understanding how it is possible to 
predict cybersecurity incidences with machine learning techniques and use externally evident 
malicious activities directly associated with network entities. To test their hypothesis, the researchers 
collected IP address-based host reputation blacklists. Their hypothesis testing features are also shown 
with features to support vector machine (SVM) for prediction. The results show that it is possible to 
achieve a reasonably good prediction performance over the forecasting window. Future research 
should focus on the effectiveness of machine learning in reducing risks at the critical infrastructure 
level. (Liu, Sarabi, et al., 2015) In this study, the researchers characterize the extent to which 
cybersecurity incidents can be predicted based on an externally observable properties organization’s 
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network. They collected externally measurable features related to an organization’s network from 
mismanagement systems and malicious activity time series. They then train and test a random forest 
(RF) to assess the vulnerabilities. The results indicate that cyber incident forecasting offers a 
completely different set of characteristics than detection techniques. Future research should focus on 
predicting incident type and how to generate risk profiles based on an organisation's network 
infrastructure.  
(Lilly et al., 2019) Despite significant advancements in identifying, deterring, and mitigating cyber 
incidents, NATO agencies are discontented, along with the intelligence agencies whose strategy 
against cyber incidents is primarily reactive and implemented rather than being executed before 
attacks. The researchers have proposed an indications and warning (I&W) framework for the cyber-
domain by applying this framework and examining its effectiveness in the private sector and also 
deployed it on an actual case. The research finds that indications and warning frameworks effectively 
detect cyber threats and risks even before they occur in the private sector infrastructure networks. 
Future research should close the gap and increase understanding of how governments can apply this 
framework and integrate it within the existing processes. 
(Makawana and Jhaveri, 2018) With the world’s information being shared using the Internet, 
cybersecurity has been a problem. Machine learning techniques are applied in dealing with 
cybersecurity threats. The researchers found that machine learning for cybersecurity has significant 
potential in enhancing network safety. The results also showed that machine learning is an integrated 
way to protect their data in real-time. Future research should discuss the effectiveness of machine 
learning in critical infrastructures in the public sector. (Okutan, Yang and McConky, 2018) If the 
cyber-threats are predicted a reasonable amount of time before their occurrence, there could be proper 
defensive actions taken; mostly, there lack enough observables of malicious activities. This research 
suggests the application of unconventional signals derived from various data sources with variant time 
granularities to help predict cyber incidents. They proposed a Bayesian network to help in predicting 
cyber-attacks. The results show that depending on the granularity, and the unconventional signals can 
predict cyber-attacks. Future research should discover more how the sampling approach can be used 
together with the Bayesian network to predict and assess risks in critical infrastructures. (Ovelgönne 
et al., 2017) despite the growing speculation concerning the role of human behaviour in machines' 
cyber-security, there have been gaps in concrete data-driven analysis and evidence. The researchers 
used the Worldwide Intelligence Network Environment (WINE) platform to study 1.6 million 
machines to understand the relationship between cyber-attacks and user behaviour against personal 
computers. The results showed a strong relationship between the number of attempted malware 
attacks and several features. They also show that software developers are at more risk of engaging in 
risky cyber-behaviour than other categories. In the future, more focus should be on how these 
software developers can approach machine learning as a way of protecting their system from external 
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threats and cyber-attacks. (Papernot et al., 2016)  in this research showed that advances in machine 
learning had enabled different applications, such as autonomous systems and data analytics. Machine 
learning has been argued to contribute to exposing new vulnerabilities in software systems. They 
identify key insights that result from related structural elements of machine learning algorithms. The 
research concludes that exposing the relationship between resilience and model accuracy is key 
applicability of machine learning. In the future, more research should use models to understand the 
complexity, resilience and accuracy that must be calibrated for the safety of network infrastructures.  
(Singh et al., 2020) Presently, machine learning techniques are used to understand 5G network 
infrastructures with the emerging IoT and 5G infrastructures. The researchers find that it is possible to 
deploy power-optimized technology in a way that promotes the network’s long-term sustainability. 
They propose a machine learning-based network sub-slicing framework in a sustainable 5G 
environment to optimise the network load balancing issues. The results show that machine learning 
techniques effectively understand the criticality of the 5G network infrastructure and the threats 
attached. Future research should focus on using machine learning to enhance the stability and 
sustainability of network infrastructures. In (Sun et al., 2018) article, the researchers argue that driven 
by increasing scale and high profile cyber-security incidents related to the public data, there has been 
a paradigm shift in understanding and defending against cyber threats. Machine learning is one way to 
do it. They propose cybersecurity incident prediction schemes by utilizing different data sources, 
including the organization’s reports and datasets, synthetic data, and social media data. They find that 
customizing models to assess risk can help characterise the latency and serve as an important way to 
align future research. Future research should focus on forecasting incidents with high accuracy and 
without making data assumptions. 
(Tanwar et al., 2019) In recent years, the emergence of blockchain technology has become a trending, 
disruptive and unique technology. Blockchain technology raises security issues such as double-
spending and majority attack. To handle issues, data analytics is necessary for blockchain-based 
secure data. Machine learning was proposed to improve the system's accuracy and provide precise 
network results and resilience against attacks. The researchers find that machine learning and 
blockchain technology can be used in intelligent applications such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) and smart cities. Future research should consider the issues and challenges in risk management 
and assessment in blockchain technology. (Tolubko et al., 2018)This research is typically about the 
definition of cyber threats in the information system. Cyber threats lead to significant loss of network 
resources and lead to system disability as a whole. The most critical task in an information system 
network is network monitoring. This research sought to develop a method to detect cyber threats and 
develop countermeasures, especially machine learning implications. Their research found that 
different methods allow the network layers to initiate topology re-arrangement to interrupt cyber-
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attack paths. Future research should uncover the effectiveness of machine learning and the OSI model 
in facilitating network security risk assessment.  
(Varshney and Alemzadeh, 2017) Machine learning algorithms influence the way we make decisions 
and our interactions daily. As we consider critical infrastructures' safety, this research argues that it is 
vital to take machine learning into account. The researchers define machine learning and its 
integration to safety and harm created by unwanted outcomes. They found that the foundational 
principle of empirical risk minimization, statistical machine learning lacks a sufficient objective. 
Future research should consider the interpretability and causality of predictive risk assessment models 
and approaches beyond human involvement. (Veeramachaneni et al., 2016) In this research, they 
presented an artificial machine learning approach, an analyst-in-the-loop security system where 
Analyst Intuition was put together with state-of-the-art machine learning helped build a complete end-
to-end artificially intelligent solution (AI). The system was found to present features such as a big 
data behavioural analytics platform, an outlier detection system, a mechanism to acquire feedback 
from the security analysts, and a supervised learning module. The system was validated using a real-
world data set, and the results showed that the system is capable of learning to defend it against 
unseen attacks. Future research should focus on an in-depth integration of analyst-driven solutions to 
prevent cyber threats. (Xu et al., 2018) increasing an understanding of the evolution of threat 
situations, analysing cyber incident data is essential. The researchers report a statistical analysis of a 
breach incident data involving cyber hacking activities such as malware attacks. The study shows that 
breach size and hacking breach incident interval times need to be modelled with stochastic processes 
instead of distributions as there are autocorrelations. They propose models to fit inter-arrival times 
and breach sizes and show that models can predict the breach time. Future research should analyse the 
threat and magnitude of cyber threats and use machine learning models to ascertain the risk imposed 
by autocorrelations.  
(Xu, Hua and Xu, 2017) Internet-based computer information systems are essential in modern society, 
but they are threatened by cyber-attacks that can cause critical risks. It is vital to measure and predict 
how effective the cyber defence mechanisms are to initiate the systems' defence. The researchers 
investigated how to predict and measure the effectiveness of a cyber-defence mechanism (early-
warning). They proposed a new vine copula model that helps in predicting the effectiveness of early 
warning more effectively. They also present a discussion of how to use the prediction approach in 
practice. Future research should consider the alignment of machine learning and the early warning 
system to assess risks in rotationally symmetric dependence structure.  
2.5.4. Case Study 
Proposed in (McQueen et al., 2006), a model can be applied in estimating the time to compromise a 
system component that an attacker can easily find. The model was applied in a case study to aid the 
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risk reduction in a small SCADA system comprising eight generic module types connected to a local 
Ethernet LAN. The total number of system vulnerability was reduced to a certain level. Proposed in 
(Bialas, 2016b), a novel designed risk management approach entails dealing with external and internal 
impacts of risky event that occurred in the critical infrastructure. However, this is a method that is 
only embedded in the resilience process of critical infrastructure. These are only requirements that can 
only be implemented on the ready-to-use software platform for further experiments. The results of the 
experimentation are used as the CIRAS input. The tool applied to the risk reduction component in 
CIRAS and the validation process considered the basis for elaborating project uses cases. The paper 
presented the validation experiment related to risk management in critical infrastructure using the 
ready-made OSCAD software platform and performed a case study to acquire knowledge. 
Presented in (Ten, Manimaran and Liu, 2010), there is an in-depth survey on critical infrastructures 
cybersecurity. A SCADA security framework that has these four distinct components is proposed: 
Real-time anomaly detection, monitoring, impact analysis, and strategies for mitigation. Further, an 
attack-tree-based impact analysis methodology is advanced. This is based on power system control 
networks, and it is mainly deployed in understanding system evaluation, scenario, and vulnerabilities 
at the leaf-level by identifying the system's adversary objectives. The methodology is also applied in 
study cases to help identify the adversary objectives of the system and identify access points of the 
power system control networks and evaluate the vulnerability of the network and proposed in (Sapori, 
Sciutto and Sciutto, 2014) the implementation of risk-based approaches in use by process engineering 
to achieve a quantitative assessment of the security management systems. This is a methodology that 
is exposed and applied to a railway case study. Primary steps guide system analysis (the study of 
macro operability functions, identification of subsystems) and ways to integrate human, technological 
and procedural aspects using flow charts. The later steps describe ways to manage threats, 
vulnerability and criticality of critical infrastructure subsystems, identify “primary causes” and “top 
event consequences” drawing event and fault trees, and finally the calculation of residual risk for the 
security management system. Thus, the methodology is applied on a case study of one railway 
subsystem and the results of the quantitative risk analysis are exposed.  
2.5.5. Determining Asset Criticality  
In (de Gusmão et al., 2018), the authors proposed a model that integrates fault tree analysis, 
decision theory and fuzzy theory to ascertain the current causes of cyber-attack prevention 
failures and determine the vulnerability of a given cybersecurity system. However, predicting 
risk type within a risk management framework is not the focus of this paper.  
(Izuakor and White, 2016) proposed a new approach for critical infrastructure asset 
identification using multi-criteria decision theory to resolve the challenges of identifying 
critical assets. The approach didn’t provide a systematic process for arriving at criticality 
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decision. (Fekete, 2011) described how society gets to choose what is critical to them, based 
on how much influence it has on them. Shows how to identify what is critical with regarding 
the fact that there cannot be full protection with respect to cascading effects and threats. The 
paper focuses less on threat prevention rather than the impacts of threats. Strategic proactive 
planning, the purpose of civil protection and activities of risk management are among the key 
attributes of identifying the above. In (Alidoosti et al., 2012) the main purpose of this article 
is to present a new methodology based on the RAMCAP framework and fuzzy inference 
system (FIS) to provide a structured framework to build a more secure, safer and more 
reliable critical infrastructures in order to develop, implement and control systems and sub-
systems. 
There are several contributions that justify the necessity and importance of identifying critical 
assets and vulnerabilities of the assets of critical infrastructure. However, we have made 
several observations. In particular, there is a lack of systematic approach that supports critical 
infrastructure organisation by identifying critical assets and their relative vulnerabilitie.   
2.6. Challenges faced by critical infrastructure systems 
Like any other complex system, a critical infrastructure system is composed of distinct elements with 
different significance levels, categorized into several levels and others are interconnected through 
linages of various intensity and types. An integrated structural arrangement leads to a broader 
correlation between the individual subsystems, which help determine the intensity and how the 
propagation of critical infrastructure systems failures affect society (Ghorbani and Bagheri, 2008). A 
study by (Leita and Dacier, 2012) showed that several issues need to be considered before complete 
protection of the critical infrastructure systems is initiated. As far as the risks are concerned, there are 
fundamental security risks directly relative to critical infrastructure systems, manifested in logical, 
physical and technical defects in the network infrastructure. The research has grouped these by (Leita 
and Dacier, 2012)as: 
• Human error 
• Failure of technical hardware  
• Technical obsolescence 
• Deviation from the quality of standard service 
• Application/protocol attack 
Well thought out act of information extortion 
• Distributed Denial-of-Service attack 
• Botnets 
• Web interface attack 
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• Advance persistence or state-sponsored threats 
Other threats will involve ransomware, water hole attack, dropper, rootkits, spyware, worms, Trojan 
horses, phishing and spear phishing. (Levy-Bencheton and Darra, 2015)On account of ENISA, 
identified and recorded various threats that could apply within a wide range of industries. They 
include:  
• Physical and large-scale attacks stem from intentional action and could affect any component 
by disrupting, altering, exposing, or gaining unauthorized access. Real-world cyber-attacks 
with destructive results have taken place in the past on another domain of interest, and more 
specifically on the Ukrainian power grid infrastructure (Shehod, 2016). 
• Insider threats include malicious actions. The threat-actor always originates from the 
organisation itself. 
Threats to critical infrastructure are real as the restructuring process has changed the networks' 
reliability and the services provide. This has created several critical infrastructural protection 
violations that range from stealing electronic data, altering or destroying electronic information on 
networks, and manipulating physical critical infrastructure systems and equipment through 
organizational controlled networks. When this happens, it collapses the mobility risks, and boundaries 
for the countries as the world is technically connected (Mikhalevich and Trapeznikov, 2019). The 
critical infrastructures are connected through information technologies as data are transmitted through 
the application of information highway. This implies that security measures to safeguard the data in 
critical infrastructures from attackers are highly needed. The critical infrastructures security concept is 
conveyed in the form of cyber-dependent attacks that range from intrusions into computer network 
space, and this is the primary mode of attack that varies in scope.  
When attacks are propagated against critical infrastructure systems, these attacks have critical and 
detrimental effects on the national and general lifestyle. This implies that the critical infrastructure's 
success depends on identifying risks and creating meaningful relationships between the stakeholders 
who are on the front line to make sure that the critical infrastructure systems are safeguarded. The 
government’s responsibility ranges from the identification of the risks to the aspects that lead to the 
failure of the critical infrastructure systems. To manage this, governments take measures to consider 
issues such as human error, equipment failure, and the natural causes that might impact the 
effectiveness of the critical infrastructure systems and lead to losses across the society. 
2.6.1. Evolving Cyber-threat landscape 
A critical infrastructure system's functioning is under different threats, especially by a wide range of 
security threats. These threats can be classified into:  
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• Technology threats: These pertain to the technological emergencies that might include the 
widespread disruptions by radiation emergencies, widespread effect on engineering works, 
air, road, and traffic accidents.  
• Climatological threats: These include natural disasters such as heavy snowfall and floods.  
• Biological threats: These might include pandemics  
• Geological threats: These include landslides, earthquakes, and volcanic activity  
• Criminal threats: Such as criminal activity, terrorism, and armed conflicts.  
Depending on the threat category, some emergencies usually lead to individual failures, which can 
typically occur in a critical infrastructure system. Once the threats have been generated, they can 
propagate further within the critical infrastructure system, and they can eventually lead to the 
production of negative impacts within a critical infrastructure system and increase the intensity and 
the effect (Hurst, Merabti and Fergus, 2014). The system failures in critical infrastructure produce 
effects within the critical infrastructure system and also outside the system where they can specifically 
affect the society on the ground of national interests such as the basic societal needs, state security, 
and the economy in general (Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly, 2001). The advances in automated 
technology, such as the Internet of things, sensors, and cybersecurity measures, can assist the people 
responsible for protecting critical infrastructure more efficiently. With the help of these advances, 
they can efficiently understand the potential threats, undertake system diagnostics make predictions 
for possible changes in the critical infrastructure systems, and strengthen the security and the 
resiliency of the critical infrastructure systems (Kozik and Chora, 2013). In countries such as the 
United States, the department of security makes sure that it has taken measures to put in place targeted 
solutions for critical infrastructure systems safety and resilience across multiple sectors. 
2.6.2. Adopting Machine Learning Techniques 
ML models are sort of elaborated than outmoded programs because they deal with a set of complex 
data. Tactical design verdicts must be made before models getting taught. The risk associated with 
machine learning will show in nearly all life cycle stages, beginning from envisaging to 
implementation. Improvements to the authentication frameworks have to shield almost all life cycle 
levels as they occur traditionally, with the additions highlighted below.  
2.6.2.1. Transparency and Interpretability 
ML models are usually be viewed in terms of its inputs and outputs, and have so many complex 
decision-making layers, making appraisal and application traceability quite challenging. ML-powered 
applications are sometimes supposed to be transparent. Organisations usually want to notice how the 
data is being processed to ensure decisions. To minimise the risks, the ML model's transparency and 
interpretability have to be placed and assessed in high order. 
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2.6.2.2. Feature Engineering 
ML models are designed to recognise patterns from the data, and the data is usually complex. Data 
becomes complex due to its quality and nature, mostly with unstructured data. Feature engineering is 
usually needed to convert the unstructured data to a structured one before processing. These processes 
are also in quick makeovers and complex with custom packaging as they have the capability of 
different engineering transformations of the data for models assessments. As they develop 
complexity, the risk assessments likewise have to be carried out.  
2.6.2.3. Data Quality Control 
 A key difference that distinguishes traditional application and machine learning application is the 
capacity to study patterns from the data. Traditional applications are destined to the programmed path 
and cannot change once arrayed. Machine learning prototypes are adept at considering data insights 
and act accordingly. This behaviour demands quality and new data; otherwise, the algorithms will not 
deliver the projected accuracy. If silos exist in the CI, it could limit or block such quality data and 
weaken the applications. 
2.7. Summary 
An overview of the primary risk management, CTI, and machine learning for risk prediction 
approaches to develop a common understanding of the research domain is presented in this chapter. A 
particular emphasis was placed on emerging risk management issues that were considered 
challenging, most notably the need for CSRM to recognise the importance of implementing CTI and a 
machine learning framework for automation of risk type prediction issues. Additionally, the chapter 
presents some elements for cybersecurity risk management in critical infrastructure. The chapter 
further discusses how existing methods affect cybersecurity risk management in critical infrastructure. 
The related literature on risk management methodologies for critical infrastructure and machine 
learning approaches for risk prediction were carefully defined. Existing works in these areas are taken 
into account since one of the significant issues in risk management is the lack of comprehensive 
cybersecurity risk management that considers the adoption of CTI and machine learning for risk 
prediction for critical infrastructure protection. It is also necessary to identify the assets and their 
criticality for critical infrastructure to identify these assets' threats and vulnerabilities. Cybersecurity 
risk management is a nascent field, and the theoretical frameworks are yet to be recognised. The 
multifaceted and varied nature of the cybersecurity domain has meant no easy theoretical fit from 
mathematical, science or other areas. The prevailing attempts to provide a theoretical model are 
mainly complex and involve significant computational work. This research intends to fill these gaps 
and proposes an integrated cybersecurity risk management framework for critical infrastructure. Other 
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This chapter details the research methodology adopted in this thesis to address the research questions 
outlined in chapter one, guided towards integrating a CSRM framework for critical infrastructure. A 
research methodology is a critical element of research studies that are used to classify current 
challenges and, as a result, achieve the goals of a specific research project (Kothari, 2004). It is a tool 
for collecting reliable data and doing a rigorous study to obtain the correct information. The research 
approach defines the study's goal and specifies the criteria relevant to the research needs (Neuman, 
2013). According to (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006), study methodology identifies how research design 
tools and procedures should be utilised, distinguishes between approaches and findings, and 
emphasises the significance of clarifying and achieving the research goal. In general, the study 




As a result, the analysis tool determined for this thesis is to provide an i-CSRM framework for critical 
infrastructure while assessing the quality of work conducted and the nature of the different 
approaches. The researcher conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) to achieve this objective. 
Lastly, the researcher evaluated the proposed framework in a real-life case study. The case study 
comprises distinct characteristics that demonstrate the broader scope of the proposed framework. A 
research methodology must be followed to achieve this research's objectives, address the research 
questions outlined, and validate the research framework effectively. This chapter presents the methods 
and hypotheses used to establish the proposed i-CSRM framework and the analysis methodology used 
to validate its applicability. 
3.2. Methodology for Framework Development 
The framework development process takes into account industry standards, theories, and 
methodologies. Figure 3.1 illustrates the steps included in the framework development methodology. 
Step one narrates the gaps in the existing literature, step two and step three proposes a novel 
framework to address the problem domain and step three evaluates the proposed framework using a 
case study. 
An overview of the different standards, frameworks, and models and the features or aspects derived 




Figure 3.1: Unified Approach model to i-CSRM that leverages existing industry standards to assist 
organisations in attaining risk management by ensuring that every step and activity is performed 
according to generally accepted security principle. 
3.2.1. Step 1: Literature Review 
The proposed research methodology's main objective is to identify, summarise, and analyse all 
approaches that have been proposed or used to represent risk management in critical infrastructure. 
The first step in developing the methodology is to review the current literature, i.e. to define, examine, 
and summarise the current state of the art literature in this field of study. In achieving this, a 
systematic review (SLR) is conducted. A systematic review is a well-defined and methodical way to 
59 
 
identify, evaluate, and synthesise the available evidence concerning a particular technology to 
understand the current direction and status of research or provide a background to identify research 
challenges (Keele, 2007). The SLR use creates a path that makes the review's scope definite to other 
researchers and makes sure that the identified literature is relevant to the study. Data from the 
literature outline the different approaches used in developing the i-CSRM framework in addressing 
research questions, aims and objectives. Combining these techniques allows us to systematically 
identify available evidence on risk management for critical infrastructure from academic and industry 
works. This method was chosen because of the requirement to have a credible, repeatable and fair 
evaluation of the available studies assessing risk management on critical infrastructures. 
3.2.2. Step 2: Development of Framework and Process 
This step entails developing an i-CSRM framework that incorporates various concepts, a unified 
process that integrates CTI information and ML techniques to support risk management activities in 
critical infrastructure. Also, the cybersecurity risk management tool (i-CSRMT) that supports 
performing risk management. The process outlines various activities that every organisation could use 
to achieve a comprehensive view of threats and associated risks. Various techniques, theories, and 
standards have been used to ensure that the framework is designed and applied following universally 
accepted principles. By taking sections from renowned industry standards, guidelines, frameworks, 
and models and implementing them across various activities were implemented across different 
activities within the process. 
The process consists of five different sequential activities, which serve as a manual for developing an 
efficient i-CSRM framework for critical infrastructure. These activities are linked with each other, and 
every activity includes steps to support specific task relating to i-CSRM and guide organisations in 
making critical decisions. Each activity's output is used as the input for the next one. The following 
sections provide an insight into the models and standards used:  
3.2.2.1. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) 
For organisations to respond to their specific threats and make informed decisions on which 
countermeasures to deploy, they must have detailed threat information. Therefore, we consider STIX 
the most widely used CTI method for the specification, capture, characterisation and communication 
of standardised cyber threat information.  
• STIX model: STIX model represents structured threat information, which conveys the full 
range of CTI (Barnum, 2012). STIX is adopted to help organisations to understand the true 
nature of threats to make intelligent defensive decisions. For a valid defence against current 
and future threats, it is necessary to understand the threat actor’s behaviour, capability in 
tactics, TTP and the threat actor’s intent. Therefore, we adopted some of the STIX concepts 
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such as TTP, threat actor, indicator and incident and integrated them with i-CSRM concepts 
to improve the i-CSRM framework in CPS.  
3.2.2.2. Industry Standards 
We consider existing, widely used standards, guidelines, methodologies, framework, models, and 
practices to develop the framework. They include:   
• ATT&CK (adversarial tactic, techniques and common knowledge) framework developed 
by MITRE is used for documenting common TTP used to target, compromise and operate in 
an enterprise network. We considered the ATT&CK framework so that the organisation's 
actors can gather valuable insights into the threat that can affect the organisation. 
• Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) is used for communicating the impacts of 
vulnerabilities. It introduces a common weakness scoring system (CWSS) which provides a 
mechanism for prioritising software weaknesses in a consistent, flexible, and open manner 
(Martin, 2007).  
• Open web application security project (OWASP) provides basic techniques to protect 
against web application security challenges. To ensure consistency and relevance of risks and 
their impact, we adopted the OWASP risk methodology (Tymchuk, Iepik and Sivyakov, 
2017). This methodology helps organisations to estimate risk from business and technical 
perspectives.  
• The Centre for Internet Security Critical Security Controls (CIS_CSC) is a collection of 
controls that help organisations protect their assets. It consists of sufficient controls that 
organisations may use to prevent or minimise identified threats and enforce a clear protection 
policy. 
• CAPEC provides a comprehensive list of a known pattern of attacks employed by an 
adversary to exploit known cyber environment weaknesses. This relevant model has been 
adopted for threat analysis for effective cybersecurity.  
3.2.2.3. Use of Machine Learning Techniques  
Machine learning classifiers are widely used in several application domains such as text categorisation 
(Sebastiani, 2002), internet traffic classification (Posch and Nguyen, 2012), recommender systems 
(Yavanoglu and Aydos, 2017), and malicious “uniform resource locator (URL)” detection (Sahoo, Liu 
and Hoi, 2017). An accurate prediction can help organisations detect frequent cyber-attacks, affected 
assets, risk type, and relevant controls with machine learning classifiers. Therefore, we used well-




3.2.3. Step 3: Research Validation 
To evaluate the main contributions of this research, an empirical research method is selected. The 
empirical analysis is growing in popularity in the information systems research domain (Runeson and 
Höst, 2009) because it is a valuable research tool for collecting relevant data for researching a 
complex information systems topic. As a consequence, a case study is chosen for this study. A case 
study is a technique that focuses on identifying the complexities that occur within a particular 
environment (Eisenhardt, 1989). Since it illustrates research initiatives and acts as a framework for 
creating well-structured research results, the case study methodology is commonly utilised in research 
domains(Straub, Boudreau and Gefen, 2004). The explanation for using a case study for this analysis 
is to provide concrete input on the validity of the i-CSRM system and stakeholder viewpoints on the 
efficacy of using ML techniques to enhance the overall protection of critical infrastructure. 
3.2.3.1. Technology Acceptance Model and Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of 
Technology 
We use the renowned Application Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) and the Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) in developing and assessing the questionnaire used to 
gather feedback from stakeholders (Venkatesh et al., 2003). TAM is concerned with predicting a 
newly created information system's adaptability by users within an environment to evaluate its 
acceptability to a context and the changes that may be made to make it applicable to all users. 
According to the authors, two main factors decide any information system's acceptability: perceived 
ease of usage and perceived utility. The degree to which an individual assumes that using a device can 
increase his success is referred to as perceived usefulness (Davis, 1989). The degree to which a person 
assumes that using a device can increase results is referred to as perceived ease of use. UTAUT, on 
the other hand, suggested four constructs: contextual impact, success expectancy, commitment 
expectancy, and encouraging environments, which are direct determinants of purpose and behaviour 
consumption (Karahanna and Straub, 1999). As a result, TAM and UTAUT were chosen because their 
structures tend to have some partnership for analysing feedback. 
3.3. Research Approach 
Choosing an effective research method is essential for any research study. The study methodology is 
the systematic application of several steps for data collection, examination, and comprehension to 
elicit concrete observations and conclusions (Amaratunga et al., 2002). According to (Orlikowski and 
Baroudi, 1991), it is essential to specifically grasp the purpose of analysis to assess and choose an 
appropriate strategy for achieving the goal. They went on to say that when choosing a research 
methodology, two considerations must be considered: the characteristics of the research subject and 
the time required to perform the analysis. 
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3.3.1. Qualitative research approach 
The qualitative analysis technique examines social phenomena and helps the researcher perceive and 
establish a detailed interpretation of the research results (Lewis, 2015). The qualitative research 
methodology, according to (Silverman, 2016),  allows for the use of various strategies such as case 
study, assessment, and interview to analyse the subject and provide a detailed description of the issue. 
Therefore, we implement the use of a qualitative analysis methodology as it helps the researcher link 
issues to the real-life case study.  
3.3.2. Quantitative research approach 
Quantitative research is systematic because it assesses research phenomena in numerical values 
(Kaplan and Duchon, 1988). The quantitative method allows for examining various variables and their 
relationships in a specific sense (Burns, 2000). A questionnaire, which includes a collection of 
specific questions and responses, illustrates a quantitative methodology analysis tool to obtain data. 
The data obtained for the questionnaire is evaluated statistically, and the conclusions are made 
available. In the case of i-CSRM for critical infrastructure, which is dependent on customer approval 
and implementation, a quantitative method is used to determine the variables that influence the 
organization's adoption decision.  
3.3.3. Mixed Research Approach 
The integration between qualitative and quantitative approaches is known as mixed methods, and 
conclusions were drawn using both approaches (Östlund et al., 2011). A mixed-method approach can 
produce a concrete outcome as it combines an ‘analytic’ approach to understand variables 
(quantitative) or a ‘systemic approach to understanding the interaction of variables (qualitative). In 
addition to a mixed-methods approach, (Malina, Nørreklit and Selto, 2011) claimed that using 
multiple methods and sources of data collection aids in producing ample evidence to address the 
research questions. A mixed method methodology enhances and maintains the efficiency of any study 
by using multiple techniques such as interviews and questionnaires. Using hybrid approaches, diverse 
forms of data are obtained from different outlets, which enhance and strengthen the data and 
conclusions' reliability. 
3.3.4. Adopted Research method for this research 
A mixed-method approach is considered for this research because it allows for qualitative and 
quantitative analysis, enabling a researcher to explore critical aspects and confirm quantitative 
analysis findings. This research focused not only on applying theory but also on testing the 
applicability of a framework and answering whether the proposed framework can improve cyber-
security risk management for critical infrastructure. The mixed-method methodology helps the study 
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be more diverse in terms of data collection and interpretation and draws conclusions and relating the 
results derived from the various data collection approaches (Creswell and Creswell, 2017).  
Also, various research techniques associated with qualitative research approaches were used to ensure 
rational research outcomes. The case study was considered to evaluate the practical implementation to 
a real-world scenario and guide the verification of i-CSRM framework validity and ML techniques' 
usability.  
3.4. Research Design 
The development of related procedures and descriptive theory to enable stakeholders to evaluate the i-
CSRM framework in an organisation with critical services is the focus of this research. The Research 
design that offers a transparent picture of the research structure, including data collection techniques, 
research queries, and data sources used in performing the analysis, is referred to as research design 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2002). The study design is determined by the type of study conducted to obtain 
quantitative outcomes or through an action plan that involves a series of exercises and activities based 
on the research questions to obtain results and conclusions (Maxwell, 2012). A study design allows a 
researcher to detail many of the research methods, such as choosing an appropriate testing 
methodology (Lewis, 2015). The following criteria’s were considered in establishing the research 
design: 
• In testing the practicality and relevancy of the framework, the researcher was involved 
directly, 
• A critical infrastructure domain was selected for testing the applicability of the proposed 
framework,  
• Guidance on how to apply descriptive theories,  
• In evaluating the practicability of the proposed framework, experienced stakeholders were 
involved. 
This research aims to examine risk management's role in critical infrastructure and how the 
framework can help organisations improve their risk management practices. An outline of the overall 
research design methodology used in this research is shown in Figure 3.12. The research architecture 
is divided into four main phases, each with its collection of activities. Firstly, a review and analysis of 
the existing literature within the problem domain is carried out to identify the knowledge gap. The 
second step is to build the i-CSRM framework to solve the research problems. The third step is 
associated with the techniques for testing and validating the proposed framework. The limitation of 
the study and future research work is concluded and presented in the last step. The four stages are 
presented as follows: 
Stage 1- Identifying current risk management practice 
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By reviewing the literature, state of the art in risk management for critical infrastructure is 
constructed. The results from reviewing the literature were used to identify problems in the current 
risk management practice. The findings from the literature review were used to define issues of the 
existing risk management practice. Empirical studies were conducted to investigate risk management 
practice in organisations that provide critical services, and a mixed-methods approach was followed 
for triangulation purposes which give research data reliability and validity. The qualitative method 
selected to triangulate the data was informal meetings/interviews. A set of semi-structured interviews 
was conducted with stakeholders within the organisation to confirm the findings and explore the 
current state of cybersecurity, the top management's expectations, and risk management limitations. 
This stage provided the foundation for developing the i-CSRM framework. 
Stage 2- Development of the i-CSRM framework 
This stage presents the concepts necessary for the proposed i-CSRM framework. We integrate the 
generic risk management concepts such as threat and vulnerability with CTI concepts such as TTP 
and indicators to improve and efficient risk management practice. In i-CSRM framework 
development, risk assessment is considered to evaluate risk factors, considering the adequacy of 
existing controls and deciding whether or not the risk is acceptable. It is essential to measure the 
magnitude of the impact of a risk factor on critical infrastructure. The i-CSRM concepts and their 
unique properties that are important for extracting features are then fed into the classifiers for risk 
prediction. Once the risk factors have been identified, the different controls regarding the 
organisation's security are introduced to mitigate those risks. ML is used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the existing controls and recommend more controls. 
Stage 3- Evaluation of the Case Study 
This stage introduced the proposed framework to organisations stakeholders, explained how it 
improves the risk management process and uses theory and decision-making techniques to conclude 
risk assessment results. A case study was conducted to evaluate the i-CSRM framework in a natural 
cyber environment. The case study began with an entrance meeting between the stakeholders and the 
researcher to set the organisations objective, scope, methodology and related risk management 
procedures. Information was gathered from relevant documents such as minutes of the meeting and 
Policies and Procedures Handbook and kept in the working paper file. A questionnaire was circulated 
to different information systems departments throughout the organisation, including system 
administrators, security experts, IT supervisors, and top management to assess the applicability of the 
framework.  
Stage 4- Discussion on the usability of the i-CSRM framework 
After completing the case study, the practicality and usability of the i-CSRM framework to enhance 
overall cybersecurity in organisations was judged. The framework's practicality and usability were 
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used to determine the framework's validity and applicability, its process, and i-CSRMT in supporting 
real-world organisations to achieve risk management. Figure 3.2 illustrates the analysis design method 
utilised in this study, which consists of four essential steps. 
 
Figure 3.2: Summary of Research Design 
3.5. Research Strategy 
The study approach outlines procedures for determining suitable research methods for analysing, 
testing, and validating the research hypothesis (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). (Lewis, 2015)discusses 
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that such study approaches are ideally adapted to specific research background and how the preferred 
approach will answer research concerns. Research methodology, research, architecture, data 
collection techniques, data interpretation, and evaluation are all components of a research approach. 
(Creswell and Creswell, 2017) describe a research strategy as arbitrary because the strategy is chosen 
based on the research challenge's characteristics. According to (Oates, 2005), there are only five 
research methods in social research: interview, case study, experiment, narratives, and archival 
material analysis. According to (Denscombe, 2008), there are only four analysis strategies: case 
analysis, survey, historical review, and experimental study. The research approach chosen is 
subjective and is determined by the essence of the research challenge. According to (Mills, 2000), 
there are four primary analysis strategies: case analysis, action testing, laboratory, and survey. When a 
technology is implemented into an enterprise, action analysis is typically performed to analyse and 
clarify the technology's socio-technical impact on customers and operations. Action analysis has been 
commonly used as a technique in information system research since it seeks to respond to both 
people's realistic needs and the socio-technical model's priorities. As a consequence, action analysis 
with case study and tests was selected for this review.  
3.6. Action Research 
This research used a participatory action research (PAR) methodology to implement and evaluate the 
proposed framework. According to (Brydon-Miller, Greenwood and Maguire, 2003), intervention 
analysis is supposed to be implemented in real-life challenges rather than laboratory experiments. 
Action study takes a systematic approach to problem-solving by integrating various data collection 
and interpretation approaches and tools (Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 1996). The primary 
distinction between action analysis and other research approaches is the participant's active 
involvement in the research, undermining objectivist science, which contends that the researcher 
should be an unbiased observer (Kemmis, McTaggart and Nixon, 2013). Therefore, the rationale 
behind adopting the PAR is the nature of this research that requires interpreting the qualitative 
approach's findings with reasoning rather than presenting quantitative data.  Also, the action research 
provides high level of practical relevance to the subject being studied. Action research allows data to 
be gathered by employing various methods i.e. observation, experiment, interview and written cases. 





Figure 3.3: Evaluation process of the proposed framework 
3.6.1. Case Study 
A case study method is selected for this research. A case study is defined as a strategy to focus on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989). When conducting a 
case study, the following process is involved (Runeson and Höst, 2009); case study design, data 
collection and analysing data. Therefore, an empirical evaluation was carried out through a case study 
to validate the framework's applicability and to demonstrate the validity of the i-CSRM framework. 
The experiment is also carried out on a dataset to further explore the validity and usefulness of using 
ML techniques as part of the i-CSRM framework, enabling the researcher to establish findings.  
3.6.2. Data collection methods 
Data collection from the case study is an essential process, and one of the most effective methods for 
finding all relevant information for this study (Cassell and Symon, 2004). Data collection and 
interpretation play an essential role in advancing the research hypothesis. According to (Yin, 2009), 
there are six essential data collection techniques to use in a case study setting, including informal 
sessions, conferences, focus group discussions, direct evaluation, reporting, tangible objects, and 
participant observation. In the course of the case study context implementation, different data 
collection techniques have been used. As it provides many potential data collection options, a case 
study is a flexible tool for stakeholders who want to understand specific problems in the workplace 
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(Turner and Danks, 2014). Also, both informal and formal data collection methods, such as interviews 
and questionnaires, were used. 
The initial step for data collection is through documentation made during the framework 
implementation process, and informal meetings, observations, workshops, and interview have been 
used throughout the implementation process.  The data collection process started with understanding 
the system context and interviewing the selected staff. We also reviewed various organisational 
documents to understand the existing policies and practices relating to risk management and 
information security. Note that we provided an overview of the integrated risk management approach 
before starting any data collection. The collected data were analysed by following both qualitatively 
and quantitatively methods. The analysis unit considered the existing risk management process, the 
number of identified risks and the effectiveness of risk control. Finally, we have taken the 
participants’’ view relating to the integrated risk management approach. 
3.6.3. Interviews 
The primary data techniques used in this research were interviews, group discussion and participant 
observation. Interviews were conducted to evaluate the implementation process of an i-CSRM 
framework based on a combination of subjective and objective questions. In qualitative research, there 
are two types of interviews; structured and semi-structured interview. A structured interview is rigid 
as the interviewer reads from a script, and findings are generally straightforward. Unstructured 
interviews tend to be very similar to informal conversation as the interviewers do not know all the 
necessary questions. In this research, triangulated semi-structured interviews were performed. 
Interviews were conducted during the initial step to investigate the existing risk management practice 
and later evaluate the i-CSRM framework.  
3.6.4. Informal Meetings/Workshops 
To gain feedback on the implementation process, informal meetings were held. This serves as an 
introduction to the process for all stakeholders and guidance in the implementation process. 
3.6.5. Observation 
In this research, observations were conducted to investigate how a specific task is carried out. This 
approach is used to closely monitor and observe how well the stakeholders applied the framework. 
Observations were recorded and analysed on how the i-CSRM framework is performing.   
3.6.7. Documentation 
In this research, document analysis was used to obtain preliminary and background information about 




In this research, experiments have been carried out by the researcher to observe and test the effect of 
ML techniques in predicting risk types using a dataset.  
3.6.9 Analyse Data 
The information gathered is analysed using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. It is essential 
to evaluate data to identify relationships between the group, person, program, or process identified in 
the problem statement. These relationships should address the research questions. Analysing data 
between cases followed by cross-checking data between cases is important (Eisenhardt, 1989). Once 
each case has been analysed, related themes between cases can be identified. According to (Turner 
and Danks, 2014), there are two types of analysis in a case study research; structural analysis and 
reflective analysis. The structural analysis focuses on identifying patterns, while reflective analysis 
uses the researcher’s judgement to gather conclusions. This research applies reflective analysis, which 
means it uses all relevant evidence, explores in detain all interpretation, and addresses the most 
significant aspect of i-CSRM framework for critical infrastructure.  
3.6.10. Expert Opinion 
Expert opinion is commonly used to determine a product is possible strengths and weaknesses before 
it is rendered accessible to consumers (Hasson, Keeney and McKenna, 2000). Expert opinion was 
used to generalise the case study results and gather opinion on the suggested framework's usability in 
the critical infrastructure domain. It has also been used to validate the dataset's mapping. The 
researcher has compiled several possible domain experts. Although the study covers a wide range of 
topics, including technical, organisational, and consumer viewpoints, specialists from many of these 
fields were chosen. The researcher weighed the amount of time the expert has worked on the topic, 
commitment to experience, position in the subject, professional qualification or another 
accomplishment in the subject domain, and their area of interest when choosing the expert. The 
framework's functionality, accessibility, and tasks were clarified to the participants in a user manual 
context. 
3.7. Integrated Cybersecurity Risk Management (i-CSRM) Framework 
An overview of the i-CSRM framework is presented in this section. The framework can be defined as 
the set of ideas or basic conceptual structures used for dealing with a particular problem (Shackel, 
2009). According to (Johnson and Foote, 1988), a framework represents a collection of concepts that 
an abstract architecture for solving a problem is reflected. The structure generally means a collection 
of definitions that main coordinate factors, structures, or constructs, as well as their relationships 
(Zachman, 1987). Frameworks are utilised in various fields, including enterprise processes, product 
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development, and information management. To ensure the rigorous application of philosophical 
theories, this analysis used a framework-oriented methodology. It also aids in the identification and 
interconnection of conceptual elements to ensure performance, efficacy, and accuracy and the 
identification of interrelationships between them.  Therefore, the i-CSRM framework introduced a 
logical representation of the interrelated key concepts needed for implementing a conceptual remedy. 
Furthermore, the i-CSRM framework integrates several concepts that act as a common language for 
enhancing risk management and providing a comprehensive means for managing cybersecurity risks. 
It decomposes and associates a high-level collection of concepts with one another to include a level of 
clarity that makes for precise implementation. 
3.8. Approach to Framework Development: Unified approach 
We considered four main areas for the unified approach. They include; CTI, existing risk management 
standards, controls and machine learning techniques. These four domains are integrated to form a 
unified approach used to improve risk management in critical infrastructure. Understanding threats 
and managing, monitoring, and communicating the presence of risks in critical infrastructure is the 
aim of the unified approach for the i-CSRM framework. As a result, the unified approach builds on 
existing industry practices to help organisations achieve overall risk control by ensuring that all steps 
and activities are carried out following universally agreed security criteria. For example, CIS CSC 
(Mbanaso, Abrahams and Apene, 2019)defines controls and assesses the efficacy of current controls 
using some of the parameters mentioned in (Dittmeier and Casati, 2014). The STIX model (Barnum, 
2012) for identifying CTI, i.e. threat actor attack pattern and information, CWE for communicating 
the impacts of vulnerabilities, OWASP provides basic techniques to protect against web application 
security challenges, and risk management standards such as NIST SP800-30 and ISO 27005:2011 
(Martin, 2007) for understanding risks in critical infrastructure. The proposed approach integrates the 
use of fuzzy set theory for determining and ranking critical assets and integrates CSRM concepts such 
as threat actor, assets, TTP and controls, extracts features from these concepts so that ML classifiers 
can predict certain risk types. The rationale for choosing these methods is that they are widely 
accepted standards for raising security awareness by identifying some of the most severe cyber-
physical organisations' faces. 
Note that, even though the unified approach uses these approaches, our contribution is beyond these 
existing works and focuses on improving risk management practice using CTI information. Our 
approach supports analysing risks by considering the attacker's profile and the evolving threat 
landscape. This makes our work different from STIX, emphasising analysing the threat profile and 
sharing this information. On the other hand, our work integrates CTI to provide a clear and vital role 
in risk management by identifying, assessing, and tracking threat, as well as evaluating current 
vulnerabilities in light of such threats .Integrating CTI with CSRM helps the organisation to analyse 
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and determine the likelihood and impact of risk. Figure 3.4 shows several areas that incorporate into a 
unified approach. 
 
Figure 3.4: Unified approach model for the development of i-CSRM  
3.9. Conceptual View of i-CSRM 
The conceptual approach generally requires a straightforward understanding and precise 
reinterpretation of abstract ideas or principles to understand what a system, frameworks, or concepts 
are, what they do, how they achieve clear objectives, and how they can be implemented (Chen, 1976). 
Conceptual view accurately and precisely provides a meaning for the concepts and models the 
concepts such that anyone with no knowledge will understand what risk management means. It also 
serves as the conceptual foundation used to develop the i-CSRM framework for critical infrastructure 
protection. 
Adopting a common terminology for the concepts would help interpret the concepts and the overall 
process implementation. For defining and explaining concepts in detail, conceptual modelling is 
highly recommended. These concepts are linked to vulnerability assessment, threat identification, risk 
management, and evaluating the effectiveness of existing controls. The emphasis is on the visual 
representation of the concepts to help their evaluation and study, utilising logical representation for 
each concept. Graph visualisation is one method that may be used to understand the structure of each 
concept further. Therefore, we used Protégé for graphically visualising the concepts and it includes a 
concept editor and other visualisation extensions. One of the most widely used ontology editors is 
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Protégé, is free, open-source ontology editor developed at Stanford University (Noy and McGuinness, 
2001). The i-CSRM framework concepts are organised in a generalisation hierarchy using Protégé 
using "is-a" links (inheritance). Each conception is made up of zero or more sub-concepts. To explain 
the modelled concepts' different features, each definition has an entity (relationship) and data 
(characteristics) properties. The following are the identified concepts and their ontological 
representations: 
3.9.1. Actor 
An actor represents an individual, such as an organisation or a human user, that has a strategic goal 
within its organisational context and performs specific activities (Castro, Kolp and Mylopoulos, 
2002). In other words, actors could be an organisation, functional department or set of people 
involved in providing, requesting or receiving critical services through many forms of information 
exchange. Actors are related and interact with each other in one or another. An organisation can be an 
actor with many different actors, such as staff and clients that use the services provided by the 
organisation. The interaction between actors is established by factors such as delivery and 
consumption of services, exchange of information or the provision of supporting computing needs. 
The increased service orientation and the opportunities of the critical services offered by the critical 
infrastructure's computing platforms have given rise to a set of new roles within the critical 
infrastructure. The listing of actors varies and will be determined in every organisation according to 
its volume of activities and resources. 
The Actor is divided into an external and internal actor. The internal Actor is the critical infrastructure 
organisation that supplies infrastructure and other services needed to run its operations and has skilled 
personnel who play different roles such as risk manager, information technology security analyst, 
senior engineer. External actors are mainly users outside the organisation who make use of the 
services provided by the organisation. They are also third-party actors who provide various forms of 
computing services such as internet services and are responsible for delivering multiple other services. 
The listing of actors varies and will be determined in every organisation according to its volume of 
activities and resources. There are different types of actors, and each has a role. It consists of sub-





Figure 3.5: Actors Classification concept for the development of i-CSRM process 
3.9.2. Assets 
Assets are necessary and have values to the organisation, such as an organisation's application or 
software. The critical assets are required for the stable and reliable functioning of the organisations 
business functions. This concept involves identifying an organisation's asset in terms of the assets 
used within the organisation. Assets are profiled to include categorisation according to asset 
criticality, asset security goal and supported business function to the organisation. The relevance of 
asset profiling is to help the organisation to have a standard, consistent, and clear understanding of 
asset boundaries, clearly designated asset goals, a description of how the asset is stored or processed, 
and an opportunity to determine the asset's criticality. The asset concept consists of sub-classes such 
as asset types, criticality and asset goal, as shown in Figure 3.6: 
• Asset profile: It describes the necessary descriptive information about the many components 
of all the organisation's asset types. Assets are profiled in a register to give a clear 
understanding of all assets and their subcomponents. The asset categories include:  
o Data are information stored and used by a computer system 
o Software is a program or application used by an organisation for its business 
activities. If such assets are not managed properly, they may result in financial loss, 
reputational damage and violation of privacy 
o Hardware is the collection of physical components of a computer system 
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o Information communications and networks are the physical connection between 
networked computing devices using cable media or wireless media. 
• Asset security goals: Each asset aims to achieve a security goal to determine the impact that 
may result from unauthorised access. Asset goals are established using five key areas related 
to information assets, including confidentiality, integrity, Availability, accountability, and 
conformance. 
• Asset criticality: Criticality is the significant indicator used by organisations to determine 
which asset is of more value to the organisation. The security goals are used to measure the 
criticality level of each asset within the organisation. An asset type's criticality level can be 
from highly critical, moderately critical, to low critical. Assets are highly critical if they are 
the most valuable to the organisation; a moderately critical rating represents a moderate 
value; while low criticality means little or no value. 
• Supported Business Process: business processes are structured activities or tasks backed by 
assets to serve a particular business objective or produce a service or product. Each asset is 





Figure 3.6: Asset Classification concept for the development of i-CSRM process 
3.9.3. Goals 
The goal of any critical infrastructure includes; the concealment of sensitive data against unauthorised 
users, ensuring the organisation's assets are made available and accessible to the end-users, and the 
assets' ability to perform their required functions effectively and efficiently without any disruption or 
loss of service. Therefore, this concept identifies each asset's goals in terms of security and 
organisational context, and the security analyst carries it out. Identifying security goals is an essential 
consideration for an organisation to determine what fundamental security principles must be ensured 
for assets to be accessed or modified during storage, processing or transmission by authorised 
systems, applications or individuals. The assets' goals represent factors against which asset criticality 
is measured; they are used to distinguish those assets whose loss could significantly impact the 
organisation's objectives. They include:   
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• Availability (A): Availability refers to ensuring that an asset is made available and accessible 
to authorised users when and where they need it. This asset goal is essential, and one of the 
primary objectives to ensure the organisation's reliable operation. In the case the asset gets 
interrupted, it must be recovered and continue secure operations without noticeable effects.  
• Integrity (I): Asset integrity refers to an asset's ability to perform its required functions 
effectively and efficiently without any disruption or loss of its services. The modification or 
destruction of an asset leads to the loss of the integrity of the asset. Loss of asset integrity 
may occur due to the intrusion in the cyber domain by the attacker or disgruntled employees 
or by human error, which degrades the asset's reliability.  
• Confidentiality (C): Asset confidentiality refers to assets staying secured and trusted and 
preventing unauthorised disclosure of sensitive data. Exposure to a sensitive asset can lead to 
a loss of confidentiality. Confidentiality ensures that only those with predefined rights and 
privileges to access an asset can do so. One of the simplest methods to provide 
confidentiality is to install encryption/decryption components at both ends of an unsecured 
connection (Taylor and Sharif, 2017). 
• Accountability (ACC): This asset goal requires that attack or incident actions that occur on an 
asset are tractable to the responsible system or Actor. It must be ensured that an authorised 
actor or an attacker who acts cannot deny involvement.  
• Conformance (CON): This asset goal ensures that the assets such as services meet the 
specified standard. Assets must operate as intended without variation to expected behaviour, 
functions and regulatory requirements. The asset must be secured from vulnerabilities that 
can be exploited to cause unwanted behaviour. Any breach or deviation from specified action 
constitutes non-conformance.  
The control concept consisting of sub-classes such as Availability, integrity, conformance, 




Figure 3.7: Goal Classification concept for the development of i-CSRM process 
3.9.4. Threat Actor 
Threat actors are actors with malicious intents to execute a cyber-attack. This concept aims to allow 
identification and characterisation of the threat actor so that organisations can understand the attack, 
its trend, and the factors to determine the risk level. It consists of sub-classes like Skill, Motivation, 
Location, Resources, Size, and Opportunity, as shown in Figure 3.8. 
 
 Figure 3.8: Threat Actor Classification concept for the development of i-CSRM process 
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3.9.5. Tactic, Techniques and Procedure (TTP) 
This concept describes various methods in which a threat actor executes an attack and possible 
outcome. TTP involves the pattern of activities or methods associated with a specific threat actor and 
consist of the threat actor’s specific behaviour (attack pattern) and specific software tools that can be 
used to perform an attack. A threat actor uses TTP to plan and manage an attack by following a 
specific technique and procedure. Therefore, TTP from the STIX model categorises attacks into the 
eleven tactics and the different techniques under each tactic provided by MITRE (Strom et al., 2017). 
TTP consist of sub-classes such as initial access, execution, persistence, privileged escalation, 
defence evasion, credential access, discovery, lateral movement, collection, exfiltration and command 
and control.  These subclasses further consist of their subclasses, as shown in Figure 3.9. For 
example, initial access consists of subclasses such as Spearphishing attachment, Spearphishing link.  
 
Figure 3.9: TTP classification concept for the development of i-CSRM process 
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3.9.6. Indicator of Compromise 
The indicator concept contains a pattern that can be used to detect suspicious or malicious cyber 
activity. IOC is detective in nature and is for specifying conditions that may exist to indicate the 
presence of a threat along with relevant contextual information. Organisations should be aware of the 
data associated with cyber-attacks, known as indicators of compromise (IOC). IOC is commonly 
partitioned into three distinct sub-classes (Tounsi and Rais, 2018). The sub-classes include network 
indicator, host-based indicator and email indicator. These sub-classes have their sub-classes, as 
shown in Figure 3.10. For instance, the email indicator has a sub-class email attachment, email link. 
The network indicator has a sub-class IP address. 
• Network indicators are found in URL and domain names used for command and control and 
link-based malware delivery. They could be IP addresses used in detecting attacks from 
botnets, known compromised servers and systems conducting DDoS attack. 
• Host-based indicators are found by analysing infected computers. They include malware 
names and decoy documents or file hashes of the malware being investigated.  Dynamic-link 
libraries (DLLs) are often targeted, and registry keys could be added by malicious code to 
allow for persistence. 
• Email indicators are created when threat actors use free email services to send social 
engineering emails to target organisations. The email source address and subject are created 
from addresses that appear to be recognisable individuals or create intriguing subject lines. 
Attachments and links are also used for deceiving individuals. 
 





Vulnerability is the weakness or mistake in an organisation's security program, software, systems, 
networks, or configurations targeted and exploited by a threat actor to gain unauthorised access to an 
asset (system or network) using TTP. There are several ways an attacker can exploit vulnerabilities in 
critical infrastructures, thereby causing severe damage. This could be from a threat actor only being 
able to view information and to a worst-case scenario. Regardless of the Vulnerability discovered, the 
threat actor could have little or complete control over the system and any action taken is referred to as 
a cyber-attack. It consists of sub-classes such as Vulnerability types, Vulnerability Factors, Assets 
targeted, as shown in Figure 3.11. 
 
Figure 3.11: Vulnerability Classification concept for the development of i-CSRM process 
3.9.8. Threat 
The threat is the possibility of a malicious attempt to damage or disrupt an organisations asset 
(systems or networks), access files and infiltrate or steal data. The threat is identified as an individual 
or group of people attempting to gain access or exploit a vulnerability of an organisation's asset or the 
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damage caused to hinder the organisations' ability to provide its services. Threats such as denial of 
service or malware attacks are famous threats to critical infrastructures, causing security challenges to 
the interconnected devices (Baldoni, 2014). Threat profile allows for the identification and 
understanding of threat characteristics. Therefore, organisations need to categorise each threat 
according to their goals and purpose and the assets targeted. By classifying these threats, the 
stakeholders check the category that a threat falls under and the most common assets affected by a 
particular threat. With this, a solid foundation of threat information sources is made available. It 
consists of sub-classes such as Threat types,as shown in Figure 3.12. 
 
Figure 3.12: Threat Classification concept for the development of i-CSRM process 
3.9.9. Risk 
Risk is defined as the probable failure of an actor (organisation or individual) to fulfil its goals, such 
as confidentiality, due to the probability of a threat actor obstructing the Actor's goal. Organisations 
cannot wholly avoid Risk; however, it is the actors' role to ensure that risks are kept to a minimum 
level to achieve their goals. Therefore, organisations need to identify security risks that need to be 
rated. The consequence of Risk resulting from cyber-attack can lead to financial loss, reputational 
damage, privacy violation and non-compliance consequences, leaving users distrustful of services. To 
understand a cyber-attack, we have to study the nature of the attack and its motivation (Gandhi et al., 
2011). Therefore, for risk severity to be estimated, it is essential for information about the threat actor, 
vulnerability factors and the impact of a successful exploit affecting the security goals of the assets to 
be gathered. The following sub-classes are involved in identifying the risk level; threat type, 




Figure 3.13: Risk Classification concept for the development of i-CSRM process 
3.9.10. Controls 
These are the corrective, detective and preventive actions to mitigate Risk. Preventive controls keep 
errors or irregularities from occurring; detective controls detect errors and irregularities, which have 
already occurred and ensured their immediate correction. Corrective controls help to mitigate damage 
once a risk has materialised. This means that the level of attack determines the type of control used, 
and the effectiveness of the existing controls is evaluated. The CIS_CSC recommended a list of 
controls that we adopt for the proposed framework. This means that the level of attack determines the 
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type of control to be used and the effectiveness of the existing controls. To evaluate the effectiveness 
of the existing controls, an assessment of each control objective is carried out. We apply a set of 
criteria: Relevance- The level to which the control addresses the relevant control objectives under 
analysis. Strength- The strength of the control is determined by a series of factors. Coverage is the 
levels at which all significant risks are addressed. Integration- The degree and manner in which the 
control reinforces other control processes for the same objective—traceability- How traceable the 
control is, which allows it to be verified subsequently in all respects. The sub-class is control type and 
control effectiveness, as shown in Figure 3.14.  
 








Figure 3.14: A unified meta-model for i-CSRM development 
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The Meta-model, illustrated in Figure 3.14 shows the relationship between the concepts. An actor 
represents an entity, an organisation or a human user that generates strategic, operational and tactical 
plans within its organisational setting. Identifying actors is essential for determining the roles played by 
actors and the implementation of the framework's process. An actor owns a wide range of assets that 
require several security goals for supporting the business process. As a result, critical assets to operations 
are comprehensively profiled to include the security goal every asset must achieve, the business process 
supported by assets, and, importantly, each asset's criticality to the organisation. The Actor is represented 
as having an interest in the organisation's assets. These assets have security goals such as confidentiality, 
integrity and Availability for the business's continuation and reputation, and the attainment of one or more 
of the goals is always their focus. The Actor has complete control over its assets and needs to keep the 
assets secure for its continuity, but these assets are prone to weaknesses in their systems, known as 
vulnerabilities. Vulnerability is the weakness or mistake in an organisation's security program, software, 
systems, networks, or configurations targeted and exploited by a threat actor to gain unauthorised access 
to an asset (system or network) using TTP. When not addressed on time, these vulnerabilities can lead to 
a threat that introduces Risk, and this Risk is likely to lead to the exploitation of the assets. Risk is the 
failure of an organisation or individual to achieve its goals due to the malicious attempt to disrupt its 
critical services by a threat. Organisations cannot wholly avoid Risk; however, it is the actors' role to 
ensure that risks are kept to a minimum level to achieve the goals by integrating CTI to improve i-CSRM. 
Therefore, the different controls regarding security and the organisation are introduced to help mitigate 
the risks.  
The threat actor is a type of Actor with malicious intent characterised by their identity, suspected 
motivation, goals, skills, resources available for them to carry out a successful attack, past activities, TTP 
used to generate a cyber-attack and their location within the organisation's network. They try to 
impersonate actors by deceiving users of the critical infrastructure into believing them and then getting 
hold of some sensitive information or directly compromising their critical assets and leading to a 
significant risk to the organisation. This is done when vulnerabilities in an asset of the organisationare 
exploited using some TTP. A threat actor uses TTP to plan and manage an attackby following a specific 
technique and procedure. They involve the pattern of activities or methods associated with a specific 
threat actor and consist of the threat actor's specific behaviour (attack pattern) and specific software tools 
that threat actors can use to perform an attack leaving behind the attack's incident. The incident is the type 
of event that represents information about an attack on the organisation. Some specific components 
determine the type of incident, such as; threat types, threat actor's skill, capability and location, assets 
affected, parties involved, and time. With a specific attack pattern, the organisation tends to think broadly 
by developing a range of possible outcomes to increase their readiness for a range of possibilities in the 
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future. Indicators contain a pattern that can be used to detect suspicious or malicious cyber activity. They 
are detectives for specifying conditions that may exist to indicate the presence of cyber activity. An 
Indicator may be used to represent a set of malicious domains. They are a detective in nature and are for 
specifying conditions that may exist to indicate the presence of a TTP along with relevant contextual 
information. Indicators are not used to characterise any given threat actors behaviour, only how to detect 
it. 
Table 3.1 shows the relationship between all the concepts.  
Table 3.1: Relationship between Concepts 
Source Type Target 
Actor Generates Report 
Actor Needs Assets 
Threat actor Impersonates Actor 
Threat actor Exploits Vulnerability 
Threat actor Uses TTP 
Threat actor Generates Incident 
Threat actor Attacks Assets 
Incident Affects Actor 
Incident Results to Risk 
Incident Affects Asset 
Incident Influenced by Threat 
Vulnerability Influences Threats 
Controls Addresses Vulnerability 
Control Mitigates TTP 
Controls Addresses Threats 
Controls Mitigates Incident 
TTP Exploits Vulnerability 
Indicator Specifies TTP 
Indicator Indicates Threat actor 
Indicator Generates Incident 
Risk Requires Control 
Risk Affects Actor 
Risk Requires Control 
Threat Introduces Risk 
 
3.10. Summary 
This chapter presented a detailed narration of the research methodology adopted in developing and 
evaluating the proposed framework. It outlined essential steps that have been taken, including; a 
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systematic literature review, framework development, process development, evaluation, discussion, and 
confirmation of research aims and objectives. It also presented the types of research approaches that exist 
and the chosen approach for this research. A research design provides an overview of the research 
structure, including methods used for data collection.    
The research methodology used in developing and evaluating the proposed framework was described in 
depth in this chapter. It presented the main steps, such as a comprehensive literature review, process 
development, evaluation, discussion, and confirmation of research aims and objective. It also discussed 
the various research methods available and the methods chosen for this study.  
This chapter also provides the fundamental properties and basics of i-CSRM. It presented a new definition 
of security transparency from a cloud computing perspective and essential areas of focus for security 
transparency in the cloud. Also, it offered the reasons for ensuring security transparency and how 
transparency can support businesses. The chapter also discussed the salient properties of cloud security 
transparency such as auditability, accountability and assurance, as well as the barriers that hinder 
transparency. Further, the principles and categories of security transparency are introduced which provide 
the basis for developing the CSTF. Importantly, the chapter introduced security transparency deployment 














Process for the Integrated Cybersecurity Risk Management (i-CSRM) Framework 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the underlying process involved in the i-CSRM framework. 
Primarily, the process aims to introduce different phases of activities that organisations can follow for 
understanding and managing risks by looking at essential considerations such as identifying roles, 
assessing critical assets, identifying vulnerabilities and threats, assessing risks, and evaluating controls. 
The process also helps organisations understand the associated risks and the necessary control measures 
to align with the business goals. The process helps organisations build a risk management profile from 
scratch to the end, meaning that they will provide accurate information about risks based on the context 
and validate whether expectations are being met by the organisation continuously. Therefore, the 
principal beneficiaries of the framework and its process are organisations that provide critical 
infrastructures responsible for ensuring the security of a given nation, its economy, and the public's health 
and safety and data protection. Hence, it is essential to emphasise that the framework does not focus on 
individual users who usually do not have as much obligation towards overall security, diverse 
requirements and responsibilities as organisations.  
An essential aspect of the process is that it provides systematic activities for developing an efficient risk 
management approach that is mainly security-oriented and provides a roadmap for organisations to 
achieve overall cybersecurity. The process's core includes several diverse activities and steps to help 
guide key decision points about organisational context, threat and vulnerability activities, potential risks, 
and security controls. It helps identify and interlink risk management components for ensuring efficiency, 
effectiveness and consistency within different areas of the organisation.     
Another essential feature of the process is that most of the activities are designed by considering various 
leading industry best practices, frameworks, guidelines, and standards applicable to all organisations 
regardless of their size or the domain in which they operate.  This implies that the process is all-
encompassing in nature and not tailored to a specific organisation type or solution but built upon high-
level considerations to ensure important cybersecurity issues are not overlooked.  
4.2. Integrated Cybersecurity Risk Management (i-CSRM) Process: A Unified Approach 
The process for the i-CSRM framework is simply a unified approach that leverages existing industry 
standards to assist critical infrastructures in attaining overall cybersecurity by ensuring that every step and 
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activity is performed according to generally accepted security principle. Sections of renowned industry 
standards, guidelines, frameworks and models were applied across different activities by looking at 
specific features within the standards and where they can be applied. Using this widely accepted standard 
is because they are industry standards and do not require any form of verification. The following are the 
different standards /guidelines: 
4.2.1. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) 
For organisations to respond to their specific threats and make informed decisions on which 
countermeasures to deploy, they must have detailed threat information. Therefore, we consider STIX the 
most widely used CTI method for the specification, capture, characterisation and communication of 
standardised cyber threat information.  
4.2.2. Fuzzy logic 
For a successful risk management process, asset identification is crucial and needs to be initiated before 
any risk is identified. Therefore, we propose the use of fuzzy logic to determine the criticality of assets 
within an organisation. Our unified approach integrates the use of fuzzy set theory which provides a way 
of absorbing the uncertainty inherent to phenomena whose information is unclear and uses a strict 
mathematical framework to ensure precision and accuracy, as well as the flexibility to deal with both 
quantitative and qualitative variables (Zimmermann, 2011).  
4.2.3. Risk Management Standards 
We considered ISO 27005:2011 as a widely accepted risk management standard for our work. We also 
considered CWE for understanding the underlying weaknesses and OWASP methodology for 
determining the impact of risks.  
• Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE): CWE seeks to understand and characterise 
vulnerabilities, misconfigurations or weaknesses that are likely to be targeted. It introduces a 
common weakness scoring system (CWSS), which provides a mechanism for prioritising 
software weaknesses consistently, flexibly, and openly. It is a standardised approach for 
characterising weaknesses and allowing organisations to make more informed decisions during 
the risk management phase and give higher risks (Martin, 2007).  
• ISO 27005:2011: ISO 27005:2011 considers risk management as an integral part of the overall 
organisational processes, including evaluating the effectiveness of controls (Firoiu, 2015). We 
consider identifying the existing controls and their effectiveness by following this standard. 
• OWASP: To ensure consistency and relevance of risks and their impact, we adopted the OWASP 
risk methodology (Tymchuk, Iepik and Sivyakov, 2017). This methodology helps organisations 
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estimate risk from business and technical perspectives, and it is also highly adaptable and 
applicable to most organisations of any sizes. In identifying relevant risks, risk sources from 
OWASP are considered because it maintains a regularly-updated list of most pressing 
cybersecurity concerns.  
• Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC): CAPEC provides a 
publicly available catalogue of common attack patterns that helps users understand how 
adversaries exploit weaknesses in applications and other cyber-enabled capabilities (Barnum, 
2008). Attack Patterns are descriptions of adversaries' common attributes and approaches to 
exploit known weaknesses in cyber-enabled capabilities. Attack patterns define the challenges 
that an adversary may face and how they go about solving them. Each attack pattern captures 
knowledge about how specific parts of an attack are designed and executed and gives guidance on 
ways to mitigate the attack's effectiveness. Attack patterns help those developing applications or 
administrate cyber-enabled capabilities to understand better the specific elements of an attack and 
how to stop them from succeeding. 
• Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC): CAPEC is a structured 
approach for understanding how an adversary operates. It provides a comprehensive list of known 
attacks employed by an adversary to exploit known cyber environment weaknesses. Such a model 
enables the identification, classification; rating, comparison and prioritisation of security risks 
associated with systems and applications, and this relevant model have been adopted for threat 
analysis for adequate cybersecurity.  
4.2.4. Controls 
Risk controls are generic fundamental, technical or procedural methods that are used to manage security 
risks. Thus, we select control measures from the predefined list provided by CIS CSC and ENISA. CIS 
CSC (Mbanaso, Abrahams and Apene, 2019) and ENISA are renowned industry guidelines for 
identifying risk control measures. 
• The Centre for Internet Security Critical Security Controls (CIS_CSC) and ENISA: 
CSC_CIS and ENISA are used for identifying risk control measures. This is because CIS CSC 
provides 20 controls categorised into three prioritised and defence-in-depth best practices that are 
implementable to mitigate the most common attacks against systems and networks. It also 
provides adequate controls that organisations should take to block or mitigate known attacks into 
their defensive cybersecurity portfolio. Some of these controls are relevant to cybersecurity risks, 
while others are less relevant. Further, ENISA provides 27 baseline security controls that focus on 
control measures that protect computing systems against operational risks. As a result, a parallel 
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matching is performed for identifying semantic equivalence between controls in CSC CIS and 
ENISA. 
4.3. Integrated Cybersecurity Risk Management (i-CSRM) Process 
From this research perspective, a process is considered a systematic set of activities executed towards 
accomplishing cybersecurity risk management. A process establishes a solid relationship between 
multiple steps for the effective delivery of an expected outcome. An activity deals with linked tasks that 
are interdependent that receive and convert one or more input into an output artefact (Knight and Burn, 
2005). The process provides a means of contextualising an organisation, determining critical assets, 
profiling threats and vulnerabilities, profiling risks, and determining existing controls' effectiveness. The 
process manifests efficiency and adequacy for analysing the cybersecurity aspects of critical infrastructure 
and can determine the effectiveness of existing controls.  
The process also provides an overview of vital phases that an organisation considers when considering the 
cybersecurity risk management framework. For simplification purposes, the process is decomposed into 
activities and steps that provide a lower level of detail, as outlined in Table 4.1. The division of the 
process is imperative in creating a comprehensive set of related activities that allow organisations to 
identify and achieve deliverables for i-CSRM. Activity one and two focuses on the organisation's scope 
for gaining a comprehensive understanding of supported assets, functions, goals and essential security 
requirements. Activity three gathers vulnerability and threat information from multiple sources through 
various means to address vulnerabilities protect assets and respond to threats.  Activity four determines 
the risk level and provides a risk register with the previous activities' data. Activity five implements 
control measures and evaluate the effectiveness of the existing control. The effectiveness of one activity 
determines the essential elements of information needed for the next activity. Therefore, activity five 
evaluates the effectiveness of the existing controls. Each activity specifies the steps that need to be 
followed, and each step identifies the needful inputs, participating actors and final output.  
Primarily, the output of each activity serves as the input to the next activity that follows it. The process's 
effectiveness is mainly achieved when conducted with the support of security experts delegated by an 
organisation to oversee the i-CSRM project. Hence, an organisation must delegate suitable actors to 





Table 4.1: i-CSRM Framework Process 




and their roles 
They are grouping the actors into 
internal and external. Internal actors 
represent the respective roles and 
responsibilities of 
personnel/departments within an 
organisation. External actors include 
stakeholders that are involved in the 
delivery of other services outside the 
organisation 
Examining job profile, 
roles, duties and 
responsibilities of actors 
Top management  A defined list of actor and 
their roles 
Activity 2: 
Asset Identification and 
Criticality 
Asset Profiling An overview and list of the 
organisation's assets, their core 
functionalities and subcomponents. 
Review of asset inventory, 
security policy, interviewing 
security analyst and 
physical observation of 
assets 
Security Analyst 
and IT Manager 
Description of assets, 
functions, and 
subcomponents owners, 




Existing asset profile Combination of asset 
control principles and 
organisation's security 
policies 
Security Analyst  
 
 
Enumeration of security 
goals and principles that 
each asset must achieve for 




Asset profile and goals. Employing asset criticality 
ranking using fuzzy logic to 
determine criticality level 
Security analyst Consistent and unambiguous 
classification of assets 
according to criticality level 
to the organisation's 
processes and functions. 
Activity 3: 




Organisational assets and list of 
vulnerabilities provided by CWE 
Employing CWE 
methodology for 
vulnerability ranking  
Security Analyst  A comprehensive 
vulnerability profile ranking 
vulnerabilities in assets 




Organisational assets, list of threats 
provided by CAPEC 
Employing the CAPEC 
model for threat analysis  
Security Analyst  A comprehensive threat 
profile detailing potential 
threats  to assets according 








A collection of security risks from 
OWASP that are associated with the 
threats are identified 
Application of OWASP risk 
methodology that provides a 
list of risk types  
Security Analyst  A detailed risk register 
highlighting risks types  
Risk level 
prediction 
A collection of vulnerabilities and list 
of critical asset, potential threats 
identified and existing control 
measures are provided from CAPEC 
Application of machine 
learning technique that 
estimates risks type and risk 
level 
Security Analyst  A detailed risk register 
highlighting risks type and 






A list of organisations controls 
detailing control functionalities 
Review of control inventory 
and report of existing 
control measures 
Security Analyst A detailed control register 
highlighting existing 
controls 
Determine the  
effectiveness of 
existing Controls 
The result of findings based on 
examining and analysing existing 
controls and implementing new 
controls from CIS CSC 
Manual and automated 
documentation of findings 
Security Analyst A detailed control register 
highlighting existing 





4.3.1. Activity 1: Organisational context 
Every organisation exclusively operates within a defined scope and available resources. 
Organisational context tends to better understand the organisation's existing state by providing the 
essential elements of information needed to give an i-CSRM framework proper direction to be 
achieved successfully. The organisational context involves identifying its significant stakeholders, 
actors, critical assets, security goals and how they impact risk management and viability. A 
stakeholder is any entity with a conceivable interest or stake in an activity (Goodpaster, 1991). A 
stakeholder can be an individual, group of individuals, or an institution affected by or influences an 
activity's impact. Stakeholders are actors such as top management and administrators. Who are 
directly or indirectly involved in influencing the success of the organisation and its processes. To 
successfully execute the process and achieve this activity, it is essential to obtain a comprehensive 
picture of actors and their roles in meeting requirements. This becomes important in identifying and 
avoiding a potential conflict of interests and other issues such as the actors responsible for the security 
and maintenance of organisations assets. 
4.3.1.1. Step 1: Identification of Actors and their roles 
An actor represents an entity such as an organisation or human user with a strategic goal within its 
organisational setting, carries out specific activities and makes informed decisions. Actors interact 
with the organisation's systems or relationships by providing technical and nontechnical support or 
services to the organisation. The nature of communications between actors needs to be clearly 
balanced, reconciled, interpreted and managed accordingly. The organisation's activities require an 
active set of actors to carry out various tasks to guide and lead the organisation in achieving its goals 
and ensuring its successful operations. In this case, actors can be identified as internal and external 
actors. The internal actor is the organisation itself that supply infrastructure, network facilities and 
other services needed to run its operations and has skilled personnel who play different roles such as 
information technology security analyst, risk manager and senior engineer. External actors mainly 
include users who use the organisation's services and third-party vendors who provide other services 
such as internet services. 
4.3.2. Activity 2: Asset Identification and Criticality 
This activity aims to identify and prioritise assets in terms of their boundary, components and 
assigning weights to the assets based on the organisation's importance. Assets are specific units such 
as hardware, a database, application, or program that support the delivery and usage of an 
organisation's services. 
Furthermore, to support organisations in assessing each asset's criticality, a decision support system 
using fuzzy set theory is created. A fuzzy set theory provides a way of absorbing the uncertainty 
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inherent to phenomena whose information is unclear and uses a strict mathematical framework to 
ensure precision and accuracy and the flexibility to deal with both quantitative and qualitative 
variables (Zimmermann, 2011). It can be used for approximate reasoning, easy to implement and 
adopt individual perception without incurring complexity within the risk management process. This 
activity includes three steps; identify assets and their goals, determining asset criticality, and 
identifying the business process. The resulting critical asset list is then used to assess vulnerability 
assessment and threat identification in Activity 3. 
4.3.2.1. Step 1: Asset Profile 
This step's basis is to profile assets in terms of their components, boundaries and assigning weight to 
the assets based on assets vital to the organisation. Assets are specific units such as a database, 
application, or program that support the delivery and usage of an organisation's services. To create 
asset profiles, a Security Analyst is involved in identifying assets by considering the core functions of 
the assets, alongside other subcomponents essential to achieving and maintaining crucial functions. 
Important asset information can be gathered by reviewing background materials, including 
independent audit/analytical reports, interviewing the critical infrastructure users, and physical 
observation of organisational assets. Besides, asset specification and management documentation 
provide essential details about the organisational asset. 
4.3.2.2. Step 2: Identify Asset Security Goals  
Security asset goals are specific attributes that describe assets expected conformance to secure 
behaviour: they are also referred to as security principles. Identifying assets security goals is vital for 
an organisation to determine what critical views of security must be ensured by each asset during 
processing, storage, or transmission by authorised systems, applications, or individuals. Also, asset 
security goals are used in determining the impact that may result from accessing assets in an 
unauthorised manner for use, interruption, change, disclosure. Therefore, the Security Analyst 
considers a set of security goals that each asset aims to achieve. The consequential impact that may 
ensure the compromise of the security goals and the level of protection needed can be easily 
determined. There are different asset categories we consider for asset criticality. They include; 
software, data, hardware, information communications and network and people. We further defined a 
set of asset security goals every asset must aim to achieve, such as; 
• Asset Availability (A): Availability refers to ensuring that an asset is made available and 
accessible to authorised users when and where they need it.  
• Asset Integrity (I): Asset integrity refers to an asset's ability to perform its required functions 
effectively and efficiently without disrupting or losing its services. 
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• Asset Confidentiality (C): Asset confidentiality refers to assets staying secured and trusted 
and preventing unauthorised disclosure of sensitive data. 
• Accountability (ACC): This asset goal requires that attack or incident actions that occur on 
an asset are tractable to the responsible system or actor. 
• Conformance (CON): This asset goal ensures that the assets such as services meet the 
specified standard. 
4.3.2.3. Step 3: Determine Asset Criticality 
This step aims to identify and prioritise an organisation's critical asset by assessing those assets' 
primary security goals. In other words, the criticality of each asset is based on its relative importance. 
Asset criticality is imperative for prioritising and developing actions that will reduce risks to the asset, 
improve asset reliability, and define strategies for implementing the appropriate controls. To ensure 
validity, consistency, and support stakeholders in assessing each asset's criticality, a decision support 
system using fuzzy set theory is created. Fuzzy set theory plays a vital role in the decision process 
enhancement. It helps to deal with or represent the meaning of vague concepts, usually in situation 
characterisation such as linguistic expressions like "very critical". Fuzzy logic, introduced by (Zadeh, 
1988), is one of the best ways to deal with all types of uncertainty, including lack of knowledge or 
vagueness (Markowski and Mannan, 2009). This system provides a methodology for computing 
directly with the word. Fuzzy set theory is a generalisation of classical set theory that provides a way 
to absorb the uncertainty inherent to phenomena whose information is vague and supply a strict 
mathematical framework to ensure precision and accuracy, as well as the flexibility to deal with both 
quantitative and qualitative variables (Zimmermann, 2011). 
4.3.2.3.1. Development of a Fuzzy Asset Criticality System (FACS)  
Criticality is the primary indicator used to determine the importance of the assets to the organisation. 
After the different assets have been identified, we determine the criticality based on their relative 
importance using Fuzzy Asset Criticality System (FACS). 
• Fuzzification: FACS determines asset criticality by using (C, I, A, CON and ACC) as the 
five fuzzy inputs for assessing the criticality of individual assets and assigning a level of 
criticality. Each input is assigned five fuzzy labels Very Low (VL), Low (L), Medium (M), 
High (H) and Very High (VH), for assessing the level of the fuzzy output Asset criticality 
(AC) value which is assigned five fuzzy labels Very Low Critical (VLC), Low Critical (LC), 
Medium Critical (MC), High Critical (HC) and Very High Critical (VHC) of individual 
assets. The details of fuzzy sets applied in the first step of the fuzzy inference system are 
presented in Table 4.2.  




Figure 4.21 Structure of the Fuzzy Asset Criticality System (FACS) 
Table 4.2 shows the numerical ranges in which fuzzy sets are selected based on them. The 
membership functions for AC also are depicted on a scale of 1 to 5. 
Table 4.2: Fuzzy Ratings 







How much data 
could be disclosed, 
and how sensitive 
is it? 
Very High (VH) 5 All data disclosed 
High (H) 4 Extensive critical data 
disclosed 
Medium (M) 3 Extensive non-sensitive 
data disclosed 
Low (L) 2 Minimal critical data 
disclosed 




How many services 
could be lost, and 
how vital is it? 
 
Very High (VH) 5 All services completely 
lost 
 
High (H) 4 Extensive primary 
services interrupted 
Medium (M) 3 Extensive secondary 
services interrupted 
Low (L) 2 Minimal primary services 
interrupted 
Very Low (VL) 1 Minimal secondary 
services interrupted 
Integrity How much data Very High (VH) 5 All data corrupt 
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(I) could be corrupted, 
and how damaged 
is it? 
High (H) 4 Extensive seriously 
corrupt data 
Medium (M) 3 Extensive slightly corrupt 
data 
Low (L) 2 Minimal seriously corrupt 
data 




Are the threat 
actors traceable to 
an individual? 
Very High (VH) 5 Completely anonymous 
High (H) 4 Fully traceable 
Medium (M) 3 Highly traceable 
Low (L) 2 Possibly Traceable 








Very High (VH) 5 Full variation 
 
High (H) 4 High profile variation 
Medium (M) 3 Clear variation 
Low (L) 2 Low variation  
Very Low 
(VL) 
1 Very low variation 
Output Asset Criticality 
(AC) 
How critical is the 




5 Extremely critical and is 
of high value to the CI 
organisation, it requires 




4 High importance to the 
organisation and requires 
a high level of protection. 
Medium Critical 
(MC) 
3 The asset is moderately 
important to the 




2 The asset is of minimal 
importance and does not 




1 The asset non-critical and 
requires a very low level 
of protection 
 
• Rules: There are many fuzzy inference methods; however, this research uses the Min-Max 
fuzzy inference method proposed by Mamdani (Cordón, 2011).This research employs 
Mamdani's method due to several advantages (Cord, 2001):  
 It is suitable for engineering systems because its inputs and outputs are real-valued 
variables 




 It allows for a high degree of freedom in the choices of fuzzifier, fuzzy inference 
engine, and defuzzifier so that the most suitable fuzzy logic system for a particular 
problem is obtained. It provides a natural framework to include expert knowledge in 
the form of linguistic rules.  
We used 125 IF-THEN rules to provide a database by mapping five input parameters (C, A, I, CON 
and ACC) and AC value. The rules are designed to follow the logic of the Asset criticality evaluator. 
A number of the IF-THEN rules of the developed system are shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: Rules Set for FACS to generate a new conclusion 
• Inference Engine: An inference engine attempts to create solutions from the database. In this 
paper, the inference engine maps fuzzy input sets (C, A, I, ACC and CON) into fuzzy output 
set (AC). Figure 4.3 shows several IF-THEN rules to provide a more understanding of the 




Figure 4.3: Sample of Rules 
• Defuzzification: Different methods for converting the fuzzy values into crisp values such as 
Centre of Gravity (COG), Maximum Defuzzification Technique and Weighted Average 
Defuzzification Technique. For this research, we used the most commonly used 
defuzzification method known as COG. The COG technique can be expressed as follows: 
𝑿𝑿∗ = ∫𝝁𝝁𝒊𝒊(𝒙𝒙)𝒅𝒅𝒙𝒙
∫𝝁𝝁𝒊𝒊(𝒙𝒙)𝒙𝒙𝒅𝒅𝒙𝒙  (Equation 4.1) (Chakraverty, Sahoo and Mahato, 2019) 
Where x* is defuzzified output, µi(x) is aggregated membership function, and x is the output 
variable.  
4.3.3. Activity 3: Threat Modelling 
Threat modelling activity focuses on identifying and measuring vulnerabilities and threats related to 
the assets. The Security Analyst performs this activity. Based on the previous activity's assets, all 
possible threats that could impact the assets negatively are profiled in a register. However, effective 
identification and control of threats require an understanding of threat sources, threat actor behaviour, 
capability and intent (Workman, Bommer and Straub, 2008). Only through an understanding of the 
current threat landscape can organisations know about the nature of threats they face and the control 
measures to implement. In other words, a holistic understanding of threats enables a more effective 
prioritisation of control actions and decision making. This is possible when known attack patterns 
employed by the threat actor to exploit vulnerabilities are known to allow an organisation to 
understand and create a threat profile expansively. Because of these considerations, this activity has 
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created two steps for threat modelling: (i) the determination of Vulnerability profile; and (ii) the 
determination of threat profile. 
4.3.3.1. Step 1: Determine the Vulnerability profile  
Determining the vulnerability profile is vital because it allows for identifying and assessing 
vulnerabilities associated with critical assets. This step aims to identify potential asset vulnerabilities 
that a threat actor may leverage to exploit an asset. It is an essential and delicate task that has an 
impact on the successful operation of critical infrastructures. A sound approach that enables gathering 
valuable insights based on the analysis of situational and contextual vulnerabilities that can be tailored 
to the organisation-specific threat landscape is used.  
Hence, the Common Weakness Enumerator (CWE) methodology (Martin, 2007) is used to determine 
the vulnerability factors as a publicly known vulnerability source. Therefore, to estimate the 
likelihood of risk, it is necessary to estimate a particular vulnerability discovered and exploited.  We 
adopt CWE, which allows for weaknesses to be characterised, allowing stakeholders to make 
informed decisions when mitigating risks caused by those weaknesses. Each related weakness is 
mapped to CAPEC and identified by a CWE identifier and the name of the vulnerability type. The 
CWE gives a general description, behaviour, likelihood of exploit, consequences of exploit, potential 
mitigation and related vulnerabilities. To apply the CWE methodology, a rating table is presented in 
Table 4.4 with corresponding values assigned to the different factors that can help organisations 
determine the likelihood of risk. Each option has a likelihood rating from 0 to 9, and the overall 
likelihood falls within high, medium and low, which is sufficient for the overall risk level.  The 
Security Analyst could explore other publicly available sources of vulnerability information, 
including internal experience, penetration test, vulnerabilities catalogues available from industry 
bodies, national government, and legal bodies. The questions can also be extended to meet the 
organisation's need.  
Table 4.4: Vulnerability Factor Rating 
Vulnerability 
Factors 
Vulnerability ID Description Likelihood rating 
Weight Value 
Ease of discovery EoD How easy is it for 
vulnerability to be 
discovered? 
1 Practically impossible 
3 Difficult 
7 Easy 
9 Automated tools available 
Ease of exploit EoE How easy is it for 





9 Automated tools available 
Awareness Awa How well known is this 





9 Public knowledge 
Intrusion I_D How likely is an exploit to 1 Active detection in 
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detection be detected? application 
3 Logged and reviewed 
8 Logged without review 
9 Not logged 
 
4.3.3.2. Step 2: Determine Threat profile  
Determining the threat profile is essential because it allows for the identification and understanding of 
threat characteristics. To determine threats, it requires a structured representation of threat information 
that is expressive and all-encompassing due to the dynamic and complex nature of a CPS. A Security 
Analyst must use a sound approach that enables gathering valuable insights based on the analysis of 
situational and contextual threats that can be tailored to the organisation-specific threat landscape. A 
method that could be used is MITRE's models for the threat intelligence sharing called CAPEC and 
WASC. Therefore, this step effectively identifies the threat types, target assets, threat actor factors, 
TTP, and compromise indicators likely to affect a critical infrastructure's ability to deliver its services.  
CAPEC is an acronym formed from the first letter of Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 
Classification used to define the potential threat, provide context for architectural risk analysis, and 
understand trends and attacks to monitor. Also, WASC stands for Web Application Security 
Consortium. Hence, the Security Analyst could explore publicly available sources of threat 
information. For example, we recommend that threat information approved by CAPEC (Barnum, 
2008) and WASC (Consortium, 2009) be followed because there are several threats identified in these 
two sources. Besides using the CAPEC and WASC models, actors use the following procedure to 
create a comprehensive threat profile: 
o Threat type: To create a comprehensive threat profile, organisations need to identify the 
potential threats of assets that a threat actor may leverage to attack.  The Security Analyst 
needs to back up his claim with a solid foundation of Information sources.  
o Threat Actor factors: Effective identification and control of threats require an understanding 
of threat sources,  threat actor behaviour, skill, resources required, capability and intent 
(Workman, Bommer and Straub, 2008). Therefore, we adopt the OWASP methodology that 
considers various threat actor factors such as; skill level, size, motivation, location, resources, 
and opportunity to understand the attack and its trend. Using these threat actor factors, the 
Security Analyst can determine the likelihood of an attack and the severity of the threat. This 
will provide the ability to create an impact rating for threats. Table 4.5 shows the threat actor 
factors, and each factor has a set of options with a likelihood rating from 0-9. 
Table 4.5: Threat Actor Factors Rating 
Threat Actor 
factors 




Skill level How technically skilled 
is the threat actor? 
1 No technical skills 
3 Some technical skills 
5 Advanced computer user 
6 Network and programming skills 
9 Security penetration skills 
Location Through what channel 
did the threat actor 




8 Private Network 
7 Adjacent Network 
5 Local Network 
2 Physical 
Motive How motivated is the 
threat actor to find and 
exploit the vulnerability? 
1 Low or no reward 
4 Possible reward 
9 High reward 
Resources What resources are 
required for the threat 
actor to find and exploit 
the vulnerability? 
0 Expensive resources required 
4 Special resources required 
7 Some resources required 
9 No resources required 
Opportunity What opportunities are 
required for the threat 
actor to find and exploit 
the vulnerability? 
0 Full access required 
4 Special access required 
7 Some access required 
9 No access required 
Size How large is the group 
of the threat actor? 
2 Developers 
2 Systems administrators 
4 Intranet users 
5 Partners 
6 Authenticated users 
9 Anonymous internet users 
 
o Determine Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) and Indicator of Compromise 
(IOC): TTP and IOC involve the pattern of activities used by a threat actor to plan and 
manage a cyber attack, thereby compromising critical assets. The different TTP types include; 
initial access, execution, credential access, persistence, privileged escalation, defence 
evasion, collection, lateral movement, exfiltration and command and control. The different 
IOC includes; network indicators, email indicators and host indicators. Therefore, we adopt 
the ATT&CK (adversarial tactic, techniques and common knowledge) framework developed 
by MITRE to document standard TTP used to target, compromise and operate in an enterprise 
network. To calculate the risk level and know the appropriate controls to protect the 
organisation's assets, information about TTP must be known.  Table 4.6 shows the possible 
TTP and IOC that are frequently employed when exploiting the vulnerability.  
Table 4.6: TTP and IOC (Tactic, 2017) 
Tactics type Techniques Procedure IOC 
Initial access Spearphishing link It employs links to download malware in an email by 
electronically delivering social engineering targeted at 
a specific individual or organisation. 
Email, Network 
Drive-by compromise A threat actor gains access to a system by visiting a 




website is compromised where the threat actor has 
injected some malicious code. 
Replication through 
removable media 
The threat actor uses a tool to infect connected USB 
devices and transmit them to air-gapped computers 




A threat actor attaches and sends a Spearphishing email 
with malicious Microsoft office attachment and 
requires user execution in other to execute.  
Email 
Execution Command-line interface  The threat actor uses a command-line interface to 
interact with systems and execute other software during 
operation.  
Host 
Dynamic data exchange 
(DDE) 
Threat actor sends a Spearphishing containing 
malicious word document with DDE execution. 
Host, Network  
Execution through 
module load  
The threat actor uses this functionality to create a 
backdoor through which it can remotely load and call 
dynamic link library (DLL) functions. 
Host  
Exploitation for client 
execution  
Threat actor exploits a vulnerability in office 
applications, web browsers or typical third party 
applications to execute the implant into the victim's 
machines. 
Network  
Persistence Account manipulation  Threat actor adds a created account to the local 
administrator's group to maintain elevated access. 
Host, Network  
Accessibility features The threat actor uses a combination of keys known as 
the sticky keys to bypass a user's windows login screen 
on remote systems during the intrusion. 
Host, Network  
Component firmware  Threat actor overwrites the firmware on a hard drive by 




External remote services  Threat actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into 




Disabling security tools  Threat actor disables the windows firewalls and routing 




Brute force Threat actor brute forces password hashes to be able to 
leverage plain text credentials. 
Host, Network 
Discovery  Network sniffing The threat actor uses a tool to capture hashes and 
credentials sent to the system after the name services 
have been poisoned. 
Host, Network  
Network service 
scanning  
Threat actor used BlackEnergy malware to conduct 




The threat actor uses tools such as systeminfo that 




Remote services  The threat actor uses putty secure copy client (PSCP) 
to transfer data or access compromised systems. 
Host  
Third-party software  Threat actor distributes malware by using a victim's 
endpoint management platform. 
Host 
Collection  Data from information 
repositories  
Threat actor collects information from Microsoft 
SharePoint services using a SharePoint enumeration 
and data dumping tool within target networks  
Host, Network 
Email collection  The threat actor uses utilities to steal email from 
archived outlook files and exchange servers that have 
not yet been archived.  
Email, Host, Network  
Man in the browser The threat actor uses a Trojan spyware program to 
perform browser pivot and inject into a user's browser 
and trick the user into providing their login credentials 
on a fake or modified web page.  
Network  
Exfiltration  Data encrypted  The threat actor uses malware such duqu to push and 
execute modules that copy data to a staging area, 




Commonly used port  The threat actor uses duqu, which uses a custom 




commonly used ports and is frequently encapsulated by 
application layer protocols.  
Remote file copy The threat actor used Shamoon malware to download 
an executable to run on the victim. 
Network  
 
4.3.4 Activity 4: Risk Assessment 
The output of threat modelling provides a list of vulnerabilities, related vulnerabilities, potential 
security threats, and assets' impact. The threat register serves as a help to the Security Analyst to 
orchestrate a risk register's creation and focus on the most potent threats. This activity allows for 
establishing the risk assessment context by following the threat register and formally approves the risk 
management activities within the organisation. The activity provides various additional estimations 
required for the risk evaluation by enabling the determination of risks that are likely to occur, the 
severity of the risks, and the steps to control or manage the risks. This requires the top management 
and risk manager's active involvement to emphasise the importance of risk assessment to the 
organisation. This activity's output is a risk register, and the overall risk impact level falls within high, 
medium and low. This ensures that minor risks are not prioritised, while more severe risks are 
overlooked. The first step of this activity identifies risk types. Secondly, it identifies existing controls 
and lastly calculates risk impact value. 
4.3.4.1. Step 1: Predict Risk Types 
This step proposes using machine learning techniques for predicting risk type so that appropriate 
mitigation processes can be implemented. In this context, risk type prediction relies on a pioneering 
mathematical model such as machine learning for analysing, compiling, combining and correlating all 
incident-related information and data acquired from previous activities. The machine learning (ML) 
techniques automatically find valuable underlying patterns within i-CSRM concepts used as features, 
and then the patterns predict risk types. The i-CSRM features are considered input for the ML 
classifiers and ML classifiers to predict the risk type. Therefore, we used well-known classifiers such 
as K-Nearest neighbours (KNN), Naïve Bayes (NB), the Naïve Bayes Multinomial (NB-Multi), 
Neural Network (NN) with Ralu activation function at activation layers and sigmoid function at the 
output layer, Decision Tree (DT), Random Forest (RF), and Logistic Regression (LR) for risk type 
prediction. There are five phases to achieve this step, and they are explained in chapter 5, section 5.2.  
We present data extraction to generate a feature set, which is then further used on the ML classifiers 
for training purposes. Finally, the test data is used to check the accuracy of the prediction. Figure 4.4 
shows how these features are used to train the classifiers and the step by step process of the risk 
prediction, i.e. the experiment in general. Data collection and extraction were considered from the 
dataset; feature extraction was carried out on those data and used to train the ML classifiers (NN, RF, 
LR, NB-Multi DT, KNN and NB). The data were further partitioned into 80% training and 20% 
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testing. We used the random partition (divide 80% data into the training set and 20% into the testing 
set), and reported the average results obtained over the ten folds. Predictions are carried out on the 
testing dataset, and accuracy measures the prediction. 
Also, risks types from multiple industry bodies can be considered because they maintain a regularly 
updated list of most pressing security risks. For example, the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration 
and Classification (CAPEC) provide a comprehensive list of risks that can be used for understanding 
and enhancing defense. All these sources can be used.  
 
Figure 4.4: Classification process about the primary analysis and methods that have been used to 
build the experiment 
4.3.4.2. Step 2: Determine Risk Level  
After information about the potential risk types, threat, vulnerabilities and assets have been identified 
and gathered, and the next step is to determine the risk level of all the possible risk types predicted. 
The risk level is usually not known and not estimated correctly.  In essence, organisations need to rate 
security risks that have been identified. Therefore, for the risk level to be estimated, we used the 
technical impact factors. The technical impacts factors are inclined toward an asset's security goals 
that include; confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, and conformance. Also, 
iinformation about the threat actor and vulnerability factors needs to be gathered. The aim is to 
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provide a rough estimate of the risk level's magnitude if a risk occurs.  The equations follow the 
OWASP methodology for assessing risk (Wichers, 2013).  
Phase 1: To estimate the overall (L) Likelihood of the risk, threat actor factors and vulnerability 
factors are put into consideration, as shown in Equation 4.2. Each option has a likelihood rating from 
0 to 9, as shown in Table 4.4 and 4.5. The overall likelihood falls within high, medium and low, 





                  (𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝟒𝟒.𝟐𝟐) 
Where:  
L= Likelihood 
TAF = Threat Actor Factors,  
VF = Vulnerability Factors 
TAF = SL + L + M + Res + Opp +S / n           (Equation 4.3) 
Where:  
SL = Skill Level 
L = Location  
M = Motivation  
Res = Resource 
Opp = Opportunity  
S = Size  
n = total number of TAF factors (6) 
VF = EoE + EoD + Aw + ID / n               (Equation 4.4) 
Where:  
EoE = Ease of Exploit 
EoD = Ease of Discovery  
Aw = Awareness  
ID = Intrusion Detection 
n = total number of VF factors (4) 
Table 4.8: Overall Likelihood Rating 
Likelihood  Rating  
Low 0.00 – 2.99 
Medium  3.00 – 5.99 




Phase 2: To Estimate the overall (ImpactF) impact of a successful attack, we consider the total loss of 
the asset's goals, as shown in Equation 4.5. Each factor has a set of options with an impact rating from 
0 to 9, as shown in Table 4.9.  
𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑬𝑬𝑰𝑰𝑬𝑬𝑻𝑻 =  𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 𝑬𝑬�                  (𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝟒𝟒.𝟓𝟓) 
Where: 
ImpactF = Impact Factor  
AF = Asset Factors (L_C +L_ A +L_I +L_ ACC +L_ CON) 
L_C = loss of Confidentiality 
L_A = loss of Availability  
L_I = loss of Integrity  
L_ACC = loss of Accountability  
L_CON = loss of Conformance 
n = Total number of the Technical factors (5) 
Table 4.9: Impact Factors 
Impact Factors 0 to < 3 (Low) 3 to < 6 (Medium) 6 to 9 (High) 
Loss of Confidentiality Minor disclosure of 
critical assets   
Critical assets are 
significantly affected 
Highly critical assets are 
extensively affected 
Loss of Integrity Minor compromise of 




All highly critical asset 
extensively 
compromised  
Loss of Availability Minor interruption of 
critical assets  
Critical assets 
significantly interrupted  
All critical assets 
extensively lost  
Loss of Accountability Threats are fully 
traceable   
Threats are possibly 
traceable  
Threats are completely 
untreatable  
Loss of Conformance A minor breach of 
compliance requirements  
A significant breach of 





Table 4.10 shows the overall ImpactF level. 
Table 4.10: Overall ImpactF Rating 
Likelihood  Rating  
Low 0.00 – 2.99 
Medium  3.00 – 5.99 
High  6.00 – 9.00 
 
Phase 3: Determine Risk Severity: To determine the risk level, we estimate the likelihood and 
impact are combined to calculate the overall severity of risk using Equation 4.6.  




RLevel = the risk level  
I = the impact of the asset goals 
L= the likelihood of the attack occurring within a given time-frame 
 
Overall risk severity is rated as high, medium, or low, as shown in Table 4.11 below.  
 
Table 4.11: Overall Risk level 
Overall Risk level 
00 – 20 Low 
21 - 45  Medium 
46 – 65 High 
66 – 81 Critical  
 
4.3.5 Activity 5: Risk Controls 
There is a need to identify and implement controls that can be used to address the risks. Risk controls 
are generic fundamental technical or procedural mechanisms that are used to manage security risks. 
This activity displays the current risk status for each risk event, together with their calculated risk 
values. The Security Analyst needs to identify the potential control measures that can be used to 
mitigate the risks based on the risk level. Therefore, risk assessment plays a critical role in this 
activity. The Security Analyst considers various industry standards that provide recommendations on 
basic security controls. For example, the Critical Security Controls (Mbanaso, Abrahams and Apene, 
2019) publishes a set of 20 controls and best practice guidelines that organisations should adopt to 
control known computer security risks. Thus, we recommend that the Security Analyst selects risk 
control measures from the predefined list provided by a renowned industry guideline named CSC CIS 
to define control measures. CSC CIS provides 20 controls categorised into three prioritised and 
defence-in-depth set of best practices that are implementable and usable to mitigate attacks against 
systems and networks.  
In selecting the controls, the security Analyst uses the matching process to compare the security 
control measures from the different standards and identify and filter controls that have similarities, i.e. 
controls that complement each other in terms of scope. The elements used for the comparison include 
the name of the control measure, type, and keywords. In such cases where control measures are the 
same, the Security Analyst should adopt CSC CIS controls. However, if there is no similarity, control 
measures from both CSC CIS and other standards should be adopted. This approach ensures that 
contents are compared more thoroughly and risk control actions consistently and easily identified.  
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Therefore, this activity's primary objective is to specify essential risks controls and evaluate the 
effectiveness of the existing control measures that protect assets to ensure sufficient coverage in the 
management of critical infrastructure. 
4.3.5.1. Step 1: Identification of Existing Control Types  
There is a need to identify a list of existing controls that are in place to address risks before risk level 
is identified. Therefore, this step identifies the existing controls and categorises them into corrective, 
detective and preventive actions to mitigate the risk. The risk impact level will determine those not 
adequate controls so that new controls can be implemented.   
4.3.5.2. Step 2:  Evaluating the Effectiveness of Existing Controls  
This step involves assessing the effectiveness of existing controls, determining each control's level, 
and avoiding unnecessary duplication of controls if existing controls are not adequate and new 
controls need to be implemented. Therefore, a check should be made to ensure that the controls are 
working correctly. If a control does not work as expected, this may cause vulnerabilities leading to 
risks. Consideration should be given to the situation where a selected control fails in operation, and 
therefore complementary controls are required to address the identified risk effectively. In assessing 
the effectiveness of existing controls and determining each control's level, an assessment of each 
control objective is carried out by an assessor team. The controls are evaluated in terms of relevance, 
strength, coverage, integration, and traceability according to ISO 27005:2011 standard (GOST, 2009). 
For each criterion, a rating score from 1 to 5 is given to measure which control addresses the specific 
control objective. Table 4.13 shows the five different criteria rating.  
Table 4.13: Criteria Rating 
Rating Description 
5 Adequate control The control achieves the objectives intended 
to mitigate the risks. 
4 Adequate control with 
some areas of 
improvement 
The control achieves the objectives intended 
to mitigate the risks with evidence of some 
areas, though not critical, subject to 
improvement to meet sound controls' 
requisites. 
3 Generally adequate 
control, with some 
critical areas 
The control mostly mitigates the risks 
intended to mitigate the risks. However, the 
characteristics of some of the controls are 
not entirely consistent with basic sound 
controls  
2 Inadequate control, 
subject to significant 
improvement 
The control partially achieves the control 
objectives intended to mitigate the risks  
1 Insufficient control The control is not sufficient to achieve the 





Table 4.14 shows the overall effectiveness of the controls. 
Table 4.14: Overall effectiveness 





Critical  21-25 
 
To find the overall evaluation of each control, Equation 4.7 is given: 
𝐎𝐎𝐎𝐎 = 𝐑𝐑 + 𝐒𝐒 + 𝐂𝐂 + 𝐈𝐈 + 𝐓𝐓                                                           (𝐎𝐎𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄 𝟒𝟒.𝟕𝟕) 
Where: 
OCE = Overall Control Effectiveness 
 R = Relevance 
 S = Strength  
C = Coverage  
I = Integration  
T = Traceability  
4.3.5.3. Step 3: Implement Control Measures to Determine New Risk Status 
Table 5.16 presents the control measures implemented in three levels represented in three different 
colours. The green ones are fully implemented to reduce the risk value evenly. The yellow ones are 
only partially implemented and reduce the risk value by half of a green one. The red ones do not 
reduce the risk at all. Therefore, this step involves performing appropriate analysis to measure which 
control addresses which risk. Criteria, each criterion help the assessment; a rating score from 0 to 9 is 
given to measure which control addresses the specific control objective. The security Analyst can 
select the control measure rating. It further displays the current risk status for each risk type. It 
presents the risk events and their calculated risk values, and the control measures that can be used to 
mitigate the risk.  
4.3.5.4. Risk Register  
A risk register is an important document that provides a tentative record of potential risks in line with 
vulnerability and threat profile, assets and security goals. The risk register displays the results of the 
risk calculation. Each risk event is evaluated and presented in a table and the elements used in the 
calculation, and the calculated risk value. The calculated risk value represents how dangerous the risk 
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event might be for the organisation. The presented risk events are then sorted from the most 
dangerous to the least dangerous, ensuring that minor risks are not prioritised while more severe risks 



















Evaluation of the Integrated Cybersecurity Risk Management Tool (i-CSRMT) 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous Chapter presented the i-CSRM process, which comprises various essential activities and 
steps. This Chapter presents an Integrated Cybersecurity Risk Management Tool (i-CSRMT) to 
support organisations' risk management activities. The tool's objective is to minimise the time and 
efforts required to perform the proposed risk management activities in Chapter five and provide 
accurate information about risks based on the cyber-attack that occurred and affects the organisation's 
assets so that the organisation can make an informed decision.  It provides a comprehensive workflow 
to guide the user through the individual activities, starting with identifying the actors and their roles 
within the organisation, identifying critical assets, revealing the hazardous threats, risk calculation and 
finishing with control evaluation. The tool can be simultaneously accessed and used by multiple users 
and different organisations and simultaneously manages multiple different projects. The tool also 
provides a separate web interface for the different actors within the organisation (application 
administrators), giving them access to the user and project management. 
In this Chapter, the architectural and critical design of i-CSRMT is presented in detail, which is 
categorically designed to support critical infrastructures in risk management performance. In plain 
terms, i-CSRMT is designed to serve as a platform by which an organisation can assess its critical 
assets, identify vulnerabilities and threats, calculate risks levels, and evaluate its existing controls' 
effectiveness to implement informed decisions. The primary objective of i-CSRMT is to facilitate the 
collection of threats and analysis of risks, including the establishment of subjective judgment and 
determination of the required course of actions that needs to be taken, thereby promoting 
cybersecurity in critical infrastructures.   
5.2. Overview of i-CSRMT 
The i-CSRM tool is an implementation of the i-CSRM process. This tool designed to support i-CSRM 
framework activities that an organisation uses to perform security risk analysis, in particular, critical 
infrastructures. It provides a comprehensive workflow to guide the user through the individual 
activities, starting with identifying the actors and their roles within the organisation, identifying 
critical assets, revealing the particularly dangerous threats, risk calculation and finishing with control 
evaluation. This helps to minimise the efforts required to perform the risk management activities and 
provide accurate information about the risk level based on the CTI context to implement the proper 
controls. It is also designed to enable organisations to use threat intelligence report to predict a certain 
risk level. Another critical aspect of i-CSRMT is that it is formed based on the principles of renowned 
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industry-standard. Also, the tool can be simultaneously accessed and used by multiple users and 
different organisations and allows managing multiple different projects simultaneously. The tool also 
provides a separate web interface for the different actors within the organisation (application 
administrators), giving them access to the user and project management. Therefore the tool aims for 
an effective risk management practice within a real-life context. 
5.3. General Description of i-CSRMT Tool 
The i-CSRMT is a web-based front end written in PHP (Lerdorf, Tatroe and MacIntyre, 2006), 
HTML5 (Hickson and Hyatt, 2011), JavaScript, and MySQL database (Glass et al., 2004).  A standard 
browser will view the client-side, and it will be able to operate on any web server that supports 
JavaScript, PHP, and MySQL. Administrative, user, actor, activities, and vendor modules make up the 
system. Java Server Pages (JSP) (Hall and Brown, 2001)is used for the managerial and user 
interfaces, and MySQL is used for retrieving, adding, removing, and updating data throughout the 
database. This design allows several users to log in and communicate with the tool at the same time. 
Furthermore, i-CSRMT was built with two interface types in mind: administrative and user. The 
administrator is a type of user, and he or she has the right to install and adjust system settings and user 
rights. The second kind of user consists of staff who can only execute activities that the supervisor has 
delegated to them. The tool is made up of many separate modules that may be used individually 
depending on the user's access privileges. The application's user interface is made up of a collection of 
related web pages that can be reached directly from the navigation menu on the left side of the 
application. Each web page is associated with certain aspects of risk management activity and 
provides essential functionalities to manage evidence collection, analysis, and report generation. 
Notably, the web pages interact with one another through a MySQL-based shared database. 
5.4. Design process 
In designing i-CSRMT, important considerations are made regarding the most vital aspects of the risk 
management activity and forming the tool's features around these considerations. Several architectural 
designs were considered, including a distributed system that utilises client-server web service 
technology and distributed systems using PHP and JavaScript. For each architectural design, the pros 
and cons were considered, including feasibility and capability to cope with the tool's features. For 
example, the architectural pattern in web services technologies is lightweight. Distributed systems 
create more cohesion and increase the degree of interdependence between modules. PHP and 
JavaScript are the server-side scripting language that is independent, multi-platform, and would allow 
the tool to be more coupled, which implies that the client will be more dependent upon the server-
side. Therefore, after thorough consideration and proof of concepts, it is decided for the tool to be 
implemented as a client-server web system designed using PHP and JavaScript.   
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5.5. Architecture of i-CSRMT 
In this section, the architecture of the tool is explained.  i-CSRMT is a simple three-tier, web-based 
system that uses a client-server architecture. A three-tier architecture is an architecture pattern for 
developing web applications that work around three critical layers, comprising a presentation layer, 
application layer and data layer (Machado, Filho and Ribeiro, 2009). The application architecture is in 
many ways inspired by the Domain-Driven Design (Evans, 2004) and was developed using the Java 
programming language. From a logical point of view, three-tier architecture is used to improve the 
tool's modularity and mainly allow for easy extension of features. Using client-server architecture, 
users can use any web browser to connect to the many services supported by the tool, such as 
initiating audit assessments. On the server-side, the web server receives requests from the client, 
handles the request and generates an appropriate response to the client. The three-tier architecture role 
of three-tier architecture is explained as:  
5.5.1. Presentation Layer 
This layer manages the communication with the Web browser, renders the application Web pages, 
and controls the user access. The layer consists of a single module that represents the user interface. It 
is implemented using the Java Play Framework (Leroux and Kaper, 2014) and follows the Model-
View-Controller  (Enache, 2015) architectural pattern. The Views represent the contents of the 
application Web pages and are built using HTML, PHP, CSS and JavaScript. Some Views contain 
only parts of the user interface; either embedded into the Web pages or loaded dynamically using 
AJAX. The server's communication is managed using Controllers, which handle the HTTP requests 
and return responses in rendered Views.  
5.5.2. Application Layer 
The application layer is built using PHP and it plays the role of linking together all the three layers by 
technically processing the various inputs and selections received at the presentation layer and 
interacting with the vast database in the third layer. Also, the layer houses the web server, scripting 
language and the scripting language engine of the tool. The Web server enables the processing of 
HTTP requests for initiating the activity process. The application layer provides the technical deal 
with dynamic content and streamlines the database's faster access to extract results.  
5.5.3. Database Layer 
The database provides a centralised place where data captured in the tool are stored, manipulated, and 
accessed. The layer comprises database management systems (DBMS) and the database, which is 
built using MySQL. The database layer's rationale is to centralise all data storage, store and retrieve 
the application data. In other words, it contains the methods for accessing the underlying database 
data. Fundamentally, the database layer is responsible for storing numerous types of data the tool will 
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take as an input, generate as output and other external services that the tool may use. The database is 
accessible to the system administrators and employees. The high-level architecture for the tool is 
shown in Figure. 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: Architecture of i-CSRMT 
5.6. i-CSRMT Features 
This section provides a detailed overview of i-CSRMT features. The application Web pages are 
organised according to the previously defined workflow activities in Chapter five. They were created 
focusing on user cooperation, which allows the users to split their work and delegate responsibilities. 
The application administrators can define dynamic user roles and assign them to the users to restrict 
their access to specific application parts. The primary purpose is to provide a general understanding of 
how the tool is decomposed and how the individual components work together to provide the desired 
functionalities. In general, the tool focuses on minimising the efforts required to perform the risk 
management activities and provide accurate information about the risks. The tool's main features 
include a main dashboard consisting of essential functions that can be performed. Each functionality 
contains essential components of a risk management process. The main features include;  
• Actor identification  
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• Asset criticality  
• Threat modelling,  
• Risk assessment,  
• Control effectiveness  
• Report dashboard  
Figure 5.2 shows the main features of the i-CSRMT. 
 
Figure 5.2: Features and components of i-CSRMT 
5.7. Dashboard Views 
A preliminary view of the powerful dashboards in i-CSRMT is presented in this section.  The 
interface uses a straightforward, plain layout with very little or no graphics. Information is displayed 
very clearly to users through HTML pages, with visualisation mechanisms that present information 
using visual aids such as charts. As mentioned earlier, the central dashboards in i-CSRMT are six and 
screenshots from these dashboards are provided below:  
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5.7.1. Super Administrator Dashboard 
A preliminary view of the super administrator dashboard in i-CSRMT is presented in this section. The 
dashboard displays the total companies created, number of active companies, number of inactive 
companies, total packages, and companies with expired licenses. To the left are the menu options 









Figure 5.3: Super Administrator Dashboard 
5.7.1.1. Super Admin Login 
This page enables the i-CSRMT super administrator to log in with a valid and authorised email 
address and password to carry out the task of creating and registering new companies, manage 
invoices (if the company is paying), manage subscriptions, perform global settings on the application 
and other essential tasks on the dashboard. This page uses a sha256 Salt Hash Security mechanism to 








Figure 5.4: Super Admin Login 
5.7.1.2. Super Admin Manages Company  
This page allows the super admin to edit, delete or add new companies. The super admin adds the 
companies’ details such as; organisation name, email, website, logo, address, and phone to add a new 
company. It also allows the super admin to create account details such as the new organisation's 
username and password. The new organisation will receive an email notification with a username and 
password and use the details to login to the tool to carry out their risk assessment tasks. The 









Figure 5.5: Super Admin Manages Company 
5.7.2. Company Administrator Dashboard 
This feature aims to provide administrative and user management functions in terms of authentication 
and providing actors access to the i-CSRMT platform. The authentication module is designed using 
PHP, JavaScript with MySQL database, which serves as an integral part of security procedures. This 
dashboard's primary user is the i-CSRMT administrator, who creates user accounts for all authorised 
actors and vendors. The admin dashboard also enables the company admin to manage logs and user 
activities to review employee activities and vendors. The company administrator can add, remove or 
edit the list of actors, projects and vendors that can use the tool, in addition to password recovery 
capabilities. Among other functions, the administrative dashboard allows the company admin to 
maintain the overall system security, carry out risk analysis, functionalities and definition of user 
access rights; create actor and company admin account; control of project platform; verification of 
Vendor's details; notification services on completed projects, in-progress projects, cancelled projects, 
overdue projects, total projects and not started projects. 
5.7.2.1. Admin Login  
This page enables the i-CSRMT administrator and all other users to log in with valid and authorised 
email address and password to carry out the task of administering essential tasks on the dashboard. 
The super administrator creates new company login details for the company admin.  
 
Figure 5.6: Admin Authentication form 
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5.7.2.2. Company Administrator Homepage 
The Company Admin login with initial username and password sent to their email by the super admin. 
The company admin is advised to request a new password the first time they login. This is the official 
landing page of the company admin if successfully logged in. The company Admin dashboard 
provides the primary features of the assessment. It comprises the data display sheet with total vendors, 
total employees, total project, pending project and completed tasks. 
Furthermore, this page enables the company Admin to add new company vendors. Furthermore, 
manage the company vendor's account. This section enables the admin to keep track of the Vendor's 
particular task or action. It shows the total number of vendors added and when i-CSRMT us of the 














Figure 5.7: Company Admin Homepage 
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5.7.2.3. Add Company Details 
This page enables the admin to add and save company details such as organisation name, website, 
email, and telephone number. To the left are the menu options navigable to linked pages and with 
various tasks. The admin creates a new company page by filling in the form and saving it.  
 
Figure 5.8: Add Company details 
5.7.3. Identification of Actors and Role Dashboard 
This homepage enables the company Admin to add new employees, delete and edit existing 
employees. Also, the company admin selects roles for each employee within the organisation to 
enable the system to create a new user account based on the assigned role. Furthermore, the company 
Admin groups users into various departments and assign a designation. The admin can create, edit and 



















Figure 5.9: Actors and Role 
5.7.3.1. Adding and Managing Actors Roles 
This page enables the admin to add new roles within the organisation and manage existing roles by 










Figure 5.10: Adding and Managing Actors Roles 
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5.7.3.2. Roles and Permissions  
This page allows the admin to define the type of permission associated with that role. Furthermore, 








Figure 5.11: Actors Roles and Permissions 
5.7.4. Managing Project Dashboard 
This section enables the Company Admin to add new projects, view archives and select a project 
template. All activities are grouped as a single project. The Company Admin can see completed, 
cancelled, in progress, not started, the overdue and total number of projects entered. Furthermore, 























Figure 5.12: Managing Projects 
5.7.4.1. Asset Inventory 
This page enables the administrator to create an asset inventory of all the organisation's assets by 
adding the different assets' name. Furthermore, this feature allows the system to automatically 
evaluate critical assets by selecting "Confidentiality (C), Availability (A), Integrity (I), Accountability 
(ACC) and Conformance (CON) as five inputs for assessing the criticality of individual assets and 
assigning a level of criticality. Each input is assigned five labels; Very Low (V), Low (L), Medium 
(M), High (H) and Very High (VH), for assessing the level of the output. The total returns a criticality 






















Figure 5.13: Managing Asset Inventory 
5.7.4.2. Threat Modelling  
After the Assets have been added to the tool, this page automatically displays the types of threats that 
are likely to affect the assets and compromise sensitive information. The page displays the treat name, 
description of the threat, resources required, skills required, indicators of compromise, TTP, related 
attack pattern and the possible vulnerabilities. This page automatically pulls data from the CAPEC 
dataset to fetch the different threat types associated with the asset's assets in the asset inventory page. 






















Figure 5.14: Threat Modelling 
5.7.4.3. Risk Assessment  
The Web pages allow the user to view the various aspects associated with risks and their relations. 














Figure 5.15: Risk Assessment 
5.7.4.3.1. Risk Impact rating to determine the risk level  
The Web page allows the user to associate the defined risk events with the risk impact factors. This is 
done by selecting from a simple list of None/Partial/Full questions, which directly impacts the results 












Figure 5.16: Risk Impact Rating 
5.7.4.3.2. Select and Implement control measures to reduce the risk level  
The web page presents the risk events and their calculated risk values, and the control measures that 
can be used to mitigate the risk. To implement the control measures, the users select from a simple list 
of None/Partial/Full questions, which directly impacts the results of the risk calculation for the overall 




Figure 5.17: Implement control measures 
5.7.4.4. Evaluate control effectiveness  
This page enables the company admin to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing controls. The user 
can add new controls by selecting a risk name and a control name from the controls list. After that, the 
user selects; Coverage,  Relevance, strength, integration, and traceability as five input ratings for 
evaluating individual control effectiveness. Each input is assigned five labels; critical, major, 
moderate, minor and insignificant for assessing the output level. Automatically, the tool returns 




Figure 5.18: Evaluate control effectiveness 
5.8. Evaluation of i-CSRM Framework 
The i-CSRM Framework presented in this research is a proposed solution that aims to address the 
many issues associated with risk management and cybersecurity-related issues. The primary purpose 
of the evaluation is to determine the applicability of the Framework in a real-world scenario. 
Evaluation is a principal activity and one of the most critical steps in framework development, 
especially for a significant importance framework like the i-CSRM Framework. The evaluation 
comprises a set of associated methodologies and techniques with a distinct purpose of providing the 
means to establish the value, quality and relevance of research, and in some cases, provides feedback 
necessary for improvement (Boudreau, Gefen and Straub, 2001). It also aims to carefully provide a 
clear-cut assessment for demonstrating the research's ability to produce the desired effect (Straub, 
Boudreau and Gefen, 2004). There are many empirical evaluation methods and techniques that could 
be adopted, such as action research, experimental methods and descriptive methods. These methods 
have been covered carefully in detail in Chapter Three. Figure 5.19 shows an outline of the evaluation 




Figure 5.19: Evaluation Approach for the Proposed Framework 
5.9. Empirical Research method 
We followed an empirical research method through a case study to determine the usefulness of the 
integrated i-CSRM Framework in critical infrastructure. Empirical studies are increasingly becoming 
popular in information systems research (Runeson and Höst, 2009) because it has proven to be an 
effective research method to collect relevant data for investigating a specific problem in information 
systems. Therefore, the case-study approach was employed to serve as the evaluation approach for 
this research, whereby a company was selected based on accessibility through the researcher's 
contacts. A case-study approach is widely used in the information systems research domain because it 
helps explanatory research projects and serves as a basis for developing well-structured research 
findings (Straub, Boudreau and Gefen, 2004). The case study is an empirical investigation that carries 
out an existing occurrence within its real-life context.The rationale behind employing a case-study is 
to obtain meaningful feedback regarding the validity and usefulness of the i-CSRM Framework and 
stakeholders' view on the usefulness of i-CSRMT. Also, the author used questionnaires to collect 
feedback from stakeholders in the case-study contexts for improving the Framework. 
Questionnaires were organised to form the guiding principles for collecting data. In particular, the 
questionnaire aims to collect stakeholders' perception and view about the use of i-CSRM Framework 
and i-CSRMT in terms of its acceptability and validity, supporting the calculation of an accurate risk 
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level and overall risk management. The questionnaires contain pre-formulated questions with defined 
response options. This consideration made the questionnaire highly relevant in obtaining feedback as 
the questions are designed to help stakeholders express their view. It is imperative to develop the 
questionnaires using essential criteria formed according to established models for information systems 
adoption (Thong, 1999). Specifically, these criteria are developed by considering the Unified Theory 
of user Acceptance of Information Technology (UTAUT) proposed by Davis (Davis, 1989) and the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Venkatesh et al., 2003). The rationale behind these two 
models is that they are both widely used for assessing the organisation-level adoption of various 
information systems products and services. Essentially, the criteria included ease of use/clarity, 
relevance, usefulness, flexibility and dynamics, conformity to security standards and best practices, 
trustworthiness (as shown in Appendix A). 
5.9.1. Data collection 
At the initial stages of evaluation, opening workshops were organised at the respective studied 
context. Workshops were attended by senior management representatives and IT personnel with at 
least three years of working experience. The primary aim was to introduce stakeholders' role in terms 
of the evaluation exercises and feedback collection through the questionnaire. An overview of the i-
CSRM Framework's process and the essential features of i-CSRMT were introduced to help 
stakeholders understand how the process/tool works, expected deliverables, procedures, and the 
methodology involved for data collection. During the workshops, the process and evaluation activities 
for the i-CSRM Framework and briefing on how to use i-CSRMT and its features were the main point 
of the presentation in the case study. Further briefing on how the risk type prediction is carried out 
using machine learning on the VCDB dataset is explained.  
Therefore, a total of 50 versions of the questionnaires were distributed across the organisation. The 
project aimed to introduce how their feedback can contribute towards validating i-CSRM 
framework/i-CSRMT, risk prediction, and the overall research findings. They were briefed about the 
criteria followed in formulating the questionnaire. Besides, the possible responses are designed to fit 
the purpose and can be indicated as either "I strongly agree", "I agree", "Not sure", or "Disagree".  
Overall, stakeholders from the case-study context returned a total of 40 questionnaires, implying a 
response rate of 80%. Table 5.1 provides a summary of the stakeholders that were involved and 
responses to the questionnaire within the studied case study.  
Table 5.1: Summary of Responses from researched case-study 
Case Study  Participants Respondents  
Senior Management  IT Staff Senior Management  IT Staff 
Case Study  15 35 12 28 
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Total  50 40 
 
5.10. Dataset Description: Implementation of Machine learning classifiers for Risk prediction 
We used the dataset from "Veris Community Database (VCDB)" (Widup, 2013), which aims to 
collect and disseminate data breach information for all publicly disclosed data breaches, to test our 
classifiers. It provides some of the enormous available collection of datasets that consists of collective 
intelligence report dataset allowing us to test the classifiers' performance in predicting risk type. We 
further created a mapped version of this dataset by selecting some features in the dataset and mapping 
them to TTP, Threat Actor, Asset and Control categories. For example, brute force is mapped to TTP. 
We extracted the features in VCDB that are of interest in training and testing our classifiers. Based on 
the requirements we used exploratory data analysis (EDA) process to clean the data. EDA is a step in 
data analysis process where a number of techniques are used to better understand the dataset being 
used by; extracting important variables and removing all the null values and features with null values. 
For example; Assets type, we looked at the types of compromised assets during the incident, Actor 
type and motive; we train our classifiers based on the actor responsible for the incident. We used the 
final mapped dataset to build out model over it. The full features are 512 and the sample size is 7,834.  
In (Liu, Sarabi, et al., 2015), data on reported cybersecurity incidents are needed to serve as ground-
truth for their study. Such data is required to train the classifiers as well as assess their accuracy in 
predicting incidents. VCDB is used to train and test a sequence of classifiers/predictors. Therefore 
data from the VCDB is collected to obtain proper coverage. 
5.10.1. Mapping 
In this section, we explain the mappingof the existing dataset features to our proposed i-CSRM 
framework concepts and then applied ML on the mapped dataset. The data for each i-CSRM feature 
is mapped to the VCDB dataset as shown below:  
• Discovery and Response: This entry in the VCDB dataset is our Control feature. It focuses 
on the timeline of the events and how the incident was discovered. It provides valuable 
insights into the organisation's detection and defensive capabilities and helps identify 
corrective actions needed to detect or prevent similar incidents from occurring.  
• Incident Description: this entry is mapped to our Threat Actor, TTP and Assets features. It 
focuses on "whose actions affected the assets", what actions affected the assets", and which 
assets were affected". Threat Action (TTP) describes what the Threat Actor did to cause or 
contributes to the incident, such as Malware, Hacking and Misuse. Actors (Threat Actors) are 
entities that cause or contribute to any particular incident, and their actions can be malicious, 
intentional or unintentional. Threat Actors are recognised in VCDB as external, internal and 
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Partner. Assets (Assets) describe the information assets that were compromised during an 
incident. Compromised means the loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
authenticity. Assets are categorised into Variety (such as SCADA), Ownership, Management, 
Hosting, Accessibility and Cloud.  
 
The features extracted from VCDB are used for training and testing our classifiers. Details 
documented in the dataset include the TTP used, assets compromised, threat actor type and motive 
and controls. The list of features extracted from the VCDB dataset that are mapped to CSRM concepts 
is shown in Tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5.    
• Threat Actor: The first set of Mapping is information regarding the individual, group of 
individuals or organisations that are believed to have operated with malicious intent. Therefore, 
each incident is put in one of the four categories: External, internal, Partner and unknown threat 
actor types. Each category includes additional features that further differentiate the threat actor 
type. For instance, an external threat actor is further categorised as organised crime, former 
employee, competitor, espionage and grudge. The Partner is further categorised as the industry. 
The internal threat actor is categorised as hired, demoted, personal issues, resigned, auditor, 
cashier and developer. Therefore, we train our classifiers based on the threat actor responsible for 
the incident. Predicting risk requires information about the threat actor type and motive; this 
allows organisations to determine the policies to educate their employees, access their data, 
safeguard their networks from attackers and perform due diligence when selecting partners as the 
third party.  
Table 5.2: Feature vector for threat actor for VCDB dataset 
Threat Actor  
Type 





Number of  
features 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ……... 80 
Total Number 




• Assets: Mapping is done for the assets that were compromised during the incident of the attack. 
There are six categories of asset types: server, media, user device, terminal, people and networks. 
Knowing the type of assets that are more likely to be affected can significantly improve their 
ability to predict risk following security incidents. Organisations can further implement 
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appropriate controls, such as network administrators keeping regular backups on media and server 
assets. 
Table 5.3: Feature vector for the asset for VCDB dataset 
Asset Type Disk 
drive 
Documents  Access 
reader 
LAN Router/Switch Patch 
Management  
RTU ....... Database 
Number of  
features 







• TTP: This set of Mapping is information regarding the type of attack, based on which each TTP 
can be put in one of seven general categories: Environmental, error, hacking, malware, 
misuse, physical and social.  Each category of TTP includes additional features that can 
help to differentiate incidents further. For instance, SQL injection and brute force are 
identified as hacking. Hacking incidents involve data breach through compromised 
credentials. Physical incidents include theft leading to tampering. Knowing the TTP type 
can provide organisations with valuable information on preventive measures to reduce risk. 
Secure passwords, setting and enforcing internal regulations and avoiding unnecessary 
access privileges for employees can be used to prevent hacking incidents.  
Table 5.4: Feature vector TTP for VCDB dataset 














Number of  
features 






• Controls: The control types fall into one of the two categories detective and corrective controls. 
We train our classifiers based on the controls available at the time of the attack. We further 
categorise Detective into sub-categories: Internal (log review, antivirus, data loss prevention, 
fraud detection) and external (actor disclose, incident response, monitoring service, suspicious 
traffic). Assessing the risk associated with controls prompts organisations further to determine the 
set of security protections or countermeasures to minimise risk. Some of the controls might be 
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insufficient to mitigate risk, so these different control types that were compromised at the time of 
the attack are the properties that serve as features for machine learning classifiers to predict risk 
type and appropriate controls implemented.  
Table 5.5: Feature vector for control for VCDB dataset 














Number of  
features 






• Full: The full feature is a combination of all the other four features (Assets, Controls, Threat 
Actor and TTP).  The full feature contains a total number of 512 features and a total of 7,834 
data points.  
 
5.10.2. Experimental Setup 
Our experiments used VCDB dataset because it has been used in literature providing easier 
benchmarking, and we have feature information about cybersecurity. Further, in our experiments, we 
used Jupyter notebook and python 3.6 interpreters to run our codes. The dataset is divided into 80% of 
the samples for building the model and the remaining 20% for testing. 
5.10.3. Feature Extraction 
Feature extraction is the first step to start a machine learning process because it is a technique that 
aims at finding specific pieces of data in natural language and then converts them into a suitable 
format for machine learning classifiers to train. Our research draws from various data sources that 
collectively characterise the security posture of organisations and the security incident report used to 
determine their security outcomes. In this step, we extract all the necessary features from the dataset 
to map the i-CSRM concepts presented in chapter three. Every concept has properties, and those 
properties are considered as features, for example: 
• Asset concept features include; Server, media, people, networks, user device and 
terminal. 
• Threat actor features include; External, Internal and supply chain partner. 
• Control features include; corrective, Detective and preventive. 
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• TTP features include; Malware, hacking, social, physical, environmental, misuse and 
error. 
The features are further converted into a format suitable for the machine learning classifiers by 
assigning a weight between 1 and 0. 
5.10.4. Features and classification labels 
This section presents the data type values used in the experiments and includes a list of features 
extracted from the dataset. The reason for choosing these feature types is because they are salient, 
straightforward and intuitive, and any machine learning classifier can be trained over them. Asset, 
threat actor and controls are assigned binary numerical data type and given a possible value between 0 
and 1. It consists of two sub-steps.  
5.10.4.1. Features weights and labels  
Dataset is collected from the "Veris Community Database (VCDB)" (Widup, 2013). We then 
mapped the features in the dataset to i-CSRM concepts, which are used as features for the 
Classification and assigned their weights. We used feature extraction techniques coupled with 
human annotation for extracting the essential features from the dataset. The risk type is the 
output class we are predicting, and the ordinal categorical data type is used with possible values from 
1 to 10 (Refer to Table 5.13).  
Output Feature 
We have used ten output categories of risks, and the value range for the features is from (R1 = 
Crimeware, R2 = Cyber espionage, R3 = Denial of service, R4 = Everything else, R5 = lost and 
stolen assets, R6 = m00iscellaneous errors, R7 = payment card skimmers, R8 = point of sale, R9 
= privilege misuse and R10 = web applications) with possible classes. This is a multi-class 
problem, and we have the following risk types as output features explained in Table 5.6. The input 
features are shown in Tables 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10. These features are used to categorise the 
input features (threat actor, control, assets and TTP) into ten categories. The classification 
model is trained on the following categories listed in the Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6: Feature vector as output features for control for VCDB dataset 
Feature name Possible classes Range of values 
Crimeware 
Cyber Espionage 
Denial of Service 
Everything Else 
Lost and Stolen Assets 
Miscellaneous Errors 
𝑹𝑹 = {R1, R2, R3 … R10} 
Where: 
𝑹𝑹𝟏𝟏 = Crimeware 
𝑹𝑹𝟐𝟐= Cyber Espionage 
𝑹𝑹𝟑𝟑= Denial of Service 
𝑹𝑹𝟒𝟒= Everything Else 
{1,2, . .10} 
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Payment Card Skimmers 
Point of Sale 
Privilege Misuse 
Web Applications 
𝑹𝑹𝟓𝟓= Lost and Stolen Assets 
𝑹𝑹𝟔𝟔= Miscellaneous Errors 
𝑹𝑹𝟕𝟕= Payment Card Skimmers 
𝑹𝑹𝟖𝟖= Point of Sale 
𝑹𝑹𝟗𝟗= Privilege Misuse 
𝑹𝑹𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏= Web Applications 
 
Input features 
We consider different classes of input feature such as threat actor (t), asset (A), TTP (TTP), and 
control (C). Table 5.7 shows the threat actor feature types with possible classes {t1, t2, t3}, 
representing the different threat actor feature types. They are trained on the proposed 
classifiers, and the possible values are between {0, 1}. 
T a b l e  5 . 7 :  Threat Actor type feature detail 
Feature name Possible classes Range of values 
External 
Internal 
Supply chain Partner 
𝑬𝑬 = {𝑬𝑬𝟏𝟏, 𝑬𝑬𝟐𝟐, 𝑬𝑬𝟑𝟑} 
Where: 





Table 5.8 shows the different asset feature types used as an input parameter for risk type 
prediction. The asset (A) features are given as {A1, A2…A6} representing the different asset 
types and are trained on the proposed classifiers. The possible values are between{0, 1}. 
T a b l e  5 . 8 . Asset type feature detail 







𝑻𝑻 = {𝐴𝐴𝟏𝟏,𝐴𝐴𝟐𝟐 …𝐴𝐴𝟔𝟔} {0, 1} 
 
Table 5.9 below shows the control (C) feature types that are used as input parameters for 
predicting risk type. They include {c1, c2, c3} representing the different types of control types 
with possible values between{0, 1}. 
T a b l e  5 . 9 . Control type feature detail 
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𝑪𝑪 = {𝑰𝑰𝟏𝟏, 𝑰𝑰𝟐𝟐, 𝑰𝑰𝟑𝟑} 
Where: 





Table 5.10 shows the different TTP feature types used as input features trained on the proposed 
classifiers. They are given possible values as {TTP1, TTP2….TTP7} represent the different 
TTP feature names and are given possible values between{0, 1}. 
T a b l e  5 . 1 0 : TTP type feature detail 









𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 = {𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝟏𝟏,𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝟐𝟐, . . ,𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝟕𝟕} {0, 1} 
 
5.10.4.2. Assigning Weights to Feature Vectors 
The full vector takes the whole dataset into account. We used the binary values of either 0 or 1 {0, 
1} to the feature vector, as shown in Table 5.11. 
Table 5.11: Feature vector weights 






𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵∈ {0, 1} 
For a given feature vector ′𝐹𝐹′, the value ′𝑣𝑣′, of any feature ′𝑥𝑥′  is 
determined using the following rule: 
𝑣𝑣𝐵𝐵𝑥𝑥 =   �
1, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
0,𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒� 
The output value for any feature is {1} if the corresponding feature 





Classification is an essential step for machine learning to understand and assign data categories 
for accurate risk prediction. Once we have extracted all the features, the next step is to classify 
the features. To achieve the Classification, we follow seven different algorithms to generalise 
our findings of integrating machine learning with i-CSRM to predict a particular risk type. The 
classifiers calculate both the likelihood and impact and find complex relationships in data to 
produce better results than the rest. Once the feature weights are defined, we train the machine 
learning classifiers over the training data. For the given partition and classifier, the results are 
shown using the following notation: (refer to Table 5.12) 
Table 5.12: Classification Models and feature description 
Scenarios  Assets Controls Threat actor TTP Models  
𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵 
PCA is not 
applied 









𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜_𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵∈ {0  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶_𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵∈  𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴_𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵∈ {0, 1} 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 





Controls, Threat actor, 
TTP} 
 
We used the notation,  𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜_𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 to denote the feature sets that have been reduced by applying PCA. 
For example, the feature vector control is denoted by  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 moreover, in case this feature vector 
has been transformed by PCA; we denote it by  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶_𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵. Similarly, the model built over 
feature set transformed by PCA is denoted by     𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶.  
PCA is a dimensionality reduction algorithm where new features are created which respresents the 
original feature dimensions in a lower dimension with a little loss of the total information. PCA 
reduces the dimensionality by projecting high dimensional data along a smaller number of orthogonal 
dimensions. We use PCA because there are a lot of features and certain features might not be visible 
when we use them in the same manner. Therefore, we use PCA for selecting the most relevant 
features such as Assets and TTP. There might be some hidden information between features. Like 
TTP and controls might be linked to each other which we can’t see in the high level scenario. PCA try 
to find some hidden relation between the features and it helps to remove noise and increase 
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dimensionality and scalability of the data. This is a well known approach in literature used for 
reducing noise.  
5.10.6. Training the machine learning classifiers 
This section describes the training of machine learning classifiers using training data. We use 
extracted features enclosed in the training examples to find a model 𝑴𝑴:𝑫𝑫 → 𝑹𝑹, which 
approximates 𝑻𝑻. The function 𝑹𝑹 defines the class to which the learned model assigns the given sample 
𝑀𝑀 and is used to classify new scenarios. The model 𝑴𝑴 (𝒅𝒅) denotes a machine learning classifier. The 
objective here is to find a model that maximises accuracy (assigns a scenario to the most proper 
class).  
T a b l e  5 . 1 3 :  Notations used for building the classifier 
Notation Description 
𝐷𝐷 The collection of cyber-attack scenarios 
𝑀𝑀′ =  {𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀2, . . ,𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁} N number of scenarios to be classified 
𝑅𝑅 = {𝑅𝑅1,𝑅𝑅2,𝑅𝑅3,𝑅𝑅4,𝑅𝑅5 …𝑅𝑅10} R is the number of possible risks categories 
𝑀𝑀′ =  {𝑀𝑀1,𝑀𝑀2, . . ,𝑀𝑀𝑁𝑁} The training set consisting of N scenarios with 
corresponding actual class labels 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑅𝑅 =
 {𝑅𝑅1, . . ,𝑅𝑅10} 
𝑇𝑇 A target concept T: D → R, which maps given a 
scenario to a class (we assume the categories are 
disjoint, i.e. each given scenario can only be 
categorised into one of the categories, and there is 
no overlapping between categories) 
𝑀𝑀:𝐷𝐷 → 𝑅𝑅 A machine learning model, which approximates T 
(i.e. close to T) 
𝑀𝑀 (𝑀𝑀) The model prediction for unknown scenario 'd’ 
(i.e. the model predict using a classification 
algorithm, which classes the unknown scenario 
belongs to) 
 




           (𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝟓𝟓.𝟏𝟏) 
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Where |d′| is the size of the test set (number of scenarios to be classified), and 1M(d)=Rd  It is an 
indicator function that output one if the model predicted the class for the test scenario is the same as 
the actual test class and zero otherwise. Formally: 
                        𝟏𝟏𝐌𝐌(𝐱𝐱)=𝐑𝐑𝐱𝐱 =  �
   𝐎𝐎𝐄𝐄𝐎𝐎 𝐄𝐄𝐢𝐢 𝐌𝐌(𝒙𝒙) = 𝐑𝐑𝒙𝒙        
𝟏𝟏      𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐨𝐨𝐎𝐎𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐨𝐄𝐄𝐨𝐨𝐎𝐎
(𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝟓𝟓.𝟐𝟐) 
The proper controls also increase the accuracy score, which corresponds to a classification error’s low 
rate. 
5.10.7. Evaluation measures 
Some of the standard measurements used to evaluate information retrieval information methods are 
Precision, Recall and F-1. Therefore, this section presents Precision, Recall and F-measure as 
evaluation measures. These metrics are used to validate accuracy in different ways, yet they can be 
applied to other purposes and describe how risk prediction methods are successful.  
 
The precision gives us the probability that a selected value is true. It can be formally defined as:  
𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑳𝑳𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒊𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 =
𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳 𝑻𝑻𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳
𝑻𝑻𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳 𝑰𝑰𝑨𝑨𝑳𝑳𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝑰𝑰𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝒅𝒅 𝑰𝑰𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳 
              (𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝟓𝟓.𝟑𝟑) 
 




𝐓𝐓𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐑𝐑 𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐑𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐑𝐑 𝐏𝐏𝐄𝐄𝐨𝐨𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐏𝐏𝐎𝐎 
               (𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝟓𝟓.𝟒𝟒) 
 
The F1 Score is a function of the Precision and Recall and can be formally defined as: 
𝑻𝑻𝟏𝟏 = 𝟐𝟐 ∗
𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑳𝑳𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒊𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 ∗ 𝑹𝑹𝑳𝑳𝑰𝑰𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳
𝑻𝑻𝑨𝑨𝑳𝑳𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒊𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 + 𝑹𝑹𝑳𝑳𝑰𝑰𝑬𝑬𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳
                    (𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒊𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬     𝟓𝟓.𝟓𝟓) 
5.11.  Case study: Implementation of i-CSRM Framework 
This presents the implementation of the i-CSRM framework process as well as i-CSRMT using the 
case-study. By following the i-CSRM process from start to end over some time, we systematically 
applied all the activities and steps within the i-CSRM process using i-CSRMT and the opportunity to 
collect feedback towards evaluating its validity. Therefore, a detailed description of the case study is 
provided by first presenting background information and implementing the existing system. This is 
concluded by a practical demonstration of how the i-CSRM Framework was achieved.   
5.11.1. Study context 
DisCos power holding company in Nigeria distributes electricity (Kemabonta and Kabalan, 2018) 
across the country, which serves at least 30,000 customers within a geographical area, with several 
branches and employees located in different states Nigeria. The company is structured based on 
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functional divisions, which include administration, support and IT. The company’s first services are to 
provide last-mile services in the electricity supply value chain, transforming or stepping down 
electricity from the high voltage at the transmission level to lower voltage depending on the 
customer’s category. They are responsible for the marketing and sale of electricity to customers, 
providing a tax to the government, collecting bills, handling electronic payments, exchanging 
information and providing customer care functions in its geographical area. In improving the 
continuity of service, timely recognition of faults, continuous monitoring and protection of the power 
systems, the company recently implemented a supervisory control system in all of its branches for 
sustainable service delivery. 
5.11.2. The Workflow 
The power distribution happens through a power distribution substation that comprises other 
components such as circuit transformers, breakers, and a bus bar. The transformers increase (step-up) 
or reduce (step down) voltages to adjust to the different stages of the journey from the power plant on 
long-distance transmission lines to distribution lines that carry electricity to homes and businesses. 
Circuit breakers enable the disconnection of distribution lines during maintenance or upgrade and 
isolating faults in the distribution lines. The bus bar splits and distributes power to distribution lines 
for reaching out to customers. The substation’s whole distribution process and components are 
managed by a cyber-physical control system, consisting of a Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) system. In other words, the SCADA system monitors the entire power control 
system in real-time by performing automatic monitoring and controlling of various equipment within 
the distribution lines. It also maintains the desired operation conditions, interrupts and restores power 
service during fault conditions. SCADA system also checks the status of various equipment 
continuously and sends control signals to the remote control unit accordingly. Further, it also 
performs operations such as bus voltage control, load balancing, circulating current control, overload 
control, and transformer fault protection  
5.11.3. Recent Cyber Incident 
DisCos is an official body with branches geographically split (Onochie, Egware and Eyakwanor, 
2015); each has its workstations networked to allow personnel to perform their tasks. All branches 
deployed a new SCADA system to improve power reliability, cybersecurity, and resilience to 
disruption. They use a SCADA consisting of 5 generic machine types connected to a local Ethernet 
LAN to support their services. In a recent event, an employee monitoring the SCADA system in one 
of the branches received a carefully crafted spear-phishing e-mail message from a highly skilled 
anonymous organisation that contained a malicious Microsoft Word attachment and disguised as a 
medical report of his sick son. The employee clicked and opened the document, and malware was 
discovered to have spread across the network, operating systems, and targeting the SCADA system, 
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which led to the unstable power system operation in the branch. The anonymous organisation 
gathered hashed credentials over a server message block (SMB) to identify information by 
downloading the word document. The anonymous organisation accessed workstations and servers on 
the corporate network that contained data output from control systems, accessed files about the 
SCADA systems, leaked network credentials, organisational design and control system information to 
a command and control server outside DisCos organisation, and accessed e-mail accounts using 
outlook web access (OWA).  
The anonymous organisation used a virtual private network (VPN) to maintain access to networks 
even with network proxies, gateways and firewalls. After the employee visited one of the 
compromised servers, a backdoor was installed on the machine, providing the anonymous 
organisation with remote access to the environment (networks, systems, databases). The anonymous 
organisation having available resources, disabled the host-based firewalls, obtained a foothold and the 
exploration activity primarily centred on identifying the central host computer server with the highest 
volume of personally identifiable information (PII) script folder and file names from hosts. The 
anonymous organisation gained access to the database host computer server by leveraging its active 
directory information to identify database administrators and their computers. Passwords were 
cracked using password-cracking techniques, allowing the anonymous organisation to gain full access 
to those systems. This caused a loss of data and operational disruption as a result of network and 
computer security failure. This particular incident has resulted in an electrical power blackout that 
remained for up to 2 weeks, affecting around 30,000 customers and their businesses. As a result, 
DisCos has decided to use i-CSRM framework to assess future impact and control measures for 
similar incidents in the other branches. A brief description of a scenario allows us to exemplify how 
the DisCos could benefit from our proposed Framework.  
5.12. Implementation of i-CSRM for the Study Context 
As DisCos is considering applying the i-CSRM Framework and the use of i-CSRMT, we had the 
opportunity to determine its relevance to a real-life context. As part of managing the entire evaluation 
process, the company assigned a team of professional stakeholders to guide the entire evaluation 
process and ensure necessary support to ensure evaluation is achieved in an ideal manner. This section 
provides a detailed description of how i-CSRM and i-CSRMT were applied to the case study.  
Before starting the activities, a meeting was organised where the evaluation plan’s overall setting was 
decided, a project team was developed, and a first step is taken towards starting the activities. The 
project team comprises representatives from senior management, the IT department and other 
stakeholders within the company.The project leader starts the meeting by giving a brief presentation 
of the i-CSRM Framework and i-CSRMT, its aim, what the company can expect from the 
145 
 
implementation, and the role of participants, data collection, and a proposed meeting plan. The project 
leader also reminded the organisation of the responsibilities concerning providing necessary 
information and documentation about the assets, threat intelligence report and background, business 
process, and allocating human resources with suitable expertise to participate in the evaluation 
process. Hence, the implementation process was performed through organised meetings, workshops, 
and discussions presented below.  
5.12.1. Activity 1: Organisational Context 
Through senior management support and active involvement, we embarked upon initial knowledge 
extraction and organisational context discovery activity to gather initial information that facilitated 
identifying the company’s business strategy. We started the activities defined in the proposed i-CSRM 
Framework with the organisational context, which allowed us to identify the organisation’s key 
objectives and understand the key actors and their roles within the organisation. This enabled us to 
interact more effectively with key actors to gather information and implement the proposed i-CSRM 
Framework. By conducting the organisational context analysis activity, we were also able to identify 
and prevent potential misconceptions about each stakeholder’s position and roles and identify sources 
of information regarding the organisation. 
5.12.1.1. Step 1: Identification of Actors and their roles 
During the initial meeting and interaction with the implementation team, we were able to identify the 
key actors that support and influence the project and the different roles they play within the 
organisation. This enabled us to interact more effectively with the key actors to gather information 
and implement the proposed i-CSRM Framework. Also, we considered actors from within and outside 
the organisation, which were categorised into internal and external actors. To present a comprehensive 
picture of actors, we have created an actor list showing actors and their roles. Each actor has a certain 
degree of activeness. Some actors fully participated in the CSRM implementation, while other actors 
were passive. Table 5.14 provides a list of different actors and their roles. Using i-CSRMT, an 
organisation can set each actor with their respective roles and define the permission associated with 
that role. When you create the role, you can assign an employee associated with that role, as shown in 
Figure 5.20 and 5.21. 
Table 5.14: List of Actors and their Roles 
Type Actors Role 
Internal Senior Management 
representatives 
Comprises high ranking personnel of the company 
whose responsibility is to coordinate, plan, oversee 
and direct the overall project. 
IT Managers In charge of the company’s technology strategy and 
responsible for coordinating and leading the 
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company’s IT experts/IT department in implementing 
the Framework’s process. 
System Analyst Responsible for coordinating the development of 
systems, asset requirements, and control measures for 
ensuring the security of all assets. 
System Administrator Responsible for the technical oversight of the entire 
content management system. He was also charged 
with installing, supporting and maintaining servers, 
responding to service outages and other problems. 
Security Analyst Responsible for identifying cyber threats and 
establishing plans and controls to protect assets. Also 
responsible for performing vulnerability testing, risk 
analysis and security assessment activities 
Risk Manager Risk Manager communicates risk policies and 
processes for an organisation. They ensure controls 
are operating effectively, provide hands-on 
development of risk models involving market, credit 
and operational risk and provide research and 
analytical support. 








Figure 5.21: Set Actors permission 
5.12.2. Activity 2: Asset Identification and Criticality 
The project team embarked upon initial knowledge extraction through senior management support, 
and active involvements were initial information that facilitated the identification of the organisation’s 
critical assets. This enabled us to understand how things are done in the organisation regarding its 
activities, followed by identifying the security goals that are part of an essential component of the 
organisation’s assets and identifying the most critical assets. During this time, the key assets’ present 
architecture was reviewed, the architectural components are identified, and the high-level 
dependencies between the assets were established. Based on the knowledge acquired, we established 
asset types, dependency, security goals, and criticality.   
5.12.2.1. Step 1: Asset Profile  
The IT manager was involved in explaining and documenting the system and its components, which 
provided the basis to identify the organisation’s critical assets and their security, needs to create a 
consistent asset profile. The IT manager also presented a comprehensive overview of the 
organisation’s assets which are the target of analysis, from where we observed that the system 
comprises many different components. Based on these discussions, we analysed the system’s 
architecture to establish asset profiles, identify the critical asset, asset dependencies, and 
interdependencies, including how information is stored and processed. This enabled us to identify 
critical assets, including data and applications and the security goals that are essential components of 
the organisation’s assets.  
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During this time, the present architecture of software systems and applications were reviewed, the 
architectural components are identified, and the high-level dependencies between them were 
established. We considered factors that influence operations, such as the organisation's structure and 
the system and processes by which work is carried out. The asset profile is crucial because it can be 
utilised when developing and applying protection strategy and risk mitigation plans for the system. 
We prepared an initial asset inventory together with details of the assets as shown in Table 5.15. 
Table 5.15: Assets Identification 
Asset Category Sub-Asset category 
Software assets Microsoft office 
Master boot record/files 
Mail server 
Service Manager 
Windows/Android operating systems 
UPS remote management interface 
Computer security protection 
Virtual machines 
User identity access management 
Hardware assets Computer systems 




Data assets Skype messages 




SCADA systems Industrial control systems (ICS) 
HMI computers 
Remote terminal unit (RTU) 
Substations 
ICS providers 
SCADA database software 
Programmable logic controllers (PLC) 
Firmware 
Substations Ethernet devices 
SCADA database software 
Workstation 
ICS software application and windows 
Information and Communication 
Networks 
Company’s computer network 




Network Internal server 
Public-facing services 
Command and control servers 
Website 
Remote access services 
Operational network 





Internet service providers 
 
5.12.2.2. Step 2: Identify Asset Security Goals 
After the asset inventory has been agreed and completed by the team, the next step is to identify each 
asset’s goals. Measuring an assets goals value requires that numerous factors are considered by using 
several criteria (Izuakor and White, 2016), such as economic impacts, financial impact, operational 
impact etc. The security analyst conducted a high-level brainstorming exercise and other team 
members to identify the most critical security goals for the assets identified in the previous step. At 
first, some representatives of DisCos emphasised that they are particularly worried about the privacy 
of data held by the CPS and availability of the services. However, the security analyst explained that 
the team had reviewed the information collected during the previous step and examined every 
functional requirement for the system through less important security goals such as confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability.  
The security goals represent factors against which asset criticality is measured and distinguish those 
assets whose loss could significantly impact the objectives of the critical infrastructure. Hence, after 
some discussion, the project team decides that the focus of security goals is based on the system’s 
known characteristics and the attributes of security goals should include confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, conformance, and accountability. 
• Confidentiality: confidentiality goals are intended to ensure that unauthorised access to data, 
application and other assets is not permitted, and that accidental disclosure is impossible. 
Information or data on all the system’s components should be restricted to only those with the 
permission to access.  
• Integrity: This asset goal ensures that data and applications of the CPS are safe from 
unauthorised modification and can be modified only by authorised users. It also ensures the 
accuracy and completeness of records, and only authorised users should be allowed to modify 
contents.   
• Availability: Data and resources must be made available for authorised use without 
interference or obstruction. Data, application, and other system resources must be available 
when requested and easily accessible to authorised users only.  
• Accountability: The ability to trace activities or operations that occurred on data, 
applications or system components to a particular source. All users must be accountable for 
the operations they perform.  
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• Conformance: CPS must operate as intended without variation to expected behaviour, 
functions and regulatory requirements. The system must also be secured from vulnerabilities 
that can be exploited to cause unwanted behaviour.   
5.12.2.3. Step 3: Determine Asset Criticality 
Having identified the system’s assets and its related security goals, the project team embarked on the 
next step of determining asset criticality on the identified assets in the previous step. The criticality 
level is determined and assessed in greater detail as part of the asset identification and criticality 
activity. An assessor team consisting of the security analyst and other experts prioritises assets in 
terms of the security goals by applying a novel asset criticality system using fuzzy logic proposed in i-
CSRM process so that the most critical assets can be connected with top priorities. This step is 
conducted as a separate brainstorming exercise, and the primary goal is to determine the criticality of 
the assets formally approved by all project team members. The FACS allows experts to express their 
differences in the inference process with less bias and higher reliability. Therefore, asset criticality is 
determined using the method proposed in the process and each asset is assigned a level of criticality 
using fuzzy inputs and the crisp rating values in Table 4.4. The result is shown in Table 5.16 using i-
CSRMT; however, we could not integrate fuzzy logic into the tool. Therefore, we used MATLAB to 
get the final asset criticality output. The list of assets may not be exhaustive, but it will include the 
assets most valuable to the organisation and its users.  
Figure 5.22 shows the AC level for each asset (according to Very High Critical, High Critical, 
Medium Critical, Low Critical and Very Low Critical) which is mainly obtained using minimum-
maximum inference, which considers the minimum of the antecedents of the maximum for 
aggregation and Defuzzification. Hence, each asset’s AC falls under one of the five categories from 
low critical to very high critical as defined in Table 5.4. For example, SCADA system is given the 
input values (C=1), (I=2), (A=1), (ACC=3), (CON=4) by an assessor, the output value is (AC = "2.5") 
using the FACS. Traditionally, different sets of fuzzy input (C, A, I, ACC, CON) may generate an 
identical value of the fuzzy output (AC); however the assets may not necessarily be the same. Figure 








Figure 5.23: Asset criticality graphical chart 
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Table 5.16: Asset criticality results 
Asset Name Asset Description Asset Goals Fuzzy output Asset Criticality Level 
Fuzzy input 




Monitor, analyse and filter any harmful 
signs, while being connected to the 
corporate network. 
1 3 4 4 1 
 
2.5 Medium Critical 
Databases Stores sensitive information about its 
customers, personnel, marketing, landlords, 
tenants, transactions, assets, finances, and 
other information about the company’s 
business process. 
4 4 3 4 5 4 Highly Critical 
Company and 
customer data 
Represent sensitive and private information 
about employees, finances, assets. 
3 3 3 4 4 3.5 Medium Critical 
Web & Application 
Servers 
Provides processes and delivers web 
contents such as images and assets 
information to employees and customers. 
The application server  provides the platform 
for hosting frontend applications used by the 
company 
1 3 3 1 1 
 
2 Low Critical  
SCADA Systems Provides the user interface that allows 
employees and customers to visualise, 
access, and patronise the company’s 
services. 
2 5 5 1 4 
 




5.12.3. Activity 3: Threat Modelling 
Investigating how cybersecurity can be addressed for each critical asset is crucial. Therefore, this 
activity’s goal is to identify as many potential threats and vulnerabilities as possible. The activity is 
organised as a workshop, drawn from actors with expertise in risk management. The actors involved in 
this activity include the security analyst and a member of senior management. Also, various 
methodologies and standards were employed at different steps of performing the threat modelling activity. 
All participating actors were briefed about the parts of the standard/methodologies used and its benefit.   
5.12.3.1. Step 1: Determine the Vulnerability profile  
The first step to secure these assets is to identify their vulnerabilities and weaknesses by examining the 
attack surface and the relevant threat models. The analysis team moved on to create a vulnerability profile 
that contains the vulnerabilities that are exploited and affect assets. To direct this process, the project’s 
team members, a security analyst and system administrator were brought together to conduct an informed 
brainstorming session to identify a detailed list of potential vulnerabilities.  
Secondly, a list of vulnerabilities compiled by CWE and CAPEC was presented to the team to understand 
by providing a standardised list of software weaknesses and the methods to exploit those weaknesses such 
that two or more people know they are talking about the same thing. Without standardisation, individuals 
are forced to engage in non-standard descriptive terms that generate rework and misunderstanding. In this 
regard, the team considered all potential vulnerabilities. Adopting these standards proved to be a simple 
yet effective way to identify, categorise and determine the likelihood of potential vulnerabilities, and it 
led to the participants having a better understanding of asset vulnerabilities. It also mitigates any problem 
that may arise due to using simplistic vulnerability categorisation and rating system, which are likely to 
be rejected by the team members. Thus, to document the assets’ vulnerabilities, a template that shows 
several vulnerability factors is used. By identifying the weak points, the security analyst documents the 
meeting’s result by filling a vulnerability profile for the study context, which affected critical assets and 
caused a threat that led to risk. 
5.12.3.2. Step 2: Determine Threat profile  
Having completed the asset inventory and identified vulnerabilities, the analysis team created a threat 
profile that identifies the threats that can potentially affect the assets and compromise sensitive 
information. To direct this process, the project’s team members, a security analyst and system 
administrator were brought together to conduct an informed brainstorming session to identify a detailed 
list of threats, threat actor factors, TTP and IOC. A list of security threats compiled by CAPEC and 
WASC was presented to the team. Firstly, the team started with identifying a combined list of 10 security 
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threats that they perceived to be important to the organisation’s assets. After a brief reconsideration, the 
list was updated with three additional threats.  
Secondly, the adoption of these two threat classification models proved helpful and straightforward in 
identifying, categorising and determining the impact of potential threats, and it led to the participants 
having a better understanding of threat elements. With the adoption of CTI, a better understanding of 
threat actors, attack patterns, and TTP use is understood by the team. In this regard, the team considered 
all potential threats to document the threats, vulnerabilities, IOC and TTP associated with the assets; a 
template that shows several threat attributes is used. Figure 5.24 displays the threat actor factors, 
indicators of compromise (IOC), TTP, related attack patterns, execution flow and possible vulnerabilities. 
The security analyst documents the result of the meeting by filling a threat profile. 
 
Figure 5.24: Threat and vulnerability profile 
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5.12.4. Activity 4: Risk Assessment 
The next activity involves a risk management process whose goal is to identify as many potential threats, 
vulnerabilities and risks as possible. The activity is organised as a workshop drawn from stakeholders 
with expertise in risk management. The stakeholders involved in this activity include the security analyst, 
information security officer, and senior management member. Also, various methodologies, machine 
learning techniques and standards were employed at different steps of performing risk management. All 
participating actors were briefed about the parts of the standard/methodologies used and its benefit.   
5.12.4.1. Step 1: Predict Risk Types  
In this step, a workshop is organised, which entails the identification of risks types. The participants are 
presented with multiple risk types, usually associated with critical infrastructure and assets of all kinds. 
The risk sources are provided by industry bodies and are updated regularly, which means that they 
provide up-to-date information about the most pressing security issues in information systems and web 
applications. In particular, a list of risks provided by the VCDB dataset is presented in the workshop, and 
the participants are challenged to select those they perceive to be relevant threats previously identified. 
We have used ten output categories of risks, and the value range for the features is from (R1 = 
Crimeware, R2 = Cyber espionage, R3 = Denial of service, R4 = Everything else, R5 = lost and stolen 
assets, R6 = miscellaneous errors, R7 = payment card skimmers, R8 = point of sale, R9 = privilege 
misuse and R10 = web applications) with possible classes. This is a multi-class problem, and we have the 
following risk types as output features. A list of risks is therefore identified. 
Phase 1:  Prediction Result  
Table 5.17 presents the six classifiers’ accuracy performance details in predicting the different risk types 
based on the given CSRM features (Assets, Controls, Threat Actor and TTP). Based on the Asset 
features, LR, DT and NB-Multi achieved 95%, 93% and 92% respectively for predicting risk type “Lost 
and Stolen Assets”, “Everything Else”, “Crimeware”, “Cyber Espionage” and “Denial of Service”. They 
failed to identify risk types “Point of Sale” and “Web Application”. RF, KNN and NB achieved 87%, 
86% and 71% respectively for predicting risk type “Crimeware”, “Cyber Espionage”, and “Lost and 
Stolen Assets”. NN failed to predict any risk type and achieved 4%. Based on the TTP features, KNN, 
LR, NB-Multi, and DT achieved an accuracy of 80% for predicting risk type “Denial of Service”, “Cyber 
Espionage” and “Everything Else”. RF achieved an accuracy of 72% for predicting risk type “cyber 
espionage” and “Everything Else” NN failed to predict any risk type and achieved 4%.  
Based on the Threat Actor features, LR, NB-Multi and RF achieved 79% accuracy for predicting risk type 
“Everything Else”, “Cyber Espionage” “Privilege Misuse”, and “Crimeware”. KNN could predict risk 
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type “Everything Else”, “Cyber Espionage”, and “Privilege Misuse” while DT could predict risk type 
“Everything Else”, “Cyber Espionage”, and “Crimeware” both classifiers with 76% accuracy. The NB 
achieved 63% accuracy for predicting risk types “” Cyber Espionage” and “Privileged Misuse”. NN 
achieved 3% accuracy and failed to predict any risk type. Lastly, based on the control features, KNN 
achieved the highest accuracy of 40% in predicting risk type “Everything Else”. LR, DT, NB-Multi and 
RF achieved 39% for predicting risk type “Everything Else”.  NB and NN achieved an accuracy of 5% 
and 3% respectively. Both classifiers failed to predict any risk type. Asset and TTP features performed 
well on all the different classifiers except NN.  Comparing the performance of all the features shows that 
NB failed to perform risk type prediction based on control features and NN achieved very low risk type 
prediction based on all the features. Therefore, for the risk types “Everything Else”, “Privilege Misuse”, 
“Denial of Service” and “Cyber Espionage” all the input features achieved high prediction. Table 5.17 
shows that Asset and TTP are the best features to predict risk types presented in this work. 
Table 5.17: Performance of the features on each of the classifiers for predicting risk types 
Accuracy Risk Type Prediction Features 
Asset TTP Threat Actor Control Full 
LR 95% 80% 79% 39% 39% 
DT 93% 80% 76% 39% 39% 
NB-Multi 92% 80% 79% 39% 39% 
RF 87% 72% 79% 39% 39% 
KNN 86% 80% 76% 40% 30% 
NB 71% 56% 63% 5% 5% 
NN 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 
 
Figure 5.25 displays the graphical chart representation of the Table 5.18 shows the percentage 





Figure 5.25: Performance of the features on each of the classifiers for predicting risk types 
This is because different classifiers are based on different fundamentals. LR takes into account the 
probabilities of several independent variables describing the possible outcomes of a single trial using 
logistic functions. NB classifier takes into account posterior probability which might be good, DT takes 
into account the relationship between data into account and NN takes hidden relationships and find final 
relationship. In our case, DT performed because it is good in solving regression and classification 
problems, thereof it’s performed better in predicting the risk types.  
Phase 2: Prediction Accuracy 
After predicting the possible risk types by feeding the i-CSRM features from VCDB dataset into our 
classifiers, the next step is to interpret the different classifiers’ accuracy for various types of input 
features. Therefore, the predictive accuracy percentage of six different machine learning classifiers based 
on CSRM features is presented. However, each feature performed differently within classifiers. The best 
overall predictive accuracy including all input features is recorded with Decision Tree (DT) algorithm 
which is (92.92%) on Asset features, Controls (79.26%), TTP (62.73%), Threat Actor (61.32%), and Full 
features was (39.12%). The second best algorithm is NB Multi which gave us (91.90%) on asset features, 
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third best algorithm is RF, it performed well on Asset features with (87.36%), control (78.75%), TTP 
(62.03%), Threat Actor (61.01%) and full features (38.93%). The fourth best algorithm is KNN, it 
performed well on almost all the input features, Asset features (85.77%), Controls (67.96%), TTP 
(58.07%), Threat Actor (56.80%) and the full features produced the least accuracy with (29.99%). The 
fifth best algorithm is the NB algorithm that performed well on the asset features with (71.03%), controls 
(55.90%), Threat Actor (19.85%), TTP (18.38%) and full features with (05.42%). The sixth algorithm 
which is NN didn’t perform well on all the features, control features is (04.02%), Asset features is 
(03.51%), Full feature is (03.32%), TTP (03.13%) and threat actor (03.06%).  
This shows that the Asset features performed well with DT (92.92%), NB Mult (91.90%), RF (87.36%), 
KNN (85.77%) and NB (71.03%). NN did not perform well with (03.51%). The control features also 
performed well with DT (79.25%), NB Multi (78.88%), RF (78.74%) and KNN (67.96%). On the other 
hand, Neural Networks (NN) and Naïve Bayes (NB) did not make satisfactory prediction accuracy on all 
the features. It can be noted that the most prominent features to detect risk types are Assets and control 
features. The result clearly shows that DT outperformed other classifiers giving the highest satisfactory 




Figure 5.26: The accuracy of different classifiers for various types of input binary features 
Phase 3: Results of the different classifiers transformed by PCA 
Figure 5.27 shows the results of different classifiers for various kinds of input features that have been 
transformed by applying PCA. We figure out that, PCA does improve accuracy for TTP and Control 
features where the accuracy is above 79%.  
 
 
Figure 5.27: The accuracy of different classifiers for various types of features transformed by applying 
PCA 
Phase 4: Results of Confusion Matrix: This section describes the classifiers’ performance on the test 
data for which the true values are known. This allows for the visualization of the performance of an 
algorithm. In this case, the best overall predictive accuracy was recorded with DT which produced better 
results than other classifiers as shown in Appendix C.  
Phase 5: Analyzing the results of the DT algorithm for identifying the different types of risk: Figure 
5.28 shows the DT classifier with a precision of 100% in identifying Crimeware (R1), 70% precision was 
obtained for cyber espionage (R2), 73% precision for Denial of Service (R3), 77% precision for 
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Everything else (R4) and 74% precision for lost and stolen assets (R5).  The precision of 61% for 
Miscellaneous Error (R6), Precision of 82% for payment card skimmer (R7), Precision of 82% for point 
of sale (R8), Precision of 95% for privilege misuse (R9) and a precision of  26% for web application 
(R10).   
The DT classifier shows a recall of 53% in identifying Crimeware (R1), 69% recall was obtained for 
cyber espionage (R2), 50% recall for Denial of Service (R3), 58% recall for Everything else (R4) and 
56% recall for lost and stolen assets (R5). Recall of 34% for Miscellaneous Error (R6), Recall of 43% for 
payment card skimmer (R7), Recall of 37% for point of sale (R8), Recall of 71% for privilege misuse 
(R9) and a recall of 71% for web application (R10). 
The DT classifier shows an F1-score  of 69% in identifying Crimeware (R1), 69% F1-score was obtained 
for cyber espionage (R2), 69% F1-score for Denial of Service (R3), 66% F1-score for Everything else 
(R4) and 64% F1-score for lost and stolen assets (R5).  F1-score of 44% for Miscellaneous Error (R6), 
F1-score of 57% for payment card skimmer (R7), F1-score of 51% for point of sale (R8), F1-score of 
81% for privilege misuse (R9) and an F1-score of 39% for web application (R10). 
Therefore, DT achieved a very high precision of 100% in identifying Crimeware (R1) and a Precision of 
95% in identifying privilege misuse (R8).  DT achieved a high Recall of 71% in identifying privilege 
misuse (R9) and web application (R10). Finally, an f1-score of 81% for identifying privilege misuse (R9) 
is achieved. 
5.12.4.2. Step 2: Determine Risk Level  
After identifying the various IOC, TTP, vulnerabilities, threats, and predicted the risk types using dataset, 
we identified and assessed the risks by estimating the assets’ likelihood and impact. The Web pages allow 
the organisation to adapt various aspects associated with risks and their relations. This includes risk types, 
risk impact, risk likelihood and control measures. 
• Phase 1- Estimating Risk Likelihood: To estimate the overall likelihood of the risk, threat actor 
and vulnerability factors are put into consideration. The overall likelihood falls within high, 




Figure 5.14:  Risk likelihood 
• Phase 2- Estimating Risk Impact: The web page allows the organisation to associate the defined 





Figure 5.15: Risk Impact factor selection 
• Phase 3- Determine Risk Level: The web page displays the results of the risk calculation. Each 
risk event is evaluated and presented separately with the elements used in the calculation and the 
calculated risk value. Figure 5.16 presents the calculated risk value which represents how 




Figure 5.16: Calculated Risk Level 
5.12.5. Activity 5: Risk Controls 
The next activity involves identifying risk controls, organised as a workshop involving the risk 
management team members who decide and establish security controls from different perspectives that 
any potential critical infrastructure must meet. During the seminar, the security analyst presented the risk 
register while also repeating the need to evaluate the effectiveness of existing risk control and develop a 
new compilation of security controls from CIS_CSC. We first identified existing controls to ensure that 
the controls worked correctly and evaluated the existing controls’ effectiveness in step 2. If controls do 




5.12.5.1. Step 1: Identification of Existing Control Types 
We first identified DisCos existing controls to ensure that the controls are working correctly. The 
organisation detected the controls; some are shown in Table 5.19 to address the identified risks. The 
outcome determines the security control budget for the organisation, and decisions are optimised. 
Table 5.19: Existing Control Types 
Control type Attack Techniques Control description 
Preventive Brute Force After a certain number of a failed login attempt to 
prevent passwords from being guessed, set account 
lockout policies. 
Disabling security tools The proper process, registry, and file permission 
should be in place to prevent the anonymous 
organisation from disabling or interfering with the 
Disco’s security services. 
Detective Account discovery 
 
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially 
malicious software that may be used to acquire 
information or data about system and domain 
accounts, and block them by using whitelisting tool or 
software restriction policies where appropriate. 
System Network Configuration 
Discovery 
File and Directory 
Discovery 
Data from the local system 
Spear-phishing attachment Network intrusion prevention systems should be 
put in place to scan and remove malicious e-mail 
attachments. 
Corrective External Remote Services Limit access to remote services through centrally 
managed VPNs, and other managed remote access 
internal systems through network proxies, gateways 
and firewalls. 
Use strong two-factor or multi-factor 
authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate 
the anonymousorganisation’s ability to leverage stolen 
credentials. 
Credential Dumping Ensure that administrator accounts have 
complex, unique passwords across all systems on the 
network.  
E-mail Collection Use of two-factor authentication for public-
facing webmail servers is recommended as a best 
practice to minimise the use of usernames and 
passwords to the anonymousorganisation. 
Forced Authentication Use strong passwords to increase the difficulty of 
credential hashes from being cracked if they are 
obtained. 
User Execution Training is required for the Disco employees to raise 
awareness on raising suspicion for potentially 
malicious events. 
Spear-phishing attachment Antivirus can also be used as it automatically 




5.12.5.2. Step 2: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Existing Controls 
It was proposed that control effectiveness should be specified according to five fundamental categories 
namely: relevance of the control, strength of the control, coverage of the control, integration of the control 
and traceability of the control. The participants became involved and based on their expert opinion; 
effectiveness of the existing controls is specified in Figure 5.17. 
 
Figure 5.17: Control Effectivenes Result 
5.12.5.3. Step 3: Implement Control Measures to Determine New Risk Status 
We first identified existing controls, to ensure that the controls are working correctly. The Web page 
allows the organisation to define a list of available controls. The user can select the control measure using 




Figure 7.18: Control measure implementation 
Figure 7.19 displays the current risk status for each risk type. It presents the risk type and their calculated 




Figure 7.19: Risk Assessment overview 
5.12.5.4. Risk Register   
Based on reviews from other members, the research team established a threat profile; the threat 
classification and impact ranking have now been approved. The language required for starting to define 
and evaluate risks that can affect assets has been established. The research team started a series of 
organised workshops to define threats, estimate likelihood and impact, and implement control measures. 
The first workshop included risk identification. Many sources of threats were posed to participants, 
typically correlated with all forms of assets. The industries have provided the sources of risk and are 
regularly updated to include up-to-date details on critical assets’ highest security threats. Specifically, the 
workshop included a set of risks offered by CAPEC and the participants had to choose the risks they 
consider important. There was a cumulative list of 23 threats, although it was shortened to 15 later. 
To quantify the likelihood and impact values of the identified threats, the second Workshop was 
conducted. During the workshop, all participants were asked to provide the best possible estimation. 
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Therefore, the methodology for risk rating OWASP was presented. As the participants represent different 
skills, they presumably have different opinions about the risk probability assessment and the impact 
values, which is the key concept behind the OWASP approach. 
Finally, another workshop was held to identify the control measures needed to reduce or apprehend risk. 
The analysis team was presented with a collection of alternative controls by CSC CIS during this 
exercise. These controls provide a robust list of best practises to alleviate most types of risk. The research 
team then discussed possible control measures and concluded which measures would control or minimise 
risk to acceptable level. The CSC CIS took most control steps, while others were obtained from ENISA, 
especially when CSC CIS did not monitor those risks. Finally, a risk register showing the threats, 
likelihood, impacts and control measures was developed. 
5.13. Feedback Review Findings for i-CSRM Framework 
This section analyses the feedback from stakeholders after implementing the i-CSRM Framework. The 
review’s focus would be to evaluate the reliability of i-CSRM in support of critical infrastructure for risk 
management from the perspective of stakeholders. Table 5.20 shows the total number of responses 
collected. 
Table 5.20: Feedbacks from Case-Study participants and Respondents 
Case Study  Participants Respondents  
Senior Management  IT Staff Senior Management  IT Staff 
Case Study  15 35 12 28 
Total  50 40 
 
Appendix A shows the relevance and acceptability outcomes for the i-CSRM Framework and i-CSRMT 
based on the assessment parameters (ease of use, relevance, usefulness, flexibility and dynamics, 
conformity to security requirements and industry standards, trustworthiness). The compiled results of the 
stakeholders’ feedback based on the assessment parameters are presented below. 
5.13.1. Ease of Use Parameter 
According to the results of the analysis, 10 out of 40 stakeholder respondents (25%) completely agreed 
that the proposed i-CSRM Framework is simple to use, 19 respondents (47.5%)  agreed that the 
Framework is simple to follow. 7 respondents (17.5%) are undecided on whether or not the system is 
simple to use, 4 respondents (10%) completely disagreed to the frameworks usability. As seen in Table 
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5.21, 72.5% of respondents believe the Framework is straightforward and convenient to use by the 
organisation. 
 Table 7.21: Stakeholders’ Views on the i-CSRM Framework’s Ease of Use 
Ease of Use 
Do you agree the i-CSRM Framework is simple and easy to understand for the intended audience? 
Response Selections Number of Response Total % 
Completely Agree 10 25 % 
Agree 19 47.5% 
Partially agree 7 17.5% 
Completely Disagree 4 10% 
 
5.13.2. Relevance Parameter 
In terms of the Framework’s relevance in supporting the organisation to achieve risk management, 37.5% 
of respondents firmly agreed, and 45% agreed that the Framework is important in assisting the 
organisation in achieving overall risk management. Furthermore, 12.5% of respondents were unsure of its 
significance. These results show that the suggested structure is appropriate for dealing with risk 
management challenges at the organisational level. Table 5.22 illustrates this. 
Table 5.22: Framework’s relevance for supporting the organisations achieve risk management 
Relevance 
Do you think the proposed Framework is applicable for assisting organisations with risk 
management? 
Response Selections Number of Response Total % 
Completely Agree 15 37.5% 
Agree 18 45% 
Partially agree 5 12.5% 
Completely Disagree 2 5% 
 
5.13.3. Usefulness Parameter 
A positive change in stakeholders’ ratings is observed based on the Framework’s usefulness in delivering 
organisation needs. As seen in Table 5.23, 87.5% of the stakeholders concluded that the process is 





Table 7.23: Responses on the Usefulness of i-CSRM Framework 
Usefulness 
Do you think the proposed Framework will help you meet the desired goals and objectives? 
Response Selections Number of Response Total % 
Completely Agree 25 62.5% 
Agree 10 25% 
Partially agree 4 10% 
Completely Disagree 1 2.5% 
 
5.13.4. Flexibility Parameter 
The proposed Framework was developed with the intent of adapting to complex and evolving situations 
in mind. According to Table 5.24, 47.5% of the stakeholder respondents completely agreed that the 
Framework is flexible and 35% agreed that it is quite flexible. As seen in Table 5.24, the overall % of 
those who agreed are 82.5%, which is higher than those who partially agreed (15%) and those who 
completely disagreed (2.5%) with the Framework’s versatility. 
Table 5.24: Responses on the Flexibility of i-CSRM Framework 
Flexibility 
Do you accept that the proposed Framework is adaptable to changing circumstances? 
Response Selections Number of Response Total % 
Completely Agree 19 47.5% 
Agree 14 35% 
Partially agree 6 15% 
Completely Disagree 1 2.5% 
 
5.13.5. Conformity to Security Requirements and Industry Standards 
The development of the Framework was based on a range of security standards and common practises. As 
seen in Table 5.25, the Framework’s conformity with applicable laws and regulations received the 





Table 5.25: Compliance with procedural laws, standards, and best practises is given a score based on the 
Framework’s compliance. 
Conformity to Security Requirements and Industry Standards 
Is the Framework following all applicable rules, guidelines, and best practises? 
Response Selections Number of Response Total % 
Completely Agree 20 50% 
Agree 14 35% 
Partially agree 4 10% 
Completely Disagree 2 5% 
 
5.13.6. Trustworthiness Parameter  
Trustworthiness is a general concept that relates to a framework’s ability to deliver results that satisfy its 
users’ standards. As per stakeholder reviews, the Framework’s trustworthiness ranking received the 
lowest rating in this category. According to the approval rating, 75% of respondents thought the i-CSRM 
Framework was trustworthy, whereas 15% partially agreed. However, 10% of the respondents disagreed 
that the Framework is feasible. According to the ratings’ findings, the Framework’s trustworthiness 
ranking is validly important, as seen in Table 5.26. 
Table 5.26: Responses to the i-CSRM Framework’s Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness 
Do you think the new Framework would protect your security and privacy? 
Response Options Response (Count) Response (Percentage) 
Completely Agree 12 30% 
Agree 18 45% 
Partially agree 6 15% 
Completely Disagree 4 10% 
 
5.14. Case Study Implementation Results and Lessons Learnt 
Stakeholder feedback was analysed using assessment parameters drawn from the well-known TAM and 
UTAUT models. The study was used to assess if the proposed Framework met its expected goals of 
facilitating and improving risk management, as stated in the research objectives. The study yielded 
promising findings in terms of stakeholders’ general perceptions of the i-CSRM Framework’s 
acceptability. This confirmation is based on the overall affirmative responses received when “Completely 
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Agree” and “Agree” are merged to assess respondents’ confidence on both of the assessment parameters, 
as highlighted below: 
• Ease of use: 72.5% f respondents thought the i-CSRM Framework was simple to use. 
• Relevance: 82.5% of respondents thought the i-CSRM Framework was important. 
• Usefulness: 87.5 % of respondents thought the i-CSRM Framework was beneficial. 
• Flexibility: 82.5% of respondents thought the i-CSRM Framework was versatile. 
• Conformity to Security Requirements and Industry Standards: 85% of the respondents believed 
the i-CSRM Framework to be compliant. 
• Trustworthiness: 75% of respondents thought the i-CSRM Framework was trustworthy. 
Based on the total summation of the responses, it can be determined that an average of 81% of 
respondents approved the proposed i-CSRM Framework, with just around 19% expressing contrary 
opinions. In a positive vein, respondents shared enthusiasm and respect for the i-CSRM Framework for 
providing adequate coverage of their needs. They admitted that it has a positive effect on the 
organisations’ ambitions for managing cyber risks. This allows one to conclude that some of the research 
objectives have been met. 
Also, the researcher made several important findings during the process evaluation, such as the 
significance of organisations adopting a simplified methodology that focuses on risk management to 
direct their achievement of strategic, organisational, and financial goals rather than a generalised 
approach. The i-CSRM Framework activities are systematic, clear, and straightforward, with no necessary 
financial or personnel strain to the organisation. The majority of the process tasks are simple to execute; 
however, the machine learning step might necessitate thorough preparation and guidance. The 
stakeholders who participated in the exercise were able to complete the measures without any bottlenecks 
or significant difficulties. More specifically, the study discovered that an inability to correctly define 
standards focusing on risk management and sufficiently probe critical infrastructure internal practises is 
likely to result in significant problems that cannot be corrected. 
5.15. Summary of the Chapter 
The empirical analysis of the i-CSRM Framework and i-CSRMT was explored in this chapter. Using a 
case-study method, the chapter presented a systematic discussion of empirical findings for verifying this 
research. The questionnaire methodology allowed the collection of reviews from participants who 
evaluatedthe i-CSRM Framework to determinethe relevance and acceptability of the proposed 
Framework. Stakeholders’ feedback was gathered and used to assess their perceptions and views on the 
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Framework’s relevance and acceptability. Stakeholders shared confidence and fair satisfaction. The 
findings demonstrated that the proposed Framework is extremely important for assisting organisations in 


















This chapter discusses the findings of the empirical research conducted in Chapter 7 through the case 
study analysis. The chapter explains how and why the research questions were addressed and justified. It 
further offers an overview of the study results and focuses on how the findings help the research aim and 
objectives. Furthermore, the chapter emphasizes the need for a critical infrastructure integrated 
cybersecurity risk management (i-CSRM) framework. 
6.2. Comparison between i-CSRM Framework with other Works 
This section compares the results of this research with those of other research studies published in the 
literature, focusing on findings that enhance critical infrastructure cybersecurity risk management. The 
researcher will then generalised the results and classify the risk management background factors utilizing 
this approach. 
To create a comparison, some of the most important research papers and industry projects that tend to 
discuss the problem of risk management in critical infrastructure were chosen to assess general correlation 
and contrast with i-CSRM. The number of comparative parameters is often specified in the form of 
questions. The questions are focused on the thesis's specific contributions, including tool support, risk 
management conceptualization, industry standards and best practices implementation, and the approach's 
assessment process. The results of the comparison are detailed in the parts that follow. 
6.3. Criteria for Reference Comparison 
The reference criteria are derived from questions posed about the thesis's main contributions. As a result, 
the contribution is illustrated, accompanied by a summary and the related query. Table 6.1 displays the 
contrast parameters. 
The comparison parameters are generated by formulating questions concerning the critical contributions 
of this thesis. Therefore, the contribution is highlighted, followed by the associated question and a brief 





Table 6.1: Comparison Parameters 











Does the literature provide 
tool support towards 
cybersecurity risk 
management?  
Each approach is analysed based on automated tool 
support that augments and enhances risk 
management from a critical infrastructure point of 
view through computation, analysis, visualisation, 
and evaluation. An automated tool to support the 
risk management activities is to minimize the 
efforts required to perform the risk management 
activities and provide accurate information about 
the risks based on the threat and vulnerability 
information to implement the proper controls.  
Therefore the tool aims for an effective risk 
management practice within critical infrastructure. 
Such a tool potentially strengthens cybersecurity 
risk management by making risk assessments and 
expert judgment procedures more effectively and 
timely. Thus, it is essential to have strong tool 
support, thereby facilitating and improving risk 






Does the literature establish 
and decompose the 
fundamental concepts 
necessary for i-CSRM?  
It is paramount for each approach to dissect 
cybersecurity risk management from a critical 
infrastructure point of view by laying the 
foundational knowledge on critical concepts. (Van 
den Berg et al., 2014) emphasised the need for an 
approach that identifies, analyse and represents risk 
management from the eyes of conceptual 
knowledge to enhance understanding and provide 
reference points to critical infrastructure. 
Adoption of 
industry standards  
Does the literature leverage 
and integrate industry 
standards? 
Industry standards provide a significant assertion to 
organisations that critical best practices are 
followed and assurance that all operations are 
executed according to generally accepted security 
principles. This is due to the global acceptance of 
industry standards, best-practice, and frameworks 






Does the literature leverage 
and integrate machine 
learning techniques within 
the risk management 
activities?  
Introducing the machine learning framework for 
automation of risk identification is vital to securing 
the critical infrastructure. The Framework takes 
data, builds the features, applies machine learning 
algorithms and gives results.  
The comprehensive 
implementation 
process of the 
proposed 
Framework 
Has the literature defined a 
comprehensive 
implementation process for 
the proposed Framework?  
The implementation process is a vital feature of 
every proposed approach. A process should provide 
a step-by-step actionable guideline for 
implementing the proposed conceptual model, 
Framework to critical infrastructure to accomplish 




6.4. Discussion on Comparison Findings 
This section displays the comparison results between i-CSRM and i-CSRMT with other risk management 
approaches based on five critical parameters peculiar to this research’s contributions. The following 
section elaborates the comparison findings.   
6.4.1. Tool Support 
There is substantial similarity in tool support, either fully or partially, amongst risk management tools and 
those presented in the existing literature. For instance,  (Creasey and Marvell, 2013) developed IRAM 
designed for business-led information risk analysis methodology. IRAM provides businesses with tools 
for impact assessment, threat and vulnerability assessment and selection of the control. Also, STREAM 
(Creasey and Marvell, 2013) provides an attractive, low-cost alternative to spread sheets for governance, 
risk and compliance (GRC), scalable from free single-user to Enterprise-wide deployment of the most 
prominent organisations. STREAM has the advantage in that its framework mappings allow controls to be 
mapped to asset classes and Threats. Each time an Asset is added to an asset class, STREAM will 
automatically map all relevant controls and threats to the asset. The CIRAS tool (Bialas, 2016a) supports 
the selection of security measures for critical infrastructure by considering the impact of typical CI 
occurrences like interdependencies, cascading, and escalating the incident. Hence, the most noticeable 
similarity between i-CSRMT and the results in that literature is that they all support a holistic assessment 
of all aspects of C.I.s security measures, which includes the expected risk. However, the difference 
between these works and i-CSRMT is that they mainly focus on risk assessment. The i-CSRMT supports 
the i-CSRM process to minimize the efforts required to perform the risk management activities and 
provide accurate information about the risks based on the CTI concepts to calculate the risk level. 
6.4.2. Conceptualization of Cybersecurity Risk Management 
Understanding the factors relating to cybersecurity risk management in critical infrastructure is 
fundamental because it simplifies and consolidates prior knowledge in the domain. The significant 
research efforts on risk management have produced many propositions, and they all have different views 
and interpretation of security transparency concepts (Alcaraz and Zeadallly, 2015). The authors (Cardenas 
et al., 2009)discussed the challenges for securing critical infrastructure and analyzed security mechanisms 
for prevention, detection and recovery, resilience and deterrence of attacks for securing CPS. In (Sridhar, 
Hahn and Govindarasu, 2012b), a layered approach is proposed for evaluating risk based on security to 
prevent, mitigate and tolerate attacks both on real power applications and cyber infrastructures. In (Wu, 
Kang and Li, 2015), the authors proposed a quantitative risk assessment model that provides users with 
attack information such as the type of attack, frequency, and target and source host identity. Authors 
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(Livadas et al., 2006) proposed a new approach for critical infrastructure asset identification using multi-
criteria decision theory to identify critical assets' challenges. The approach did not provide a systematic 
process for arriving at criticality decision. 
To summarize the literature mentioned above, several contributions use the ML approach in different 
application domains. However, the comparison results have shown that existing literature has not 
considered the pressing need to define the various concepts that constitute cybersecurity risk management 
and how risk prediction can be used within the risk management process. Also, there is little effort in 
evaluating the effectiveness of existing controls. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate existing controls so 
that new controls can be identified and implemented to improve the overall risk management process for 
CPS. The i-CSRM is unique in this regard because it conceptualized cybersecurity risk management using 
a set of concepts from CTI and ML techniques for risk prediction. 
6.4.3. Adoption of Industry Standards 
A substantial number of the literature considered for comparison has promoted industry standards to 
allow consistency and a reliable metric for assessing results' validity. Industry standards generally provide 
well-documented rules, guidelines, or characteristics for activities and agreement approved by a 
recognised body that aims to achieve the best degree of order (Saint-Germain, 2005). For example, 
cybersecurity strategies (tactical, operational and strategic plans) are mapped to security standard such as 
NIST CSF (Shen, 2014). Furthermore, the authors in ISRAM (Pauley, 2010), NSRM (Ouedraogo and 
Mouratidis, 2013), (Leitner and Cito, 2016), and ADVISE (Li et al., 2010) have also considered the 
integration of industry standards in their approach. Most of the literature standards are more security-
oriented, meaning they have significant similarity with an i-CSRM framework in terms of the integration 
of security standards. However i-CSRM framework uses a unified approach by focusing on particular 
sections of renowned standards, guidelines, frameworks and models rather than just security standards. 
They are applied across different activities within the process by looking at specific features within the 
standards, frameworks, models and guidelines and where they best fit into the process. For example, 
NIST CSF tiers have been used for understanding cybersecurity strategy. This is because NIST CSF tiers 
provide context on how an organisation views cybersecurity risks and the processes in place to manage 
those risks. CIS CSC have been used for identifying risk control measures. This is because CIS CSC 
provides 20 controls categorised into threeprioritised and defence-in-depth best practices that are 




Also, to ensure consistency and relevance of risks and their impact, we adopted the OWASP 
methodology. OWASP is used for determining the impact of risks because it estimates risks from 
technical perspectives and business process, and it is highly adaptable and applicable to most 
organisations of all sizes. In identifying relevant risks, risk sources from OWASP were also considered 
mainly because it maintained a regularly-updated list of most pressing security concerns and provided a 
list of 35 risks that fall under categories such as technical, organisational and legal. Also, we integrate 
some factors from the CWE’s common weakness scoring system (CWSS), which provides a mechanism 
for prioritising software weaknesses in a consistent, flexible, and open manner. It is a standardised 
approach for characterising weaknesses, thereby allowing organisations to make more informed decisions 
during the risk management phase and give higher risks. To evaluate the effectiveness of existing 
controls, we adopt the NIST SP800-30, which enables more effective prioritisation of control actions and 
decision making because risk assessment requires sufficient threat identification and control, an 
understanding of threat sources, threat actors behaviour, capability and intent. STIX model is actively 
being considered for adoption by cyber threat-related organisations, which helps organisations understand 
the true nature of threats to make intelligent defensive decisions. 
6.4.4. Integration of machine learning techniques for i-CSRM findings on Dataset 
The benefits of machine learning techniques for risk management are still at an early stage. “Reference 
(Das and Morris, 2017) focused on machine learning techniques for intrusion detection, traffic 
classification and spam mail protection. However, more analysis needs to be performed to ascertain the 
algorithms' performance to quantitatively measure the level of cyber-security risks and help critical 
infrastructure organisations select appropriate controls”. In (Livadas et al., 2006), the use of machine 
learning-based classification techniques, “Naïve Bayes (N.B.)” and “Bayesian belief networks (BBN)” to 
identify the “command and control (C2)” of botnet-based attack being used as part of a cyber-attack is 
presented. This approach only considered two different machine learning algorithms, which heavily 
depended on the training sets and may not be desired in some instances, like risk identification. In (Abu-
Nimeh et al., 2007), a study that compares the predictive accuracy of six machine learning classifiers for 
predicting phishing email is presented. “Reference (Barreno et al., 2010) presented a taxonomy for 
identifying and analysing attacks against machine learning systems. The problem with this taxonomy is 
that it is not desirable in cases where organisations want to forecast security risks level”.  
Machine learning has distinguished itself as a discriminator of malicious and anomalous cybersecurity 
events for power grid infrastructure. However, the grid provider requires a comprehensive cybersecurity 
solution to support stakeholders in assessing vulnerabilities and threats for an effective “cybersecurity risk 
management (CSRM)”. In (Yang et al., 2013), there is a proposal of an “intrusion detection system 
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(IDS)” for synchro-phasor systems that detect cyber-attacks but is limited to “man-in-the-middle 
(MITM)” and “denial of service (DoS)” cyber-attacks against synchro-phasor devices only. The authors 
(Hadeli et al., 2009) proposed an anomaly detection technique for industrial control systems that extract 
behaviour patterns of devices from networks and communications assets only. This alone cannot 
minimise the vulnerabilities associated with modern power systems, threats and risks. Every asset of the 
power grid system is a potential target for a cyber-attack. In the work of (Beaver, Borges-Hink and 
Buckner, 2013), they applied multiple learning algorithms to Modbus “return terminal unit (RTU)” data 
in order to demonstrate an ability to discriminate command and data injection attacks on the “supervisory 
control and data acquisition systems (SCADA)” of a pure gas pipeline system. (Hink et al., 2014) 
explored the suitability of machine learning methods as a means of discriminating power system 
disturbances. This work sought to determine an optimal algorithm that is accurate in its classification such 
that it can provide reliable decision support to a power system operator. However, further work is still 
required. However, due to the constant changing of the threat landscape and sophisticated technology 
used to exploit the attack, this task becomes more challenging.  
Our work aims to contribute to risk prediction so that an organisation can undertake necessary control 
and strategic decision for risk control. The proposed i-CSRM considers various ML techniques and 
extracts i-CSRM features which are relevant for the risk prediction. We use a cyber-attack Dataset to get 
the data for the features so that ML can predicate the risk type. We finally use PCA for selecting the most 
relevant features such as Assets and TTP. These features performed well on all the classifiers in 
predicting seven out of ten risk types. PCA reduces the dimensionality by projecting high dimensional 
data along a smaller number of orthogonal dimensions. We further figure out that PCA's transforming 
data can improve some of the classifiers such as NN and NB on all the features. Our initial focus is on i-
CSRM for critical infrastructure. However, any organisation can widely adopt the proposed framework to 
warn of the intensity of risks. Therefore, the implication of such work is vast. An organisation of any size 
must understand the existing cybersecurity risks and their prediction. It helps to understand the current 
security control status and undertakes strategic decisions to improve overall cybersecurity so that critical 
services can continue with no significant disruption due to cybersecurity risks.   
The overall results for the prediction of the different risk types based on the given i-CSRM features 
indicated that NB-Multi and DT are the best classifiers because they performed better by predicting seven 
different risk types such as “Crimeware”, “Cyber Espionage”, Denial of Service”, Everything Else”, 
“Lost and Stolen Assets”, “privilege Misuse” and “Point of Sale” while others predicted six or less. 
Following the above discussion, we observe that i-CSRM features (TTP, Assets, Controls and Threat 
Actor) types could predict risk type. Therefore, as security threats grow, organisations need to identify 
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cybersecurity threats and its trend and also be able to detect and respond to both known and unknown 
risks. This supports organisations to determine the proper risk type and implement appropriate controls. 
6.4.4.1. Comparison with other study results 
This section compares our approach's results with other study results from the literature to generalize our 
findings. In (Nguyen and Franke, 2012), an adaptive intrusion detection system is proposed that detects 
different types of attacks in adversarial network environments. However, the proposed framework needs 
to be applied to other information security problems. In (Salman et al., 2017), an investigation on 
detecting and categorizing anomalies is carried out using LR and RF machine learning techniques. The 
result demonstrates that the RF technique with a feature selection scheme can achieve 99% accuracy with 
anomaly detection. Much research has been carried out in this domain without identifying risk and 
imposing appropriate countermeasures against different attacks. In (Yavanoglu and Aydos, 2017), the 
authors reviewed the most commonly used machine learning algorithms, which are primary tools for 
analysing network traffic, intrusion detection, DDoS attack detection, web applications, and detecting 
anomalies. However, detecting risk type is still an ongoing plan. In (Liu, Zhang, et al., 2015), the result 
demonstrates how and to what extent business details about an organisation can help forecast its relative 
risk of experiencing different types of data incidents using incident reports collected in the VCDB achieve 
some level of protection. In (Liu, Zhang, et al., 2015) RF classifier is used to train more than 1,000 
incidents taken from the VCDB to predict an organisations network breaches. Our work also used ML 
techniques in the cybersecurity domain but differentiated them from other existing works with a specific 
focus on cybersecurity risk prediction.  Decision Tree is the best classifier in our case, with 93% accuracy 
initially and further to 96% using PCA. The reason is that the decision tree can quickly identify the most 
prominent feature to construct the tree and stop the model's induction before overfitting happens, which 
gave the better generalization error for the test set. We notice that the accuracy is comparatively lower in 
our case for all the approaches. One possible reason can be the nature of the data, which is highly 
imbalanced and sparse. As a future endeavor, we intend to use oversampling and sparsity reduction 
techniques before applying classification algorithms, which might increase the performance of various 
models. 
6.4.5. Implementation process 
A process provides a systematic set of activities that aim to achieve desired objectives, deliver results and 
provides outputs (Chang, Kuo and Ramachandran, 2016). A practical implementation guide for any 
approach to address a problem has been highlighted as a vital success factor for any proposed solution to 
an existing problem (Gottschalk, 1999). The various studies such as (Nocco and Stulz, 2006), (Lai and A 
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Samad, 2010), (Siang and Ali, 2012) and (Hudin and Hamid, 2014)  have provided the underlying 
architectural and technical guide for implementation. This shows there is a commonality between the 
literatures mentioned above with the i-CSRM framework.   However, the process proposed by i-CSRM is 
more cybersecurity-oriented. It consists of different activities that organisations can follow for 
understanding and strengthening their cybersecurity risk management by looking at essential 
considerations such as identifying roles, identifying vulnerabilities and assessing risks. The process also 
guides organisations to build a cybersecurity strategy from initiation to complete activities based on the 
need for continuous validation of its assets' integrity. Also, the process is guided by a variety of leading 
industry best practices, frameworks, guidelines and standards that are generally applicable to all 
organisations regardless of size. This implies that the process is all-encompassing in nature, not tailored to 
a specific critical infrastructure domain but built upon high-level considerations to ensure important 
cybersecurity risk issues are not entirely missed.     
6.5. Discussion about case study findings 
Discos' staff observed that the integrated i-CSRM framework is very obliging and detailed for asset 
identification, assessing potential vulnerabilities and calculating risk level. It provides a comprehensive 
and holistic analysis of the critical assets, vulnerabilities and threats, and risk types based on the cyber-
attack scenarios relevant to the study context. Based on the studied evaluation, the following observations 
have been made. 
6.5.1. Applicability of the Framework on case study 
In terms of the framework's applicability, many assumptions have been made. The activities in the 
process are both practical and appropriate. The integrated risk management framework lays out the basics 
for defining critical assets, evaluating their weaknesses and risks, and assessing a business disruption risk. 
This approach has made stakeholders aware of the possible threats that could impact their critical services 
and business operations, therefore taking the necessary actions to control threats and risk events from 
occurring. Furthermore, gaining a better view of Disco's existing risk control practices, evaluating them, 
and suggesting changes raised overall visibility. Disco's management aimed to move from tier 1 (partial) 
to tier 2 (risk-informed) by proactively incorporating the integrated risk management framework, 
prioritising data protection practices, informal exchange of intelligence, including all agencies, and 
cooperation external stakeholders. 
The framework is a comprehensive process that incorporates risk management facets from a systemic 
viewpoint, including stakeholder research and existing standards, from defining cybersecurity strategy to 
identifying risk. It assesses how a cyber-attack would affect asset targets, organisational functions, 
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activities, and other technical aspects of the power grid system. The framework evaluates weaknesses, 
risks, TTP and monitors machine learning techniques to understand the risk level. 
6.5.2. Comparison with Existing Study Results 
The outcomes of our case study were compared to those of other research reported in the literature. 
Compared to other works in the literature, the applied cyber-security risk management framework is a 
systematic solution. A previous author (Buzdugan, 2020) identified a range of security risks and events 
through different critical infrastructure domains. The work incorporates specific mitigation steps for 
critical infrastructures, such as vulnerability assessments and penetration testing approaches; however, 
this paper's emphasis was not just on vulnerability evaluation but also on how danger can be measured, 
mitigated, and managed. Because of the interdependency between properties, asset detection and 
cascading vulnerabilities were not taken into consideration. An earlier paper (Ani, He and Tiwari, 2017) 
provides a helpful overview of potential response directions for understanding industrial control system 
protection dynamics in terms of cyber risks, weaknesses, assaults, and impacts on the industrial control 
system (ICS). The work did not introduce some realistic approach to defining properties, evaluating 
weaknesses, hazards, and minimising risks; instead, it provided some suggestions. Authors of a previous 
paper (Andrew, 2020) suggested a risk and threat analysis approach for critical infrastructure that focuses 
on severe incidents while emphasising critical infrastructure business dependencies. However, no 
systematic study has been performed to define essential assets and weaknesses specific to such assets or 
identify the specific chains of events (cascading vulnerabilities). (Kumar et al., 2021) suggested a single 
risk assessment strategy for a power grid infrastructure in a previous. Danger and vulnerability evaluation 
and categorising were addressed, but properties were not objectively defined, cascading vulnerabilities 
were not considered, and controls to reduce the risk were not enforced. The authors of a previous paper 
(Van Greuning and Bratanovic, 2020) stressed the need for a holistic risk management system that 
includes all phases of the risk management process; our work reflects this to enhance the CPS's cyber-
security. Our analysis quantified danger by first defining sensitive properties, then analysing weaknesses, 
identifying risks, and finally determining the risk level and applying proper controls, as suggested by the 
writers of a previous paper Ref. (Yaacoub et al., 2020). In their risk evaluation process, the writers of a 
previous paper (Xu et al., 2020) listed several threats, including the unintentional usage of compromised 
information media, the disclosure of classified information, and a lack of understanding. This study 
described these threats, including human mistakes, power outages, unavailability of power, revenue loss 
to the power grid, and security breaches. In comparison to the writers of a previous paper (Sridhar, Hahn 
and Govindarasu, 2012a), who suggested a layered method for assessing risks based on protection, our 
work evaluated risks cyber-attacks databases, as well as risk level and proper controls. Although the 
184 
 
writers of a previous paper (Sun, Hahn and Liu, 2018) explored a framework for avoiding, detecting, and 
restoring attacks for protecting CPS, our study presented a mechanism for recognising sensitive 
properties, evaluating cascading weaknesses, creating cyber-attack scenarios, determining the effect of an 
attack happening, and providing preventive controls to better protect the CPS. 
None of the works provides a structured risk assessment mechanism that defines sensitive assets before 
evaluating vulnerabilities andemphasising the initial vulnerability impact that contributes to the cascading 
vulnerability effect. Our research identifies and contrasts current risk reduction solutions for CPS in 
critical infrastructure, allowing critical infrastructure organisations to do an in-depth cyber-security study 
on CPS. There are certain similarities between our research and other works in terms of risk assessment 
and reduction. In a previous paper (Bialas, 2016b), the writers discussed danger by addressing 
interdependencies and risk monitoring. These results are fully or partially close to what we observed in 
our study. However, specific threats found (Gai et al., 2016), such as energy waste and deploying mobile 
cloud computing problems, are not strictly comparable to our studied background. Lack of contingency 
planning, emergency response, reporting systems, robust risk assessment, and the use of machine learning 
tools to assess the risk level and analyse the efficacy of current controls are some of the specific risk 
factors not listed in other reports. We urged consumers and operators not to shirk their IT obligations, 
since the threats of essential infrastructure vary depending on the organization's background. It is also 
important to raise knowledge of cyber security threats through the whole enterprise and the supply chain 
climate, as well as to continue to improve and use innovative cyber security capabilities to exercise risk 
assessment and risk evolution. 
6.5.3. Study Limitation and Validity 
Some of the participants' observations was that it is difficult to understand the machine learning 
algorithms for predicting risk type. Also, we tried to reduce the bias of our study finding by actively 
involving the staff throughout the process. Data was collected from various sources such as interviewing 
participants, reviewing the existing documentation, and the organisation’s internal and external context. 
The active participation of key staff of the organisation also supported the precondition for action 
research. However, there is a possibility of cultural bias as data was gathered from a single geographical 
location. We compared our findings with other study results and observed several common and unique 
issues to generalize our findings to mitigate this. 
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6.6. Integrating CTI with i-CSRM findings 
The integration of CTI with the CSRM helps the studied organisation understand the risk's likelihood and 
the risk for functional risk calculation. This research's novel contribution is to provide new insights into 
the effect of cybersecurity by incorporating CTI concepts to improve risk management in critical 
infrastructure and discover the existence of unknown threats, fully understanding and mitigating those 
threats to avoid risk to the entire organisation in a proactive manner.  
6.6.1. Applicability of CTI for improving i-CSRM 
We have applied a real case study to demonstrate the applicability of this research.  The proposed 
framework is tailored to how CTI improves i-CSRM for critical infrastructure. It provides a detailed 
analysis of threat and threat actors profile, existing risk management practice, and controls effectiveness. 
A brief description of the scenario allows us to exemplify the integration of CTI to improve i-CSRM is a 
critical infrastructure. Applying the concepts supports the organisation to have information such as the 
TTP, incidents, indicators, and the threat actors profile to perform an adequate risk assessment. Having 
CTI information about threats helps to manage risks effectively, provides mechanisms to prioritise efforts 
and focus on the most significant risks first. If information about what vulnerabilities are being exploited 
is known, it can be actively exploited to help decide which security patches should be applied first. The 
threat information can then be leveraged to help draw a clearer understanding of the risks that the threat 
environment poses to the organisation.  
Furthermore, CTI gave them early warning of potential threats to consider specific operational and 
tactical decisions to address the threats and associated risks. Also, by setting up a CTI as part of the risk 
management process, it is assumed that all indicators of compromise are shared, driving towards a better 
and more informed response to security incidents. It also enables a better security investment strategy.  In 
particular, operational, tactical, and strategic plans enabled both long-term and short-term information 
security planning by focusing on intelligence collection and analysis to understand threat actors' cyber 
capabilities, plans, and intentions and enable countermeasures. Evaluating the proposed controls' 
effectiveness is very difficult without a good understanding of the motives, means, and methods of the 
threats being addressed.  Lastly, this research allows actors to carefully examine an attack pattern's 
existence and understand threats in a cyber-environment; this allows them to monitor security events 
continuously.  The case study results reveal that having CTI as part of risk management allows 
organisations to know about threats, improving estimating likelihood and impact of risks. 
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6.6.2. The result from the case study 
The risk level generated was calculated using the threat information factors and the asset security goal 
factors. The risk being medium needed to be materialised immediately. Therefore we identified ten new 
controls for them; some of the controls already exist but are identified as either ineffective or not 
sufficient. The controls were checked to determine whether they should be removed or replaced by a 
more suitable control. The result suggests that DisCos should adopt CTI for improving i-CSRM to detect 
and respond to threats accordingly. With the adoption of CTI, an organisation can defend against current 
and future threats, which involves understanding the threat actor’s attack pattern, location, skills, 
motivation and intent to make intelligent defensive decisions.  
6.6.3. Comparison with other work in adopting CTI for risk management 
When comparing the proposed framework with other approaches, we can quickly identify our 
framework's unique differences. The authors (Boyson, 2014) proposed a research-based 
capability/maturity model to capture the spectrum of lagging, collective, and best practices associated 
with threat intelligence. The work in (Borum et al., 2015)highlightsstrategic cyber intelligence's 
importance and role to support risk-informed decision-making. However, it only focuses on the strategic 
level of planning. The author (Abouzakhar, 2013) presented various security threats and incidents on 
different critical infrastructure domains. The work introduces some security measures, including 
vulnerability assessment and penetration testing approaches for critical infrastructure; however, having 
CTI can further effectively help in risk to be assessed, mitigated and controlled. The work in (Ani, He and 
Tiwari, 2017) offers an insightful review of possible solution paths of understanding the industrial control 
systems security trends about cyber threats. The work did not implement the use of CTI to assess 
vulnerabilities, threats and mitigate risks. This author (Caglayan et al., 2012) examines the behavioural 
patterns of fast-flux botnets for threat intelligence. The Threat Intelligence infrastructure, which was 
developed explicitly for fast-flux botnet detection and monitoring, enables this analysis but did not 
explain how risk can be managed and controlled. In (Yadav and Mahajan, 2015) surveys of the risk 
assessment methods, significant challenges, and controls for various aspects of the smart grid such as 
SCADA systems and communication networks to address the challenges facing the innovative grid 
technologies. However, as a provider, smart grids require a comprehensive cybersecurity solution by 
supporting stakeholders to assess cyber threats by integrating CTI and providing guidelines for effective 
risk management. 
In a dynamic environment like critical infrastructure, it is essential for risk management to have 
information about threats to assess threats as it continuously changes. Most of the cyber risk results 
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fromchallenges in identifying critical threats, assets affected, parties involved, attributed threat actor, 
nature of compromise, and historically observed TTP used by the threat actor. Based on the case study, 
other factors influence a successful attack, such as weak passwords, weak firewalls, and operator 
unawareness. Managing these risks requires the involvement of CTI. We concluded that threats caused by 
a cyber-attack could be mitigated or controlled using the threat information with existing risk 
management and by creating more proactive and adaptive mitigation solutions. 
6.7. Empirical Studies Conclusion 
The application of the case study approach and the empirical research method used in this research has 
allowed the researcher to conduct an in-depth empirical analysis of a real-life scenario. The adoption of 
the case-study technique has enabled the researcher to make systematic observations, collect and analyse 
data, and establish findings within the context in which activities took place. It also allowed the researcher 
to observe the complexities of real-life situations, which may not otherwise be captured through other 
forms or methods. Many participants from two different companies took part in the implementation and 
determining the validity of the research. The participants provided invaluable feedback on their 
experiences and perception of the proposed framework. The analysis of the participants’ feedback 
provided an encouraging finding that shows the validity, relevance and acceptability of the proposed 
framework amongst organisations. The participants expressed optimism about the i-CSRM framework 
and its potentiality in addressing the current and emerging cybersecurity issues in critical infrastructure. 
6.8. Summary 
This chapter discusses the empirical evaluation of the i-CSRM framework. The chapter provides a 
detailed discussion regarding empirical studies for validating this research using a case study approach. 
The evaluation results showed that the i-CSRM framework provides a comprehensive approach to 
managing risk in critical infrastructure. The above discussion shows that the underlying activities within 
the i-CSRM process were easy to follow, implying that it has a reasonable degree of practicality and 
usability.  
The questionnaire technique enabled feedback collection from participants who took part in the 
evaluation of i-CSRM and i-CSRMT to establish the proposed framework's validity, acceptability, and 
relevance. The chapter also presented results from the case-study contexts. Stakeholder feedback was 
collected and used to evaluate their perception and view regarding the framework's validity and 
acceptability. The stakeholders expressed confidence and reasonable satisfaction. The results proved that 
the proposed framework is highly relevant for helping organisations attain overall cybersecurity risk 
management. The chapter also comparedthe literature between some of the critical approaches to risk 
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management in critical infrastructure. The comparison parameters have been defined based on which the 
i-CSRM framework could be compared against the selected literature. The comparison parameters are 
created according to the distinct features or contributions of i-CSRM. The results of the comparison have 





















CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESAERCH 
7.1. Introduction 
Critical infrastructures are increasingly facing many challenges, including cyber-security attacks that tend 
to disrupt the continuity of its operations and services. The i-CSRM framework for critical infrastructure 
is proposed to systematically analyse the risks and offer plans to control the risks to ensure continuity. 
Every critical infrastructure should implement an effective risk management process that protects it from 
financial, organisational and reputational loss.  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by providing an i-CSRM Framework for critical 
infrastructure to highlight significant risk areas and implement appropriate controls. This helps the critical 
infrastructure develop foundational knowledge of risk management, integrate the concepts within 
organisational settings to advocate the creation of cybersecurity risk management awareness, the 
importance of CTI for improving i-CSRM and the use of machine learning techniques for risk prediction. 
To demonstrate the work's applicability, we applied the proposed framework to a power grid CPS and a 
healthcare system. The case study shows that the framework sufficiently supports the organisation to 
analyse its security issues, identify critical assets, and assessvulnerabilities and potential threats. Also, to 
determine risk level, predict risk types and implement the appropriate controls to mitigate those risks. 
Finally, the i-CSRM framework provides a critical infrastructure to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
existing controls. The proposed i-CSRM framework and i-CSRMT have been validated using real-
environment study contexts. Furthermore, the feedback has been collected and analysed to establish the 
acceptability, relevance, usability and validity of the proposed framework.  
To conclude this thesis, this Chapter presents concluding remarks of the fundamental research. It expands 
how the research objectives could be met, expatriate research contributions to knowledge, and highlights 
limitations and future research directions. 
7.2. Fulfilling Research Objectives 
The proposed CSRM framework has been developed and validated using two real-life case study to meet 
the research aim: to develop an integrated Cybersecurity Risk Management (i-CSRM) framework for 
critical infrastructure protection and resilience used by organisations that provide essential services for a 
practical risk assessment. To ensure the research aim above is satisfied, the objectives were specified as:  
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• Objective 1: To develop an integrated i-CSRM framework that adopts theoretical concepts to 
improve the overall CSRM process to protect critical infrastructures. The framework proposes an 
implementable process for i-CSRM activities based on existing industry standards, frameworks 
and models. The process includes evaluating the effectiveness of existing controls and 
recommending new control actions in areas where security improvement is needed to protect their 
systems from potential cyber-security risks and threats. To investigate the usability of the 
framework, we use different critical organisation domains.  
• Objective 2: Integration of techniques such as machine learning for risk prediction and accurate 
information about the risk impact level.  
• Objective 3: Develop a dedicated integrated cybersecurity risk management tool (i-CSRMT) that 
automates the overall i-CSRM process enabling organisations to continuously identify and 
quantify risks within a reasonable amount of time.  
The three main research objectives listed above must be checked to determine whether they are 
accomplished in the research process. The research has strived to ensure they are completed and an 
attempt has is made to justify how the objectives are achieved. 
7.2.1. Develop a Novel Framework 
The research's primary objective entails developing the proposed i-CSRM framework, which is also 
necessary for achieving the final research aim. Objective One was accomplished in Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five. On the one hand, Chapter Two provided the basic principles, background knowledge and 
understanding of risk management and cybersecurity. Chapter Two contains an analysis of the existing 
literature in the subject domain. It seeks to identify the critical factor affecting the cybersecurity of critical 
infrastructures. We reviewed different risk management approaches adopted by the various critical 
infrastructures for managing cybersecurity risks. Therefore, in Chapter Four, we proposed the framework 
considering the principles and background knowledge introduced and discussed in Chapter Two. The 
Chapter started with the unified approach adopted for the proposed i-CSRM framework that establishes 
and understands the various concepts that constitute the i-CSRM framework for critical infrastructure. As 
it is a highly recommended and common practice to build any framework of relevance based on 
established theory or methodology, a novel agent-oriented software methodology called Secure Tropos 
(Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007)was chosen to develop these concepts. Secure Tropos covers software 
development from initial requirement analysis and uses concepts such as actors, constraints, and goals. 




Also, the threat landscape is evolving rapidly with new techniques and more sophisticated attacks. The 
security strategies for mitigating and eliminating these threats are not always enough. We considered CTI 
to provide comprehensive information about security threats, and this effectively supports i-CSRM 
framework activities. Organisations need to integrate CTI with risk management to allow faster detection 
and alerting of attacks on their assets. Every organisation should implement an effective risk management 
process with CTI feeds to protect the actors from financial loss, privacy violations, and reputational 
damage. Our work contributes to the existing literature by providing a unified approach that uses CTI to 
improve CSRM. To demonstrate the work's applicability, we applied the proposed framework to a power 
grid (DisCos). The result shows that the framework sufficiently supports the organisation to analyse their 
security issues, identify asset goals, assess vulnerabilities and potential threats, and identify risk levels 
with proper controls to mitigate risks. We advocate for creating i-CSRM awareness within all 
organisational levels; staff must not ignore their IT responsibilities. 
7.2.2. Proposed i-CSRM process 
Part of objective one aimed at proposing an implementable unified process for the framework activities 
considering existing risk management standards that provide guidelines to organisations in attaining 
cybersecurity. There are existing processes for risk management (PatéCornell et al., 2018); however, such 
techniques have certain limitations because they are not explicitly developed, focusing on or emphasizing 
risk prediction using CTI information. To fulfill this objective and address the gap, the research attempted 
to collect systematic activities that produce different outcomes and ensure that the proposed i-CSRM 
Framework can be applied to real-world settings. The objective is met in Chapter Five, in which various 
distinct activities are introduced that guide organisation in attaining cybersecurityfrom start to finish 
based on the artifacts of the CSRM framework as proposed in Chapter Four. The activities consist of 
essential exercises that range from: determining cybersecurity strategy, analysing the organisational 
context, identifying and classifying critical assets, identifying vulnerabilities on the assets, identifying 
threats affecting the assets, performing risk prediction, and determining the effectiveness of existing 
controls. All these activities and others are combined to create a process for implementing the CSRM 
framework. Fundamentally, to ensure adaptability and diverseness, the activities are designed in 
consideration and by following an assortment of industry best practices, guidelines and standards that are 
generally applicable to all types of organisations regardless of size or industry. Section 3.2 of the Chapter 
presented a Unified Approach for the i-CSRM framework process wherein the sections taken from 
industry standards, best practices and guidelines used in forming the activities are presented. The risk 
management activity considered the STIX model and ATT&CK Framework (Barnum, 2012); OWASP; 
ENISA (ENISA, 2009); and CIS CSC for developing threats profile and risk register respectively. NIST 
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SP800-30 supports risk response decisions at the different tiers of the risk management hierarchy and ISO 
27005:2011 to effectively evaluate controls. 
7.2.3. Integration of techniques for the prediction of unknown risk and risk level 
Objective two proposed a novel approach for risk prediction using ML techniques. This was 
accomplished in Chapter Four. The research considers the binary model and trains the ML classifier using 
the CSRM features. We achieved an accuracy level of 93% initially from the experiment and further 
improved to 96% by transforming the PCA features. For hybrid algorithms, the order of the best 
classifiers was found to be NB >> KNN>> LR>>NB Multinomial >> RF >>DT for all the features. 
Experimental results revealed that decision tree-based algorithms (DT and RF) are well suited for the risk 
prediction problem (provided they are early pruned to avoid over-fit). This risk prediction can give the 
organisations an early warning about the risk so that appropriate control can be undertaken proactively. 
Both industry and research communities have widely recognized ML for its applicability in the 
cybersecurity domain. However, ML integration for i-CSRM is still early stage, and to the best of our 
knowledge, this research is one of the first attempts that propose the ML framework for risk type 
prediction. The primary hypothesis of the study is that we can automate the risk prediction based on 
occurring events. We use the VCDB dataset and found out that the decision tree provided better accuracy 
in predicting the risk type.  
7.2.4. To evaluate the effectiveness of existing controls as well as recommending new control actions 
in areas where security improvement is needed to protect their systems from any potential cyber-
security risk and threat 
This part of objective one has been accomplished in Chapter five and Chapter seven. An assessment of 
the existing controls is carried out to ensure the controls are working correctly in mitigating current and 
future risks. Those controls that do not work correctly were detected, and new controls were 
implemented.  
7.2.5. Develop i-CSRMT 
This objective is fulfilled in Chapter six. Objective three aimed at developing an assessment tool that 
enables organisations to assess their critical assets, identify vulnerabilities and threats, calculate risks 
levels and evaluate the effectiveness of their existing controls so that informed decisions can be 
implemented. The primary objective of i-CSRMT is to facilitate the collection of threats and analysis of 
risks, including the establishment of subjective judgment and determination of the required course of 
actions that needs to be taken, thereby promoting cybersecurity in critical infrastructures. The objective is 
drawn by considering the limitations associated with existing works, approaches and tools that have been 
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designed to foster risk management. Current literature efforts that identify and analyse the risks for 
organisations mainly consider the analysing risk level. There are complexities involved in the overall risk 
management process, specifically identifying and quantifying the risks. It requires a reasonable amount of 
effort for doing the activities under the risks management process. Based on the above context, Chapter 
six has successfully designed and implemented a proposed i-CSRMT (integrated Cyber Security Risk 
Management Tool) built to serve as a supporting platform that automates the i-CSRM process within 
critical infrastructure.  The tool helps to minimise the efforts required to perform the risk management 
activities and provide accurate information about the risks. Section 6.6 provided a detailed overview of 
the features supported by i-CSRMT, which are included in the central dashboards: the administrative and 
actor dashboards. 
7.2.6. Validate i-CSRM in real-life critical infrastructure sectors 
Part of objective one is fulfilled in chapter 5. Once the i-CSRM framework had been developed, it is 
important to validate it to aid an appropriate case study. A case study and a dataset in a real-life context 
were selected to evaluate the applicability and the usability of the i-CSRM framework to enhance risk 
management in critical infrastructures. The case study allowed for the assessment of the i-CSRM 
framework in great detail. The validation result supports the view that the i-CSRM framework can be 
applied in any critical infrastructure domain to measure risks effectively. The i-CSRM framework 
provides the stakeholders with substantial justification about the risk level to enhance cybersecurity and 
improve overall risk management, increasing the critical infrastructure's integrity.  
Secondly, this objective found out that the i-CSRM framework is effectively integrated into critical 
infrastructure domains. Upon applying the i-CSRM framework, this research found that the unified i-
CSRM process is understood in many ways and applied according to the critical infrastructure domain 
and its need. Thus, it seems that the i-CSRM framework can be used for assessing risk controls of high 
complexity and be customised according to the organisation's objectives. The organisation's stakeholders 
can quickly learn and use the i-CSRM framework; the only prerequisite is the basic knowledge of risk 
management and selecting the cybersecurity tier. The stakeholders who integrated the i-CSRM 
framework were satisfied with the outcome as it accelerates the decision-making process and highlights 
essential risks areas.  
7.3. Research Limitation 
• Time constraints allowed for only one organisation to be investigated in this research. Also, the 
risk monitoring activities and residual risks were not thoroughly explored due to the 
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organisation's lack of time.However, unfulfilled research activities are considered for future 
research and described in the following section.   
• Another limiting factor to be noted for this research is the empirical evaluation method that 
covered only one case-study. The evaluation part of i-CSRM enabled the researcher to collect, 
and analyses feedback from stakeholders' perception and acceptability of the proposed 
framework. The limited number of case-studies used and responses collected could potentially 
impact the research's generalisation. The findings would have been generalised if more case study 
had been covered.  
• During the implementation of the i-CSRM framework, some issues such as human error due to 
some stakeholders, misunderstanding of the procedures were unfolded. Precisely, some of the 
framework's activities, such as evaluating the effectiveness of existing controls, are carried out 
manually without automated techniques. However, the researcher's involvement curtailed this 
problem; but, it could be a potential issue when adopted. 
• The target recipients of this proposed framework are organisations of all size, especially small 
and medium-sized, the scalability and adaptability of the framework to accommodate diverse and 
changing environments like that of large organisations who have complex systems and immense 
requirements is not performed. Therefore, there is a need to apply the research to a large 
organisation's context to establish its suitability to adapt to diverse contexts.    
7.4. Further Research 
During the research process of the i-CSRM framework, some limitations and difficulties were identified. 
This research has revealed the potentials for different research directions and works in the area of risk 
management. It is essential to outline future research and how some of the limitations mentioned above 
can be addressed.  
• One of the participants' observations was that it is difficult to understand the machine learning 
algorithms for predicting the risk level and risk type. Therefore, we plan to automate the whole i-
CSRM framework process as future research. Full automation of the process will ensure that 
every activity is performed consistently and accurately and reduces human error chances. Also, it 
will provide time-saving by reducing the time and the number of personnel required to undertake 
each activity. Further, the i-CSRM process automation will improve reliability, thereby leading to 
wider acceptability amongst critical infrastructures. 
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• The evaluation of the i-CSRM framework was performed in a proportionately medium-sized 
case-study context. Nevertheless, there is a need for further validation in larger-scale situations. 
Therefore, a potential research area is adjusting and applying the proposed framework to large-
scale scenarios to test its efficacy to address critical infrastructures cybersecurity needs.  We plan 
to use the proposed framework in another case study to generalise our findings and validate the 
framework's applicability. 
• The i-CSRM framework focuses only on the supervised learning method, which requires an 
existing labelled dataset. As a part of our future research, we will apply unsupervised learning 
(clustering) to handle the zero-day attacks and use natural learning processing (NLP) for feature 
extraction. Furthermore, we would like to build an ontology of different risk events and based on 
the events' semantics, we hope to increase the accuracy of the proposed models further. 
• The analysis conducted for this research reveals that the framework continues to be updated and 
improved as it provides feedback on implementation. As the framework is put into practice, 
lessons learned will be integrated into future evaluations. This will ensure it meets critical 
infrastructure owners and operators' needs in a dynamic and challenging environment of new 
threats, risks, and solutions. In this case, there is room for more research to implement the i-
CSRM framework and update its findings  
• As seen in the evaluation of the results, the i-CSRM framework was designed to be extended to 
adapt to a dynamic environment. Such an extension can be considered in future work by 
incorporating more variables to adjust to cyber-attack scenarios.  
• As CPS are becoming more complex due to the expansion of businesses and networks, 
technologies are changing, the coverage of the i-CSRM framework may have to be customised to 
suit the Big Data environment, particularly in analysing other forms of data, examining 
correlations, and establishing predictions for the critical infrastructure.  
• Regarding time efficiency to complete the risk management task, i-CSRM is constrained by the 
complexity and size of the critical infrastructure and the number of practical control evaluations. 
Future work should more rigorously examine these consequences by creating a thorough control 
list and creating a sub-team to test the controls on each critical infrastructure aspect separately. 
7.5. Summary 
Risk management is a continuous process of maintaining the effective functioning of critical assets in any 
circumstance. The threat landscape is evolving rapidly with new techniques and more sophisticated 
attacks, and the security strategies for mitigating and eliminating these threats are not consistently 
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enough. Therefore, risk management's significance is expanding even more, every day as critical 
infrastructure is becoming more complex, and cybersecurity risks are growingly affecting critical 
infrastructures. This research proposes an i-CSRM framework that determines the impact of 
vulnerabilities on the asset and how they can cascade and result in a more significant issue if not 
addressed on time. Risk types are analysed using a predictive model influenced by the vulnerabilities 
identified, threat investigated, TTP used, and IOC of the organisation to provide accurate risk levels. The 
results of the risks management were integrated into the study context. The proposed framework is 
demonstrated using the power grid critical infrastructure. An integrated cyber-security risk management 
framework for the CPS of critical infrastructure can systematically analyse the risks and offer plans to 
control the risks to ensure business continuity.  We believe that the proposed i-CSRM framework, its 


















Aakaash, N. et al. (2021) ‘Prediction of Network Attacks Using Connection Behavior’, in Machine 
Learning for Predictive Analysis. Springer, pp. 299–312. 
Abouzakhar, N. (2013) ‘Critical infrastructure cybersecurity: A review of recent threats and violations’, in 
European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, ECCWS, pp. 1–10. 
Abu-Nimeh, S. et al. (2007) ‘A comparison of machine learning techniques for phishing detection’, in 
Proceedings of the anti-phishing working groups 2nd annual eCrime researchers summit, pp. 60–69. 
Abu, M. S. et al. (2018) ‘Cyber threat intelligence–issue and challenges’, Indonesian Journal of 
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 10(1), pp. 371–379. 
Adar, E. and Wuchner, A. (2005) ‘Risk management for critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 
challenges, best practices & tools’, in First IEEE International Workshop on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (IWCIP’05). IEEE, p. 8 pp. 
Addison, T. and Vallabh, S. (2002) ‘Controlling software project risks: an empirical study of methods 
used by experienced project managers’, in Proceedings of the 2002 annual research conference of the 
South African institute of computer scientists and information technologists on Enablement through 
technology. South African Institute for Computer Scientists and Information Technologists, pp. 128–140. 
Ahmed, N. and Abraham, A. (2015) ‘Modeling cloud computing risk assessment using machine 
learning’, in Afro-European Conference for Industrial Advancement. Springer, pp. 315–325. 
Albladi, S. M. and Weir, G. R. S. (2020) ‘Predicting individuals’ vulnerability to social engineering in 
social networks’, Cybersecurity, 3(1), pp. 1–19. 
Alcaraz, C. and Zeadallly, S. (2015) ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection: Requirements and Challenges for 
the 21st Century’, 8, pp. 5366–1. 
Alhanahnah, M. J., Jhumka, A. and Alouneh, S. (2016) ‘A multidimension taxonomy of insider threats in 
cloud computing’, The Computer Journal, 59(11), pp. 1612–1622. 
Alidoosti, A. et al. (2012) ‘Risk assessment of critical asset using fuzzy inference system’, Risk 
Management, 14(1), pp. 77–91. 
Almoghathawi, Y., González, A. D. and Barker, K. (2021) ‘Exploring Recovery Strategies for Optimal 
Interdependent Infrastructure Network Resilience’, Networks and Spatial Economics, 21(1), pp. 229–260. 
Alqahtani, H. et al. (2020) ‘Cyber intrusion detection using machine learning classification techniques’, 
in International Conference on Computing Science, Communication and Security. Springer, pp. 121–131. 
198 
 
Amaratunga, D. et al. (2002) ‘Quantitative and qualitative research in the built environment: application 
of “mixed” research approach’, Work study. 
Amin, S. M. (2011) ‘Smart grid: Overview, issues and opportunities. advances and challenges in sensing, 
modeling, simulation, optimization and control’, European Journal of Control, 17(5–6), pp. 547–567. 
Andrew, L. (2020) ‘The vulnerability of vital systems: how’critical infrastructure’became a security 
problem’, in Securing ‘the Homeland’. Routledge, pp. 17–39. 
Ani, U. P. D., He, H. (Mary) and Tiwari, A. (2017) ‘Review of cybersecurity issues in industrial critical 
infrastructure: manufacturing in perspective’, Journal of Cyber Security Technology. doi: 
10.1080/23742917.2016.1252211. 
Argaw, S. T. et al. (2020) ‘Cybersecurity of Hospitals: discussing the challenges and working towards 
mitigating the risks’, BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making, 20(1), pp. 1–10. 
Argyroudis, S. A. et al. (2020) ‘Resilience assessment framework for critical infrastructure in a multi-
hazard environment: Case study on transport assets’, Science of The Total Environment, 714, p. 136854. 
Baldoni, R. (2014) Critical infrastructure protection: threats, attacks, and counter-measures. Technical 
Report. Available online: http://www. dis. uniroma1. it/~ tenace …. 
Barnum, S. (2008) ‘Common attack pattern enumeration and classification (capec) schema description’, 
Cigital Inc, http://capec. mitre. org/documents/documentation/CAPEC_Schema_Descr iption_v1, 3. 
Barnum, S. (2012) ‘Standardizing cyber threat intelligence information with the Structured Threat 
Information eXpression (STIX)’, Mitre Corporation, 11, pp. 1–22. 
Barreno, M. et al. (2010) ‘The security of machine learning’, Machine Learning, 81(2), pp. 121–148. 
Baskerville, R. L. and Wood-Harper, A. T. (1996) ‘A critical perspective on action research as a method 
for information systems research’, Journal of information Technology, 11(3), pp. 235–246. 
Beaver, J. M., Borges-Hink, R. C. and Buckner, M. A. (2013) ‘An evaluation of machine learning 
methods to detect malicious SCADA communications’, in 2013 12th International Conference on 
Machine Learning and Applications. IEEE, pp. 54–59. 
Benbasat, I., Goldstein, D. K. and Mead, M. (1987) ‘The case research strategy in studies of information 
systems’, MIS quarterly, pp. 369–386. 
Van den Berg, J. et al. (2014) ‘On (the emergence of) cyber security science and its challenges for cyber 
security education’, in Proc. NATO STO/IST-122 symposium. 
Bialas, A. (2016a) ‘Risk management in critical infrastructure-Foundation for its sustainablework’, 
199 
 
Sustainability (Switzerland), 8(3). doi: 10.3390/su8030240. 
Bialas, A. (2016b) ‘Risk Management in Critical Infrastructure—Foundation for Its Sustainable Work’, 
Sustainability. doi: 10.3390/su8030240. 
Bilge, L., Han, Y. and Dell’Amico, M. (2017) ‘Riskteller: Predicting the risk of cyber incidents’, in 
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 
1299–1311. 
Borum, R. et al. (2015) ‘Strategic cyber intelligence’, Information & Computer Security. 
Boudreau, M.-C., Gefen, D. and Straub, D. W. (2001) ‘Validation in information systems research: A 
state-of-the-art assessment’, MIS quarterly, pp. 1–16. 
Boyson, S. (2014) ‘Cyber supply chain risk management: Revolutionizing the strategic control of critical 
IT systems’, Technovation, 34(7), pp. 342–353. 
De Bruijne, M. and Van Eeten, M. (2007) ‘Systems that should have failed: critical infrastructure 
protection in an institutionally fragmented environment’, Journal of contingencies and crisis 
management, 15(1), pp. 18–29. 
Brydon-Miller, M., Greenwood, D. and Maguire, P. (2003) ‘Why action research?’ Sage Publications. 
Burger, E. W. et al. (2014) ‘Taxonomy model for cyber threat intelligence information exchange 
technologies’, in Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Workshop on Information Sharing & Collaborative 
Security, pp. 51–60. 
Burns, R. B. (2000) ‘Introduction to research methods . Frenchs Forest’. NSW: Longman. 
Buzdugan, A. (2020) ‘Review on use of decision support systems in cyber risk management for critical 
infrastructures’. 
Byres, E. J., Franz, M. and Miller, D. (2004) ‘The use of attack trees in assessing vulnerabilities in 
SCADA systems’, in Proceedings of the international infrastructure survivability workshop. 
Caglayan, A. et al. (2012) ‘Behavioral analysis of botnets for threat intelligence’, Information systems 
and e-business management, 10(4), pp. 491–519. 
Cardenas, A. et al. (2009) ‘Challenges for securing cyber physical systems’, in Workshop on future 
directions in cyber-physical systems security. 




Cassell, C. and Symon, G. (2004) Essential guide to qualitative methods in organizational research. 
Sage. 
Castro, J., Kolp, M. and Mylopoulos, J. (2002) ‘Towards requirements-driven information systems 
engineering: the Tropos project’, Information systems, 27(6), pp. 365–389. 
Chakraverty, S., Sahoo, D. M. and Mahato, N. R. (2019) ‘Defuzzification’, in Concepts of Soft 
Computing. Springer, pp. 117–127. 
Chang, V., Kuo, Y.-H. and Ramachandran, M. (2016) ‘Cloud computing adoption framework: A security 
framework for business clouds’, Future Generation Computer Systems, 57, pp. 24–41. 
Chen, P. P.-S. (1976) ‘The entity-relationship model—toward a unified view of data’, ACM transactions 
on database systems (TODS), 1(1), pp. 9–36. 
Cherdantseva, Y. et al. (2016) ‘A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems’, 
Computers & security, 56, pp. 1–27. 
Chismon, D. and Ruks, M. (2015) ‘Threat intelligence: Collecting, analysing, evaluating’, MWR 
InfoSecurity Ltd. 
Coffey, A. and Atkinson, P. (1996) Making sense of qualitative data: Complementary research strategies. 
Sage Publications, Inc. 
Committee, R. S. (2010) ‘Department of Homeland Security’, DHS Risk Lexicon–2010 Edition. 
Connolly, J., Davidson, M. and Schmidt, C. (2014) ‘The trusted automated exchange of indicator 
information (taxii)’, The MITRE Corporation, pp. 1–20. 
Consortium, W. A. S. (2009) ‘Web application security consortium threat classification’. 
Conti, M., Dargahi, T. and Dehghantanha, A. (2018) ‘Cyber threat intelligence: challenges and 
opportunities’, in Cyber Threat Intelligence. Springer, pp. 1–6. 
Cord, O. (2001) Genetic fuzzy systems: evolutionary tuning and learning of fuzzy knowledge bases. World 
Scientific. 
Cordón, O. (2011) ‘A historical review of evolutionary learning methods for Mamdani-type fuzzy rule-
based systems: Designing interpretable genetic fuzzy systems’, International journal of approximate 
reasoning, 52(6), pp. 894–913. 
Creasey, J. and Marvell, S. (2013) ‘A complete information risk management solution For ISF members 
using IRAM and STREAM’, Managing Information Risk, pp. 1–7. 
201 
 
Creswell, J. W. and Creswell, J. D. (2017) Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches. Sage publications. 
Cybersecurity, C. I. (2014) ‘Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity’, Framework, 
1, p. 11. 
Dalziell, E. P. and McManus, S. T. (2004) ‘Resilience, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity: implications 
for system performance’. 
Das, R. and Morris, T. H. (2017) ‘Machine learning and cyber security’, in 2017 International 
Conference on Computer, Electrical & Communication Engineering (ICCECE). IEEE, pp. 1–7. 
Davis, F. D. (1989) ‘Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and user acceptance of information 
technology’, MIS quarterly, pp. 319–340. 
Denscombe, M. (2008) ‘Communities of practice: A research paradigm for the mixed methods approach’, 
Journal of mixed methods research, 2(3), pp. 270–283. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2002) The qualitative inquiry reader. Sage. 
Dittmeier, C. and Casati, P. (2014) ‘Evaluating Internal Control Systems: A Comprehensive Assessment 
Model (CAM) for Enterprise Risk Management’, Altamonte Springs, Florida: The Institute of Internal 
Auditors Research Foundation. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) ‘Building theories from case study research’, Academy of management review, 
14(4), pp. 532–550. 
Ellinas, G. et al. (2015) ‘Critical infrastructure systems: Basic principles of monitoring, control, and 
security’, in Intelligent monitoring, control, and security of critical infrastructure systems. Springer, pp. 
1–30. 
Elmaghraby, A. S. and Losavio, M. M. (2014) ‘Cyber security challenges in Smart Cities: Safety, security 
and privacy’, Journal of advanced research, 5(4), pp. 491–497. 
Enache, M. C. (2015) ‘Web Application Frameworks.’, Annals of the University Dunarea de Jos of 
Galati: Fascicle: XVII, Medicine, 21(3). 
ENISA, C. C. (2009) ‘Benefits, risks and recommendations for information security’, European Network 
and Information Security. 
Ericsson, G. N. (2010) ‘Cyber security and power system communication—essential parts of a smart grid 
infrastructure’, IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, 25(3), pp. 1501–1507. 




Ezell, B. C. (2007) ‘Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model (I‐VAM)’, Risk Analysis, 27(3), pp. 
571–583. 
Fang, X. et al. (2019) ‘A deep learning framework for predicting cyber attacks rates’, EURASIP Journal 
on Information Security, 2019(1), p. 5. 
Fekete, A. (2011) ‘Common criteria for the assessment of critical infrastructures’, International Journal 
of Disaster Risk Science, 2(1), pp. 15–24. 
Firoiu, M. (2015) ‘General considerations on risk management and information system security 
assessment according to ISO/IEC 27005: 2011 and ISO 31000: 2009 standards’, Calitatea, 16(149), p. 93. 
Fossi, M. et al. (2011) ‘Symantec internet security threat report trends for 2010’, Volume XVI. 
Fournaris, A. P., Pocero Fraile, L. and Koufopavlou, O. (2017) ‘Exploiting hardware vulnerabilities to 
attack embedded system devices: a survey of potent microarchitectural attacks’, Electronics, 6(3), p. 52. 
Gai, K. et al. (2016) ‘Dynamic energy-aware cloudlet-based mobile cloud computing model for green 
computing’, Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 59, pp. 46–54. 
Gandhi, R. et al. (2011) ‘Dimensions of cyber-attacks: Cultural, social, economic, and political’, IEEE 
Technology and Society Magazine, 30(1), pp. 28–38. 
George, P. G. and Renjith, V. R. (2021) ‘Evolution of Safety and Security Risk Assessment 
methodologies to use of Bayesian Networks in Process Industries’, Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection. 
Ghorbani, A. A. and Bagheri, E. (2008) ‘The state of the art in critical infrastructure protection: a 
framework for convergence’, International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, 4(3), pp. 215–244. 
Glass, M. K. et al. (2004) Beginning PHP, Apache, MySQL Web Development. John Wiley & Sons. 
Goodpaster, K. E. (1991) ‘Business ethics and stakeholder analysis’, Business ethics quarterly, pp. 53–73. 
GOST, R. (2009) ‘ISO/IEC 31010-2011 Risk management. Risk assessment methods’. 
Gottschalk, P. (1999) ‘Implementation of formal plans: the case of information technology strategy’, 
Long Range Planning, 32(3), pp. 362–372. 
Van Greuning, H. and Bratanovic, S. B. (2020) Analyzing banking risk: a framework for assessing 
corporate governance and risk management. World Bank Publications. 
Gupta, R. et al. (2020) ‘Machine learning models for secure data analytics: A taxonomy and threat 
203 
 
model’, Computer Communications, 153, pp. 406–440. 
de Gusmão, A. P. H. et al. (2018) ‘Cybersecurity risk analysis model using fault tree analysis and fuzzy 
decision theory’, International Journal of Information Management, 43, pp. 248–260. 
Hadeli, H. et al. (2009) ‘Leveraging determinism in industrial control systems for advanced anomaly 
detection and reliable security configuration’, in 2009 IEEE Conference on Emerging Technologies & 
Factory Automation. IEEE, pp. 1–8. 
Hahn, A. et al. (2013) ‘Cyber-physical security testbeds: Architecture, application, and evaluation for 
smart grid’, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 4(2), pp. 847–855. 
Hall, M. and Brown, L. (2001) Core web programming. Prentice Hall Professional. 
Hanus, B., Wu, Y. A. and Parrish, J. (2021) ‘Phish Me, Phish Me Not’, Journal of Computer Information 
Systems, pp. 1–11. 
Hasson, F., Keeney, S. and McKenna, H. (2000) ‘Research guidelines for the Delphi survey technique’, 
Journal of advanced nursing, 32(4), pp. 1008–1015. 
Hawk, C. and Kaushiva, A. (2014) ‘Cybersecurity and the Smarter Grid’, Electricity Journal. doi: 
10.1016/j.tej.2014.08.008. 
Hickson, I. and Hyatt, D. (2011) ‘HTML 5’, W3C Working Draft WD-html5-20110525, p. 53. 
Hink, R. C. B. et al. (2014) ‘Machine learning for power system disturbance and cyber-attack 
discrimination’, in 2014 7th International symposium on resilient control systems (ISRCS). IEEE, pp. 1–
8. 
Hudin, N. S. and Hamid, A. B. A. (2014) ‘Drivers to the implementation of risk management practices: A 
conceptual framework’, Journal of Advanced Management Science Vol, 2(3), pp. 163–169. 
Hurst, W., Merabti, M. and Fergus, P. (2014) ‘A survey of critical infrastructure security’, in 
International Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Springer, pp. 127–138. 
Husák, M. et al. (2018) ‘Survey of attack projection, prediction, and forecasting in cyber security’, IEEE 
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 21(1), pp. 640–660. 
Huyghue, B. D. (2021) ‘Cybersecurity, Internet of Things, and Risk Management for Businesses’. Utica 
College. 
Islam, S. et al. (2017) ‘A risk management framework for cloud migration decision support’, Journal of 
Risk and Financial Management, 10(2), p. 10. 
204 
 
Ivanenko, O. (2020) ‘Implementation of risk assessment for critical infrastructure protection with the use 
of risk matrix’, ScienceRise, (2), pp. 26–38. 
Izuakor, C. and White, R. (2016) ‘Critical Infrastructure Asset Identification: Policy, Methodology and 
Gap Analysis’, in Critical Infrastructure Protection X: 10th IFIP WG 11.10 International Conference, 
ICCIP 2016, Arlington, VA, USA, March 14-16, 2016, Revised Selected Papers 10. Springer, pp. 27–41. 
Jalali, M. S. and Kaiser, J. P. (2018) ‘Cybersecurity in hospitals: a systematic, organizational perspective’, 
Journal of medical Internet research, 20(5), p. e10059. 
Jasmin Harvey and Service, T. I. (2007) ‘Introduction To Managing Risk’, p. 12. 
Jenkins, B. (1998) ‘Risk Analysis helps establish a good security posture’, Risk Management keeps it that 
way, Countermeasures. Inc. 
Johnson, R. E. and Foote, B. (1988) ‘Designing reusable classes’, Journal of object-oriented 
programming, 1(2), pp. 22–35. 
Kaplan, B. and Duchon, D. (1988) ‘Combining qualitative and quantitative methods in information 
systems research: a case study’, MIS quarterly, pp. 571–586. 
Karahanna, E. and Straub, D. W. (1999) ‘The psychological origins of perceived usefulness and ease-of-
use’, Information & management, 35(4), pp. 237–250. 
Keele, S. (2007) Guidelines for performing systematic literature reviews in software engineering. 
Technical report, Ver. 2.3 EBSE Technical Report. EBSE. 
Kemabonta, T. and Kabalan, M. (2018) ‘Using What You Have, to Get What You Want–A Different 
Approach to Electricity Market Design for Local Distribution Companies (DISCOs) in Nigeria’, in 2018 
IEEE Global Humanitarian Technology Conference (GHTC). IEEE, pp. 1–2. 
Kemmis, S., McTaggart, R. and Nixon, R. (2013) The action research planner: Doing critical 
participatory action research. Springer Science & Business Media. 
Kim, K.-D. and Kumar, P. R. (2013) ‘An overview and some challenges in cyber-physical systems’, 
Journal of the Indian Institute of Science, 93(3), pp. 341–352. 
Kirillov, I. et al. (2011) ‘Malware attribute enumeration and characterization’, The MITRE Corporation 
[online, accessed Apr. 8, 2019]. 
Knight, S. and Burn, J. (2005) ‘Developing a framework for assessing information quality on the World 
Wide Web.’, Informing Science, 8. 
Kothari, C. R. (2004) Research methodology: Methods and techniques. New Age International. 
205 
 
Kotzanikolaou, P., Theoharidou, M. and Gritzalis, D. (2013) ‘Interdependencies between critical 
infrastructures: Analyzing the risk of cascading effects’, in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including 
subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). doi: 10.1007/978-
3-642-41476-3_9. 
Kozik, R. and Chora??, M. (2013) ‘Current cyber security threats and challenges in critical infrastructures 
protection’, in 2013 2nd International Conference on Informatics and Applications, ICIA 2013. doi: 
10.1109/ICoIA.2013.6650236. 
Kumar, N. et al. (2021) ‘A novel framework for risk assessment and resilience of critical infrastructure 
towards climate change’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 165, p. 120532. 
Kure, H. I. et al. (2021) ‘Asset criticality and risk prediction for an effective cybersecurity risk 
management of cyber-physical system’, Neural Computing and Applications, pp. 1–22. 
Kure, H. I. and Islam, S. (2019) ‘Assets focus risk management framework for critical infrastructure 
cybersecurity risk management’, IET Cyber‐Physical Systems: Theory & Applications, 4(4), pp. 332–340. 
Kure, H. I., Islam, S. and Razzaque, M. A. (2018) ‘An integrated cyber security risk management 
approach for a cyber-physical system’, Applied Sciences, 8(6), p. 898. 
Kure, H. and Islam, S. (2019) ‘Cyber Threat Intelligence for Improving Cybersecurity and Risk 
Management in Critical Infrastructure’, Journal of Universal Computer Science, 25(11), pp. 1478–1502. 
Lai, F. W. and A Samad, F. (2010) ‘Enterprise risk management framework and the empirical 
determinants of its implementation’. 
Lavanya, N. and Malarvizhi, T. (2008) ‘Risk analysis and management: a vital key to effective project 
management’, in. Project Management Institute. 
Leita, C. and Dacier, M. (2012) ‘Security of power grids: a European perspective’, in Cybersecurity in 
Cyber-Physical Systems Workshop. 
Leitner, P. and Cito, J. (2016) ‘Patterns in the chaos—a study of performance variation and predictability 
in public iaas clouds’, ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT), 16(3), pp. 1–23. 
Lerdorf, R., Tatroe, K. and MacIntyre, P. (2006) Programming Php. ‘ O’Reilly Media, Inc.’ 
Leroux, N. and Kaper, S. de (2014) Play for Java: Covers Play 2. Manning Publications Co. 
Levin, D. A. (2021) ‘The State of K-12 Cybersecurity: 2020 Year in Review’, K-12 Cybersecurity 
Resource Center. 
Levy-Bencheton, C. and Darra, E. (2015) ‘Cyber security and resilience of intelligent public transport: 
206 
 
good practices and recommendations’. 
Lewis, J. A. (2006) ‘Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection’. 
Lewis, S. (2015) ‘Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches’, Health 
promotion practice, 16(4), pp. 473–475. 
Lewis, T. G. (2019) Critical infrastructure protection in homeland security: defending a networked 
nation. John Wiley & Sons. 
Li, A. et al. (2010) ‘CloudCmp: comparing public cloud providers’, in Proceedings of the 10th ACM 
SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement, pp. 1–14. 
Lilly, B. et al. (2019) ‘Applying Indications and Warning Frameworks to Cyber Incidents’, in 2019 11th 
International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon). IEEE, pp. 1–21. 
Liu, Y., Sarabi, A., et al. (2015) ‘Cloudy with a chance of breach: Forecasting cyber security incidents’, 
in 24th {USENIX} Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 15), pp. 1009–1024. 
Liu, Y., Zhang, J., et al. (2015) ‘Predicting cyber security incidents using feature-based characterization 
of network-level malicious activities’, in Proceedings of the 2015 ACM International Workshop on 
International Workshop on Security and Privacy Analytics, pp. 3–9. 
Livadas, C. et al. (2006) ‘Usilng machine learning technliques to identify botnet traffic’, in Proceedings. 
2006 31st IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks. IEEE, pp. 967–974. 
Luna, J. et al. (2011) ‘A security metrics framework for the cloud’, in Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Security and Cryptography. IEEE, pp. 245–250. 
Machado, L., Filho, O. and Ribeiro, J. (2009) ‘UWE-R: an extension to a web engineering methodology 
for rich internet applications’, WSEAS Transactions on Information Science and Applications, 6(4), pp. 
601–610. 
Mackenzie, N. and Knipe, S. (2006) ‘Research dilemmas: Paradigms, methods and methodology’, Issues 
in educational research, 16(2), pp. 193–205. 
Makawana, P. R. and Jhaveri, R. H. (2018) ‘A bibliometric analysis of recent research on machine 
learning for cyber security’, in Intelligent Communication and Computational Technologies. Springer, pp. 
213–226. 
Malina, M. A., Nørreklit, H. S. O. and Selto, F. H. (2011) ‘Lessons learned: advantages and 




Marinos, L. (2016) ‘ENISA Threat Taxonomy: A tool for structuring threat information’, ENISA, 
Heraklion. 
Markowski, A. S. and Mannan, M. S. (2009) ‘Fuzzy logic for piping risk assessment (pfLOPA)’, Journal 
of loss prevention in the process industries, 22(6), pp. 921–927. 
Martin, R. A. (2007) ‘Common weakness enumeration’, Mitre Corporation. 
Mateski, M. et al. (2012) ‘Cyber threat metrics’, Sandia National Laboratories. 
Mavroeidis, V. and Bromander, S. (2017) ‘Cyber threat intelligence model: an evaluation of taxonomies, 
sharing standards, and ontologies within cyber threat intelligence’, in 2017 European Intelligence and 
Security Informatics Conference (EISIC). IEEE, pp. 91–98. 
Maxwell, J. A. (2012) Qualitative research design: An interactive approach. Sage publications. 
Mbanaso, U. M., Abrahams, L. and Apene, O. Z. (2019) ‘Conceptual Design of a Cybersecurity 
Resilience Maturity Measurement (CRMM) Framework’, African Journal of Information and 
Communication, 23, pp. 1–26. 
McNeil, A. J., Frey, R. and Embrechts, P. (2015) Quantitative risk management: concepts, techniques 
and tools-revised edition. Princeton university press. 
McQueen, M. A. et al. (2005) Quantitative Cyber Risk Reduction Estimation for a SCADA Control 
System. INL/EXT-05-00319, Idaho National Laboratory, CSSC Report, prepared for US Department of 
Homeland Security. 
McQueen, M. A. et al. (2006) ‘Time-to-compromise model for cyber risk reduction estimation’, in 
Quality of Protection. Springer, pp. 49–64. 
Mikhalevich, I. F. and Trapeznikov, V. A. (2019) ‘Critical infrastructure security: alignment of views’, in 
2019 Systems of Signals Generating and Processing in the Field of on Board Communications. IEEE, pp. 
1–5. 
Mills, G. E. (2000) Action research: A guide for the teacher researcher. ERIC. 
Moteff, J. (2005) ‘Risk management and critical infrastructure protection: Assessing, integrating, and 
managing threats, vulnerabilities and consequences’, in. DTIC Document. 
Moteff, J., Copeland, C. and Fischer, J. (2003) ‘Critical Infrastructures: What Makes an Infrastructure 
Critical?’ 
Moteff, J. and Parfomak, P. (2004) ‘Critical infrastructure and key assets: definition and identification’, 
in. DTIC Document. 
208 
 
Mouratidis, H. and Giorgini, P. (2007) ‘Secure tropos: a security-oriented extension of the tropos 
methodology’, International Journal of Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, 17(02), pp. 
285–309. 
Mrabet, H. et al. (2020) ‘A survey of IoT security based on a layered architecture of sensing and data 
analysis’, Sensors, 20(13), p. 3625. 
NERC, C. I. P. (2006) ‘Standards as Approved by the NERC Board of Trustees May 2006’. 
Neuman, W. L. (2013) Social Research Methods: Pearson New International Edition. Pearson Education 
Limited. 
Nguyen, H. T. and Franke, K. (2012) ‘Adaptive Intrusion Detection System via online machine learning’, 
in 2012 12th International Conference on Hybrid Intelligent Systems (HIS). IEEE, pp. 271–277. 
Nocco, B. W. and Stulz, R. M. (2006) ‘Enterprise risk management: Theory and practice’, Journal of 
applied corporate finance, 18(4), pp. 8–20. 
Noy, N. F. and McGuinness, D. L. (2001) ‘Ontology development 101: A guide to creating your first 
ontology’. Stanford knowledge systems laboratory technical report KSL-01-05 and …. 
O’Rourke, M. (2017) ‘Protecting Our Critical Infrastructure’, Risk Management, 64(10), pp. 3–4. 
Oates, B. J. (2005) Researching information systems and computing. Sage. 
Okutan, A., Yang, S. J. and McConky, K. (2018) ‘Forecasting cyber attacks with imbalanced data sets 
and different time granularities’, arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.09560. 
Onochie, U. P., Egware, H. O. and Eyakwanor, T. O. (2015) ‘The Nigeria electric power sector 
(opportunities and challenges)’, Journal of Multidisciplinary Engineering Science and Technology, 2(4), 
pp. 494–502. 
Organization, W. H. and Control, R. for I. T. (2008) WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic, 2008: 
the MPOWER package. World Health Organization. 
Orlikowski, W. J. and Baroudi, J. J. (1991) ‘Studying information technology in organizations: Research 
approaches and assumptions’, Information systems research, 2(1), pp. 1–28. 
Östlund, U. et al. (2011) ‘Combining qualitative and quantitative research within mixed method research 
designs: a methodological review’, International journal of nursing studies, 48(3), pp. 369–383. 
Ouedraogo, M. and Mouratidis, H. (2013) ‘Selecting a cloud service provider in the age of cybercrime’, 
Computers & Security, 38, pp. 3–13. 
209 
 
Ovelgönne, M. et al. (2017) ‘Understanding the relationship between human behavior and susceptibility 
to cyber attacks: A data-driven approach’, ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology 
(TIST), 8(4), pp. 1–25. 
Papernot, N. et al. (2016) ‘Towards the science of security and privacy in machine learning’, arXiv 
preprint arXiv:1611.03814. 
Parhizkar, T., Rafieipour, E. and Parhizkar, A. (2021) ‘Evaluation and improvement of energy 
consumption prediction models using principal component analysis based feature reduction’, Journal of 
Cleaner Production, 279, p. 123866. 
Paté‐Cornell, M. et al. (2018) ‘Cyber risk management for critical infrastructure: a risk analysis model 
and three case studies’, Risk Analysis, 38(2), pp. 226–241. 
Patel, S. C., Graham, J. H. and Ralston, P. A. S. (2008) ‘Quantitatively assessing the vulnerability of 
critical information systems: A new method for evaluating security enhancements’, International Journal 
of Information Management, 28(6), pp. 483–491. 
Pauley, W. (2010) ‘Cloud provider transparency: An empirical evaluation’, IEEE Security & Privacy, 
8(6), pp. 32–39. 
Piggin, R. S. H. (2013) ‘Development of industrial cyber security standards: IEC 62443 for SCADA and 
Industrial Control System security’, in IET Conference on Control and Automation 2013: Uniting 
Problems and Solutions. IET, pp. 1–6. 
Posch, P. N. and Nguyen, T. (2012) ‘Risikoidentifikation und Risikoinstrumente im 
Rohstoffmanagement’, Controlling & Management, 56(2), pp. 52–57. 
Purdy, G. (2010) ‘ISO 31000: 2009—setting a new standard for risk management’, Risk analysis, 30(6), 
pp. 881–886. 
Pyle, D. H. (1999) ‘Bank risk management: theory’, in Risk Management and Regulation in Banking. 
Springer, pp. 7–14. 
Rinaldi, S. M., Peerenboom, J. P. and Kelly, T. K. (2001) ‘Identifying, understanding, and analyzing 
critical infrastructure interdependencies’, IEEE Control Systems, 21(6), pp. 11–25. 
Runeson, P. and Höst, M. (2009) ‘Guidelines for conducting and reporting case study research in software 
engineering’, Empirical software engineering, 14(2), p. 131. 
Sahoo, D., Liu, C. and Hoi, S. C. H. (2017) ‘Malicious URL detection using machine learning: A survey’, 
arXiv preprint arXiv:1701.07179. 
210 
 
Saint-Germain, R. (2005) ‘Information security management best practice based on ISO/IEC 17799’, 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT JOURNAL-PRAIRIE VILLAGE-, 39(4), p. 60. 
Salman, T. et al. (2017) ‘Machine learning for anomaly detection and categorization in multi-cloud 
environments’, in 2017 IEEE 4th International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing 
(CSCloud). IEEE, pp. 97–103. 
Sapori, E., Sciutto, M. and Sciutto, G. (2014) ‘A Quantitative Approach to Risk Management in Critical 
Infrastructures’, Transportation Research Procedia, 3, pp. 740–749. 
Sapori E, Sciutto M and Sciutto G (2014) ‘ScienceDirect A quantitative approach to risk management in 
Critical Infrastructures’, Transportation Research Procedia, 3(3), pp. 740–749. doi: 
10.1016/j.trpro.2014.10.053. 
Sasaki, R. (2020) ‘A Risk Assessment Method for IoT Systems Using Maintainability, Safety, and 
Security Matrixes’, in Information Science and Applications. Springer, pp. 363–374. 
Sauerwein, C., Sillaber, C. and Breu, R. (2018) ‘Shadow cyber threat intelligence and its use in 
information security and risk management processes’, Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik (MKWI 
2018), pp. 1333–1344. 
Schauer, S. (2015) ‘Novel Approaches To Risk And Security Management For Utility Providers And 
Critical Infrastructures’. 
Sebastiani, F. (2002) ‘Machine learning in automated text categorization’, ACM computing surveys 
(CSUR), 34(1), pp. 1–47. 
Selby, R. W. (2007) Software engineering: Barry W. Boehm’s lifetime contributions to software 
development, management, and research. John Wiley & Sons. 
Shackel, B. (2009) ‘Usability–Context, framework, definition, design and evaluation’, Interacting with 
computers, 21(5–6), pp. 339–346. 
Shehod, A. (2016) ‘Ukraine Power Grid Cyberattack and US Susceptibility: Cybersecurity Implications 
of Smart Grid Advancements in the US’. Cybersecurity Interdisciplinary Systems Laboratory (CILL), 
Massachusetts …. 
Shen, L. (2014) ‘The NIST cybersecurity framework: Overview and potential impacts’, Scitech Lawyer, 
10(4), p. 16. 
Siang, L. C. and Ali, A. S. (2012) ‘Implementation of risk management in the Malaysian construction 
industry’, Journal of Surveying, Construction and Property, 3(1). 
211 
 
Silverman, D. (2016) Qualitative research. sage. 
Singh, B. and Ghatala, M. H. (2012) ‘Risk management in hospitals’, International journal of innovation, 
management and technology, 3(4), p. 417. 
Singh, S. K. et al. (2020) ‘Machine Learning-Based Network Sub-Slicing Framework in a Sustainable 5G 
Environment’, Sustainability, 12(15), p. 6250. 
Sridhar, S., Hahn, A. and Govindarasu, M. (2012a) ‘Cyber-physical system security for the electric power 
grid’, Proceedings of the IEEE. doi: 10.1109/JPROC.2011.2165269. 
Sridhar, S., Hahn, A. and Govindarasu, M. (2012b) ‘Cyber–physical system security for the electric 
power grid’, Proceedings of the IEEE, 100(1), pp. 210–224. 
Stoneburner, G., Goguen, A. Y. and Feringa, A. (2002) ‘Sp 800-30. risk management guide for 
information technology systems’. 
Straub, D., Boudreau, M.-C. and Gefen, D. (2004) ‘Validation guidelines for IS positivist research’, 
Communications of the Association for Information systems, 13(1), p. 24. 
Strom, B. E. et al. (2017) ‘Finding cyber threats with ATT&CK-based analytics’, The MITRE 
Corporation, Bedford, MA, Technical Report No. MTR170202. 
Sun, C.-C., Hahn, A. and Liu, C.-C. (2018) ‘Cyber security of a power grid: State-of-the-art’, 
International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 99, pp. 45–56. 
Sun, N. et al. (2018) ‘Data-driven cybersecurity incident prediction: A survey’, IEEE Communications 
Surveys & Tutorials, 21(2), pp. 1744–1772. 
Tactic, A. (2017) ‘Techniques and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK)’. 
Tanwar, S. et al. (2019) ‘Machine learning adoption in blockchain-based smart applications: The 
challenges, and a way forward’, IEEE Access, 8, pp. 474–488. 
Taylor, J. M. and Sharif, H. R. (2017) ‘Security challenges and methods for protecting critical 
infrastructure cyber-physical systems’, in Selected Topics in Mobile and Wireless Networking (MoWNeT), 
2017 International Conference on. IEEE, pp. 1–6. 
Ten, C. W., Manimaran, G. and Liu, C. C. (2010) ‘Cybersecurity for critical infrastructures: Attack and 
defense modeling’, in IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Part A:Systems and 
Humans. doi: 10.1109/TSMCA.2010.2048028. 
Theocharidou, M. and Giannopoulos, G. (2015) Risk assessment methodologies for critical infrastructure 
protection. Part II: A new approach. tech. report EUR 27332 EN, EU Joint Research Centre. 
212 
 
Thong, J. Y. L. (1999) ‘An integrated model of information systems adoption in small businesses’, 
Journal of management information systems, 15(4), pp. 187–214. 
Tolubko, V. et al. (2018) ‘Method for determination of cyber threats based on machine learning for real-
time information system’, International Journal of Intelligent Systems and Applications, 10(8), p. 11. 
Tounsi, W. and Rais, H. (2018) ‘A survey on technical threat intelligence in the age of sophisticated cyber 
attacks’, Computers & security, 72, pp. 212–233. 
Trigaux, C. et al. (2021) ‘SARS-CoV-2: impact on, risk assessment and countermeasures in German Eye 
Banks’, Current Eye Research, 46(5), pp. 666–671. 
Turner, J. R. and Danks, S. (2014) ‘Case study research: A valuable learning tool for performance 
improvement professionals’, Performance Improvement, 53(4), pp. 24–31. 
Tweneboah-Koduah, S. and Buchanan, W. J. (2018) ‘Security risk assessment of critical infrastructure 
systems: A comparative study’, The Computer Journal, 61(9), pp. 1389–1406. 
Tymchuk, O., Iepik, M. and Sivyakov, A. (2017) ‘Information security risk assessment model based on 
computing with words’, in MENDEL, pp. 119–124. 
Varshney, K. R. and Alemzadeh, H. (2017) ‘On the safety of machine learning: Cyber-physical systems, 
decision sciences, and data products’, Big data, 5(3), pp. 246–255. 
Veeramachaneni, K. et al. (2016) ‘AI^ 2: training a big data machine to defend’, in 2016 IEEE 2nd 
International Conference on Big Data Security on Cloud (BigDataSecurity), IEEE International 
Conference on High Performance and Smart Computing (HPSC), and IEEE International Conference on 
Intelligent Data and Security (IDS). IEEE, pp. 49–54. 
Venkatesh, V. et al. (2003) ‘User acceptance of information technology: Toward a unified view’, MIS 
quarterly, pp. 425–478. 
Virtualization, N. F. (2013) ‘European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)’, Industry 
Specification Group (ISG). 
Walsham, G. (1995) ‘Interpretive case studies in IS research: nature and method’, European Journal of 
information systems, 4(2), pp. 74–81. 
Wang, S., Zhang, J. and Gan, L. (2016) ‘Vulnerability analysis and critical components identification of 
Power Networks under cascading failures’, in Control Conference (CCC), 2016 35th Chinese. IEEE, pp. 
6570–6574. 
Warkentin, M. et al. (2009) ‘Analysis of systems development project risks: An integrative framework’, 
213 
 
ACM SIGMIS Database, 40(2), pp. 8–27. 
Wichers, D. (2013) ‘Owasp top-10 2013’, OWASP Foundation, February. 
Widup, S. (2013) ‘The veris community database’. 
Workman, M., Bommer, W. H. and Straub, D. (2008) ‘Security lapses and the omission of information 
security measures: A threat control model and empirical test’, Computers in human behavior, 24(6), pp. 
2799–2816. 
Wu, W., Kang, R. and Li, Z. (2015) ‘Risk assessment method for cyber security of cyber physical 
systems’, in Reliability Systems Engineering (ICRSE), 2015 First International Conference on. IEEE, pp. 
1–5. 
Xiong, W. et al. (2021) ‘Cyber security threat modeling based on the MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK 
Matrix’, Software and Systems Modeling, pp. 1–21. 
Xu, J. et al. (2020) ‘Seismic risk evaluation for a planning mountain tunnel using improved analytical 
hierarchy process based on extension theory’, Journal of Mountain Science, 17(1), pp. 244–260. 
Xu, M. et al. (2018) ‘Modeling and predicting cyber hacking breaches’, IEEE Transactions on 
Information Forensics and Security, 13(11), pp. 2856–2871. 
Xu, M., Hua, L. and Xu, S. (2017) ‘A vine copula model for predicting the effectiveness of cyber defense 
early-warning’, Technometrics, 59(4), pp. 508–520. 
Yaacoub, J.-P. A. et al. (2020) ‘Cyber-physical systems security: Limitations, issues and future trends’, 
Microprocessors and Microsystems, 77, p. 103201. 
Yadav, D. and Mahajan, A. R. (2015) ‘Smart grid cyber security and risk assessment: an overview’, Int. J. 
Sci. Eng. Technol. Res, 4, pp. 3078–3085. 
Yan, Y. et al. (2012) ‘A survey on cyber security for smart grid communications’, IEEE Communications 
Surveys and Tutorials. doi: 10.1109/SURV.2012.010912.00035. 
Yang, Y. et al. (2013) ‘Intrusion detection system for network security in synchrophasor systems’. 
Yavanoglu, O. and Aydos, M. (2017) ‘A review on cyber security datasets for machine learning 
algorithms’, in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data). IEEE, pp. 2186–2193. 
Yavneh, A., Lothan, R. and Yamin, D. (2021) ‘Co-similar malware infection patterns as a predictor of 
future risk’, PloS one, 16(3), p. e0249273. 
Yin, R. K. (2009) ‘Case study research: Design and methods 4th edition’, in United States: Library of 
214 
 
Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data. 
Yoneda, S. et al. (2015) ‘Risk assessment in cyber-physical system in office environment’, in 
Proceedings - 2015 18th International Conference on Network-Based Information Systems, NBiS 2015. 
doi: 10.1109/NBiS.2015.63. 
Zachman, J. A. (1987) ‘A framework for information systems architecture’, IBM systems journal, 26(3), 
pp. 276–292. 
Zadeh, L. A. (1988) ‘Fuzzy logic’, Computer, 21(4), pp. 83–93. 
Zimmermann, H.-J. (2011) Fuzzy set theory—and its applications. Springer Science & Business Media. 
Zografopoulos, I. et al. (2021) ‘Cyber-physical energy systems security: Threat modeling, risk 
assessment, resources, metrics, and case studies’, IEEE Access, 9, pp. 29775–29818. 
Županović, I. (2014) ‘Sustainable Risk Management in the Banking Sector’, Journal of Central Banking 












Appendix A: Questionnaire Evaluation for Framework Evaluation 
Acceptability Ratings for the Proposed Framework 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect your feedback about the proposed “An Integrated Cyber 
Security Risk Management Framework for Critical Infrastructure Protection”, which is aimed at 
supporting your organisation in achieving and enhancing risk management. Your feedback is critical in 
establishing the validity of the proposed Framework and areas of improvement. Kindly respond to the 
questions that follow by “checking” one of the boxes where appropriate. The questions are designed and 
evaluated according to criterion as:  
1. Ease of use: inquiries whether the Framework is designed so that users can easily use it.   
2. Relevance: determines whether the Framework is relevant in terms of feasibility for supporting 
your organisation achieve cybersecurity risk management.  
3. Usefulness: whether the Framework will be very useful in helping the organisation achieve 
cybersecurity risk management.  
4. Flexibility and dynamics: whether the Framework is dynamic enough to cover and deal with 
larger contexts and scenarios.   
5. Compliance with security standards and best practices: attempts to establish whether the 
Framework complies with industry standards such as ISO27001 and NIST  
6. Trustworthiness: inquiries whether the Framework is trustworthy in ensuring privacy and 
security and preventing future cybersecurity issues.  
Thank you for your cooperation.  
S/N Evaluation 
Criteria 






1.  Ease of Use Do you agree that i-CSRM 
Framework and i-CSRMT is clear 
and easily understandable to intended 
users? 
    
       
2.  Relevance Do you agree that the proposed 
Framework is relevant for supporting 
organisations to achieve 
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cybersecurity risk management? 
       
3.  Usefulness Do you agree that the proposed 
Framework is helpful in terms of the 
expected deliverables? 
    
       
4.  Flexibility Do you agree that the proposed 
Framework is flexible to adapt to 
dynamic and complex contexts? 
    
       




Does the Framework comply with 
relevant laws, standards and best 
practices? 
    
       
6.  Trustworthiness Do you consider the proposed 
Framework to be trustworthy in 
ensuring cybersecurity risk 
management? 
















Results of the Training Set 
The accuracy results of different classifiers for the various kinds of input features are explained here. The 
most prominent features to detect the risk type are Assets and Controls where accuracy is above 70%. 
From left to right (top to bottom), the X-axis denotes different classifiers and Y-axis denotes the 
corresponding accuracy for a given feature set. It can be seen from the descriptive result is based on the 
asset features KNN, NB Multi, RF and DT have produced the most accurate predictions by giving the 
accuracy value of above 70% compared to NB and NN classifiers. The graph’s predictive results for 
control features indicate that DT produced the maximum accuracy with a value of 79% compared to other 
classifiers. Therefore, DT for Control features is the best predictive classifier. The different algorithms 
were used to determine the predictive accuracy for Threat Actor features. DT, RF, KNN and NB Multi 
produced maximum accuracy, however, DT and NB Multi produced the most accuracy (61%).Further, 
and we checked the performance of the different algorithms under the TTP features. DT, RF, KNN and 
NB Multi produced good accuracy but DT outperformed other algorithms with 62%. NN and NB 
algorithms did not give us excellent results. Lastly, the Full feature result in the graph below shows all the 
classifiers produced accuracy of 39% and less. The result shows that Full features did not perform well on 
all the classifiers. Therefore, we can conclude that the best algorithm that performed well on all the input 
















Result of the Confusion Matrix for the best classifier (DT). 
 
 













Snippets of the Jaro-Wrinkler Similarity code 
 






















Table E1 displays the asset inventory showing the critical level for each asset.  





Asset Goals Asset Criticality  
C I A CON ACC Low Medium High Very High 
           
           
           
 
Threat Profile  
Table E2 displays the threat profile showing the output of the threat modelling activity used as an input 
for the risk assessment activity.  
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Table E2: Threat Profile 


























          
          
          




Table E3 displays the list of the different controls types.  
Table E3: Control Types 




Risk Control Profile  
Table E4 displays the control type together with its calculated overall control effectiveness value.  
Table E4: Risk Control Profile 
Control Type Control Description Criteria Overall Control 
Effectiveness S R C I T 
        
        
        
 
Risk Status profile  
Table E5 displays the new risk status after controls has been implemented.  
Table E5: Risk status 
Risk Type Risk Impact 
Level  
Control measures Implemented Risk Status  
None  Partial Full  
      
      
      
      
 
 
Risk Register  
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Table E6 presents the risk register with the list of the risk types, existing control measures and the risk 
impact level. 
Table E6: Risk Register 
Risk Name Risk Likelihood Risk Impact on 
Security goals  
Control Measures Risk Value 
Low Med High Low Med High None Partial  Full 
           
           
 
 
 
 
